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Introduction
Uncertainty is a feature of many economic decision problems, processes and situations
of economic interaction. Through research and learning agents reduce this uncertainty
and thereby create informational externalities to others. For example, consumers trying a
new product (for example, a new movie or electronic device) or a novel service share their
experiences with friends and acquaintances, and even with strangers through customer
reviews in the internet. A recommendation by a friend, say for a movie, reduces the
uncertainty about the quality of the movie, as this friend’s opinion provides a signal about
the movie’s quality. In this way the experience of others influences our opinions and
consequently our decisions. Another example in which informational externalities play
an important role is research or innovation. Firms invest in R&D in the search of new
technologies. However, inventions of one firm often reveal information or knowledge to
other (possibly competing) firms that have been acquired by the inventor in a lengthy
and expensive process. Without proper protection of its intellectual property firms may
find their invention copied and possibly improved shortly after releasing the original
innovation, because of the informational externalities created by their discovery.
Economic agents that interact strategically take into account the informational ex-
ternalities created by themselves and others when deciding which products to buy or
whether to invest in R&D. Models of strategic experimentation are a useful tool to study
and analyze strategic interaction with uncertainty and informational externalities. The
idea of these models is that agents can invest money or effort into a risky project (often
referred to as the risky arm of a multi-armed bandit machine), where ex ante it is not clear
whether the payoff from the risky alternative is higher than the payoff from investing into
a safe alternative with known return. By trying out the risky alternative repeatedly (that
is, by experimenting) agents learn about its quality from observing the outcomes of their
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own actions, but also from observing the outcomes of others’ actions. In a situation where
agents can observe each others experimentation decisions and outcomes, a public good
problem arises and agents have an incentive to free-ride on the experimentation effort of
others.
The first models of strategic experimentation were introduced in Bolton and Harris
(1999) and Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005). In the first, the payoff generating process fol-
lows a Brownian motion with drift. Additional to the free-riding effect an encouragement
effect arises, which means that the experimentation of one agent motivates other agents
to experiment. In Keller et al. (2005) agents face an exponential bandit machine in which
the first high payoff realization reveals that the risky alternative is good. These two pa-
pers laid the foundation for a growing body of literature on strategic experimentation
and particularly the exponential bandit framework has been modified and studied in dif-
ferent settings. A more detailed discussion of the related literature can be found in the
corresponding chapters of the thesis.
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of uncertainty, learning
and informational externalities in strategic interaction. To be more precise, the follow-
ing questions are answered: How are the incentives of strategic agents to invest in risky
and innovative activities affected by the monitoring protocol and monitoring imperfec-
tions? In particular, under which conditions does a fast and perfect diffusion of informa-
tion maximize welfare and when can monitoring imperfections or incomplete interaction
structures be beneficial? Different monitoring structures can be represented in the form of
social or economic networks. Comparing different network structures shows how experi-
mentation effort is influenced by a delay in information transmission or who experiments
and who free-rides in a given network. From this analysis suggestions can be derived
on how to structure teams, how to organize information flows in multinational corpora-
tions and when a fast diffusion of information is beneficial for society. Moreover, I study
monitoring imperfections stemming from intransparencies (or uncertainties) in the patent
system and show how these intransparencies affect the incentives of firms to invest in in-
novative activities. The Federal Trade Commission (2011) emphasizes the importance of
a clear patent notice to attain efficiency. However, before implementing policies to in-
crease transparency, it is important to understand the links between intransparencies in
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the patent system and R&D investment to be able to assess the consequences of such
policies.
Besides monitoring imperfections and different monitoring structures, I analyze how
informational externalities interact with different types of payoff externalities - not only
within one line of research or sector but also across sectors. The decision of firms in which
research lines to invest depends on inter- and intrasectoral R&D spillovers as well as on
intellectual property rights and competition. Understanding how informational external-
ities interact with different levels of inter- and intrasectoral spillovers can tell us how to
design intellectual property rights to encourage firms to choose a line of research that is
beneficial for society.
To answer these questions I study variants of the exponential bandit model, which
was introduced by Keller et al. (2005). This modeling framework is particularly suitable
to model fundamental research, where researchers spend considerable time and effort to
tackle unsolved problems that might not have a solution and even if a solution exists, it is
highly uncertain when it will be discovered. Yet, also other situations feature these types
of uncertainty, as e.g., farmers experimenting with a new type of crop or fertilizer where
it is unclear whether output can be increased by changing to the new technology. In the
first two chapters, I study a discrete time version of the exponential bandit model similar
to Heidhues, Rady and Strack (2015). In Chapter 1, I consider a team problem in which
one discovery has perfect positive spillovers and study how different network structures
affect the incentives of agents to experiment. In Chapter 2, I analyze the impact of inter-
and intrasectoral R&D spillovers on the decision of competing firms in which research
lines to invest. Finally, in Chapter 3, I investigate a stopping game in continuous time in
which heterogeneous (competing) firms invest in R&D and intransparencies in the patent
system affect R&D investment.
The first chapter of the thesis analyzes a dynamic model of rational strategic learning
in a network. It complements existing literature on learning in networks by providing
a detailed picture of the short-run learning dynamics. Agents are located on the nodes
of a social network and can observe the actions and outcomes of their direct neighbors
immediately, while information generated by agents more far away in the network trav-
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els along the links in the network with delay. The complete network, the ring and the
star network are compared in terms of their experimentation intensities in equilibrium.
The delay in information transmission caused by incomplete network structures induces
players to increase own experimentation efforts. As a consequence the complete network
can fail to be optimal even if there are no costs for links. This means that in the design
of networks there exists a trade-off between the speed of learning and accuracy. Further-
more, the combination of delay and specialization, where only some agents exert effort,
can be beneficial for society.
The second chapter analyzes R&D investment with inter- and intrasectoral R&D spill-
overs, in which the profitability of an invention in one sector increases if there is an in-
novation in another sector. In the selection of research lines firms face a trade-off; joint
research in the same sector increases the probability of an invention, while working in
different sectors increases profits in case of two complementary discoveries. Interpreting
intrasectoral R&D spillovers as a measure of intellectual property rights I characterize in-
tellectual property rights for which firms select optimally between research lines. In the
presence of intersectoral R&D spillovers imitating an invention in the sector benefiting
from the spillover is facilitated.
In the third chapter, I analyze how monitoring imperfections in the form of intrans-
parencies in the patent system affect R&D investment. Two firms invest in research of
uncertain quality and file an application at the patent office upon an invention. In an
intransparent patent system the scope as well as the content of a patent can be unclear. If
the patent race is a winner-takes-all competition, the R&D investment of the weaker firm
increases in the level of transparency, while the stronger firm’s investment only increases
if the difference in the firms’ R&D productivities is not too severe. In the presence of pos-
itive R&D spillovers, R&D investment is non-monotonic in the level of transparency and
maximal under full intransparency. An optimal information disclosure policy enables
firms to assess whether a new discovery leads to a patent. The risk of litigation or diffi-
culties in identifying relevant patents, however, increase the likelihood that firms invest
in R&D. Thus, full transparency is not necessarily optimal provided that the costs of R&D
are sufficiently low.
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To sum up, in the presence of informational externalities, the incentives of strategic
agents to invest in innovative and risky activities are affected by different monitoring
structures and monitoring imperfections. A fast and perfect information transmission is
not certainly optimal due to the strong incentives of firms to free-ride on the experimenta-
tion efforts of others. Incomplete interaction structures or monitoring imperfections such
as uncertainties in the patent system can encourage firms to invest in R&D and thereby
increase welfare.
The proofs to each chapter can be found in the corresponding sections of the Ap-
pendix. All references are collected in the end of the thesis.
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Chapter 1
Learning faster or more precisely?
Strategic experimentation in networks
“Some people will never learn anything, for this reason, because they understand everything too
soon." Alexander Pope
1.1 Introduction
The experience of others plays an important role when individuals have to take decisions
about alternatives that they cannot perfectly evaluate themselves. This is the case if pay-
offs associated with one or more alternatives are uncertain. For example, when it comes
to the adoption of new technologies it can be ex ante difficult to evaluate whether a new
technology will be superior to the status quo. In such situations a person will base his
or her decision on own past experiences, ask friends and coworkers about their opinions,
and additionally collect information via other sources as for instance, customer reviews
on the internet. One way to model learning situations where people have to take deci-
sions under uncertainty is by so called bandit models (see e.g., Bolton & Harris, 1999 or
Keller, Rady and Cripps, 2005 [KRC, hereafter]). The idea of these models is that play-
ers have to choose between different options (different arms of a bandit machine) under
imperfect knowledge of their relative advantage, that is, the outcomes of the arms are un-
certain. By playing repeatedly, the agents can learn about the type of the arm, however,
this learning or experimentation is costly as future payoffs are discounted. Such bandit
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models can provide a framework to discuss different (economic) situations as for example
specific problems of product choice, technology adoption, research or innovation.
So far, most models of strategic experimentation assume that agents interact with ev-
eryone else in society. That is, each agent can observe or communicate with all other
individuals and as actions and payoffs are publicly observable, a common belief about
the state of the world prevails. We relax this assumption by letting agents interact di-
rectly only with a subset of agents that is determined by the structure of connections in
a social network. This extension of the model is thought to better reflect interaction pat-
terns in reality, where without doubt the structure of relationships in shaping beliefs and
opinions plays an important role. Empirical work in economics highlights the impact of
network structures in labor markets (e.g., regarding information about job vacancies, see
Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004) or finds evidence of the importance of interaction
patterns in learning about a new technology (see e.g., Conley and Udry, 2010). In general,
learning and innovation are influenced by the structures of information exchange be-
tween different sources. For example, in the field of research, workshops and conferences
bring together researchers from dispersed geographical regions and different fields of
specialization to enable exchange of ideas. Similarly, innovation plays an important role
for firms to secure competitiveness, and the structure of information exchange between
subsidiaries of multinational organizations might be a key to success. For example, Nobel
and Birkinshaw (1998) analyze communication patterns between subsidiaries of multina-
tional corporations and find that innovation is associated with comparatively high levels
of communication within the firm and outside. Teece (1994) emphasizes the importance
of organizational structures that enable an easy flow of communication between business
units and guarantee a high speed of learning.
The aim of our model is to provide insight into how the structure of relations influ-
ences the evolution of beliefs, decisions and incentives of rational agents who need to
acquire information. More precisely, we consider a dynamic model of strategic learning
in which individuals can generate own information through experimentation and learn
about the experimentation of others. The information generated by other agents diffuses
along the links of a social network and only information generated by direct neighbors
can be observed immediately. The model is built on a discrete time version of the expo-
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nential bandit model by KRC as in Heidhues, Rady and Strack (2015) [HRS hereafter].
Agents can choose between a safe and a risky option. The payoff of the risky option
depends on an unknown state of the world which is either good or bad for all players.
A good risky option generates high payoffs with positive probability, while a bad risky
option never generates a high payoff. Thus, it is not clear whether a high payoff can
be obtained and if so when it will occur. These two types of uncertainties are common
features of research and innovation. Examples include pharmaceutical firms working on
the development of a new drug, mathematicians tackling a Millennium Prize Problem, or
farmers experimenting with a new fertilizer as in Conley and Udry (2010). Agents decide
between the two options based on their belief, i.e., the probability attached to the good
state of the world and their beliefs depend on their observations and hence the interaction
structure. This interaction structure will be fixed and imposed on the agents before the
game starts.
First, we characterize symmetric equilibria in Markovian strategies in three different
network structures, the complete network, the ring and the star network. Further, ex-
perimentation intensities in equilibrium are compared across these structures. In a net-
work structure in which agents learn from unobserved players (neighbors of neighbors)
with a delay, players increase their experimentation intensity or effort to compensate for
the worse possibility to learn from others. Depending on the structure and the belief,
agents are able to fully outweigh this loss and thereby keep expected utilities unaltered
compared to interaction in a complete network. The agents’ strategies depend on their
beliefs and there exists an upper cut-off belief above which agents experiment with full
intensity and a lower cut-off below which experimentation ceases. These cut-off beliefs
depend on the network structure and take into account whether agents still expect infor-
mation that was generated by unobserved individuals to arrive. Specialization, where
only some players experiment, arises in networks where agents are not symmetric with
respect to their position, as in the star network. As part of a welfare comparison, we ob-
serve a trade-off between interaction structures that enable fast learning and structures
in which learning is more precise, or put differently between delay and free-riding. How
this trade-off is resolved depends on the discount factor. Additionally to the trade-off
between delay and free-riding, we show that also specialization, which occurs naturally
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in the star network, motivates agents to exert higher effort. For pessimistic beliefs welfare
in the star network is strictly higher than in the ring or complete network because of a
combination of delay and specialization.
The chapter contributes to the theory of rational strategic learning in networks and
aims to fill the gap between static models and dynamic models that focus on long-run
results and conditions for complete learning. Due to the complexity that network set-
tings can create, attention was often restricted to the behavior of myopic or boundedly
rational agents to ensure tractability.1 In a recent contribution Sadler (2014) analyzes a
strategic experimentation problem as in Bolton and Harris (1999) in a network setting
with boundedly rational agents. In the field of rational learning, there are several exam-
ples of Bayesian learning models focusing on asymptotic long-run results and conditions
for complete learning or convergence of actions or payoffs (see e.g., Gale and Kariv, 2003,
Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille, 2009, Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2011, Acemoglu, Bimpikis
and Ozdaglar, 2014, Arieli and Mueller-Frank, 2015 and Mossel, Sly and Tamuz, 2015).
These results, however, offer little insight into how social relations shape incentives in
early stages of the learning process and how this influences expected payoffs.
One closely related paper is Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) [BK hereafter] who inves-
tigate a public goods game in a network in a static framework. The authors show that
networks can lead to specialization and that this specialization can have welfare bene-
fits, features that are confirmed within our framework. The main difference between the
model of BK and our model is that BK consider a static setting. As learning, innovation
and research have a dynamic character, a dynamic perspective might be better suited
to analyze these processes. Such a perspective yields additional insights concerning the
updating rules agents use, the effects of different beliefs within a society that are a conse-
quence of asymmetric positions, and the impact of network structures on the speed and
accuracy of learning.
Besides the literature on learning in networks the chapter relates to the growing lit-
erature on strategic experimentation. In strategic experimentation models where agents
1See e.g. Jackson (2008), Chapter 8 or Goyal (2009), Chapter 5 for different types of learning models in a
network setting.
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can observe the outcomes and actions of others, strong incentives to free-ride on the ex-
perimentation effort of others prevent the socially optimal outcome (see e.g., Bolton and
Harris, 1999, KRC or HRS). Bonatti and Hörner (2011) show that when actions are private
agents do not only experiment too little, but also too late. If actions can be observed but
payoffs are private free-riding can be ameliorated when agents have access to cheap talk
communication (see HRS). Bimpikis and Drakopoulos (2014) show that (full) efficiency
can be obtained in the model of KRC if information is aggregated and released with an
optimal delay. An incomplete network structure also causes time lags in the information
transmission that can increase experimentation efforts and mitigate free-riding. Addi-
tionally to the trade-off between delay and free-riding that is also present in Bimpikis
and Drakopoulus (2014) we show that in asymmetric network structures as the star net-
work specialization arises in equilibrium. Furthermore, the combination of delay and
specialization can be beneficial for society.
The contribution of the chapter is twofold. First, we introduce delay into a model
of rational (and farsighted) learning in networks. Thereby we are able to highlight the
importance of the trade-off between delay and free-riding for social learning when the
delay is determined by the interaction structure. Second, by adding a network structure
to a game of strategic experimentation we show how equilibrium experimentation varies
with the interaction structure. As a consequence of asymmetric positions in the network
specialization can arise in equilibrium.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 introduces the basic model. In Section
1.3 the complete network is analyzed to set up a benchmark case for future comparison.
Section 1.4 analyzes a simple incomplete interaction structure, namely a ring, to see how
spatial structures change the problem at hand. In Section 1.5, the star network as the
simplest irregular network is considered. A welfare analysis is conducted in Section 1.6.
Section 1.7 contains a discussion and conclusion. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
1.2 Model
First, we describe the underlying bandit model. After that, main concepts of the network
structure are outlined and the timing and information structure are specified. With the
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help of a short example we briefly show how a network structure affects updating rules.
Finally, strategies as well as the equilibrium concept are discussed.
1.2.1 A two-armed bandit model
The model is based on the two-armed exponential bandit model as described by KRC or
more specifically the discrete time version thereof by HRS. There are agents i ∈ N and we
denote the cardinality of N by n. Time is discrete and players discount future payoffs by
a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
Players can experiment with an uncertain technology. To be more precise, in each time
period t = 1, ..., T each agent is endowed with one unit of a perfectly divisible resource
(e.g., effort or money) that can be allocated between a risky and safe technology (which
correspond to the risky and the safe arm of two-armed bandit machine). Let φi,t ∈ [0, 1]
denote the fraction of the unit resource that is allocated to the risky arm and 1 − φi,t is
allocated to the safe arm. Subsequently we will refer to φi,t as experimentation effort or
experimentation intensity, however, φi,t can be also interpreted as R&D investment.
The safe arm yields a fixed deterministic payoff normalized to 0. The risky arm (de-
noted by R) yields an uncertain reward Xi,t ∈ {0, XH} with XH > 0. The distribution of
the risky payoffs is independent across players and time and only depends on the state
of the world, which is either good (θ = 1) or bad (θ = 0) for all players. In the bad state of
the world the probability of obtaining a high payoff XH is zero. If the state of the world
is good, R yields a high payoff XH with positive probability. This probability is propor-
tional to the level of effort invested and given by φi,tpi, where pi > 0. Consequently, the
first high payoff realization (also called a breakthrough) perfectly reveals that the risky
arm is good. Further, investing into the risky arm is costly and costs are proportional
to effort invested. That is, an agent choosing effort level φi,t pays costs of φi,tc at time t
where c > 0. Thus, φi,t is a pure action that on the one hand determines the costs an agent
has to pay for experimenting with the risky technology and on the other hand scales the
probability of success.
In any given time period the expected risky payoff conditional on the state of the
world equals −φi,tc if the state is bad and φi,tpiXH − φi,tc if the state is good. In what
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follows we will denote the expected low payoff −c by E0 and the expected high payoff
piXH − c by E1. Additionally to the fact that E0 < 0 we assume that E1 > 0, which means
that it is optimal for all players to use the risky arm if θ = 1 and use the safe arm if θ = 0.
Players hold a belief p about the risky arm being good, and it is assumed that they
start with a common prior. Agents influence each other only through the impact of their
action on the belief of others, meaning there are only informational externalities and no
payoff externalities. In the model of HRS and KRC all players interact with everyone else
in the society and hence agents hold a common posterior belief. This will no longer be
true when players interact only with a subset of society. A player’s belief depends on
whether she learns about a breakthrough. Once she does, her uncertainty about the type
of the arm is resolved and the posterior belief jumps to 1. As long as agents experiment
without learning about a breakthrough, beliefs are updated according to Bayes’ rule and
decrease (no news is bad news). Players are said to experiment if they use the risky arm
before knowing its type.
1.2.2 Introducing a network structure
Given a set of nodes N (representing individuals), a network or graph g is an n× n inter-
action matrix that represents the relationships in the society. The typical element of g is
denoted by gij ∈ {0, 1}. If gij = 1, a link between i and j exists and implies that agent i
observes agent j’s actions and outcomes immediately without delay. The matrix is sym-
metric (gij = gji), meaning links are undirected, and always has 1 on the main diagonal
(every individual can observe her own actions and outcomes, i.e., gii = 1 for all i). The
structure of relations is assumed to be common knowledge. If a link between two indi-
viduals exists, those agents are considered to be neighbors. The neighborhood of agent i is
denoted by Ni and defined as Ni(g) = {j 6= i : gij = 1}.
Subsequently a fixed interaction structure g will be imposed. The game is analyzed in
three different network structures: the complete network2 as a benchmark case; the ring,
an incomplete but regular3 structure; and the star network with one player in the center
and all other n− 1 players only connected to the central player (see Figure 1.1).
2A complete network is a network in which every agent is connected to everyone else.
3Regular networks are networks where all players have the same number of neighbors.
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(a) Complete Network (b) Ring Network (c) Star Network
Figure 1.1: Network structures for n = 6.
1.2.3 Timing and information structure
The timing of the game is as follows: agents start in t = 1 with a common prior belief p1.
Each agent chooses an experimentation intensity or effort φi,1 ∈ [0, 1], determining how
much effort is invested in the risky option. At the end of t = 1 players observe their own
outcomes as well as the actions and outcomes of their neighbors and update their prior
accordingly to pi,2. Those agents who have not observed a success choose φi,2 ∈ [0, 1]. That
is, φi,2 is the experimentation effort conditional on not having observed a breakthrough
in t = 1. Agents then observe outcomes and actions in their neighborhood and exchange
verifiable reports about previous experiments by unobserved agents, i.e., in t = 2 agent i
knows φm,1 as well as Xm,1 for all agents m ∈ Nj\Ni where j ∈ Ni. This process of infor-
mation transmission continues in the subsequent periods. Agents do not need to draw
inferences from the actions of their neighbors as they receive this information through
the report. The exchange of reports in our game takes place automatically and agents can
neither choose whether they want to exchange reports nor the information these reports
contain.4 That is, agents can only choose their experimentation effort φi,t.
Formally, agent i’s information at a given point in time t consists of
Ii,t = {Hi,t, ri,t},
where Hi,t = {φi,1, Xi,1, ..., φi,t, Xi,t} is the complete history of actions and outcomes for
agent i up to time t and ri,t = (ri,1, ..., ri,t) is the history of reports agent i received. Each
4If agents are allowed to freely choose any message, they may find it optimal to report a breakthrough
although there was none in order to induce additional experiments. See HRS for a strategic experimentation
game in which payoffs are privately observed and agents exchange cheap talk messages.
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element ri,t is a vector that contains for each agent j ∈ Ni the history Hj,t up to this point
in time as well as the reports j received up to t− 1, i.e., rj,t−1.
For t > T agents cannot experiment anymore, i.e., they are restricted to the safe option
(φi,t = 0 for all t > T ) if they did not learn about a success up to time T . Information
diffusion still takes places after T and agents can switch to the risky option in case they
learn that the state of the world is good.5 After learning about a breakthrough the agent
continues to use the risky option forever.
As soon as the network is incomplete at least some of the agents do not possess com-
plete information about (past) actions and payoffs of others. Consequently, when inter-
acting with their neighbors, agents obtain information through them about (past) actions
and payoffs of unobserved agents and use this information to make inferences about
the true state of the world. In incomplete networks the probability of learning about a
breakthrough at a given point in time depends on the entire structure of relations, and in-
formation about a breakthrough will travel along the paths in the network. This implies
that players will not necessarily hold a common belief about the state of the world. We
will illustrate the impact of the network structure on the updating of beliefs with the help
of a short example.
1 2 3
Figure 1.2: The star network, n = 3.
Example 1 There are three agents i = 1, 2, 3, whose connections can be described by
the following interaction matrix (see Figure 1.2)
g =

1 1 0
1 1 1
0 1 1
 .
5Restricting the experimentation period allows us to solve for the equilibrium experimentation effort
by backward induction. Besides this, in many situations arbitrarily long experimentation might not be
possible. For example, research funds are often granted for a certain time period and not prolonged in
the absence of a success or new (risky) technologies with more promising success probabilities will cause
agents to stop experimenting with a less attractive alternative.
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As g2j = 1 for all j ∈ N, agent 2 has complete information and can observe all actions and
payoffs at any point in time. The other two agents only observe agent 2 and their own
actions and payoffs, and they receive information through agent 2. A success by agent
2 immediately reveals to everyone that the risky arm is good. If agent 1 has a break-
through, only 1 and 2 know about it. However, agent 3 learns about the breakthrough
through agent 2 so that agent 3 knows about it one period later. As long as there is no
breakthrough, agents update their beliefs depending on how many unsuccessful experi-
ments they learn about. That is, player 2 updates her belief according to
p2,t+1 =
p2,t
3∏
i=1
(1− φi,tpi)
p2,t
3∏
i=1
(1− φi,tpi) + 1− p2,t
if no breakthrough occurs, where
3∏
i=1
(1 − φi,tpi) reflects the experiments conducted by 2
and her neighbors. The numerator is the probability of not observing a breakthrough
on a good risky arm and the denominator gives the total probability of not observing a
breakthrough. In case of a breakthrough the posterior jumps to 1. Player 1 updates her
belief according to
p1,t+1 =
p1,t
2∏
i=1
(1− φi,tpi)(1− φ3,t−1pi)
p1,t
2∏
i=1
(1− φi,tpi)(1− φ3,t−1pi) + 1− p1,t
,
if there is no breakthrough. At time t agent 1 observes the outcome of her own experi-
ment as well as agent 2’s experiment. While agent 1 does not observe agent 3’s current
experiment she gets informed about the experiment performed in t−1, which is captured
by the term (1− φ3,t−1pi). Agent 3’s belief at time t is derived analogously.
1.2.4 Strategies and equilibrium concept
Players are fully rational and maximize their expected payoffs. In period t, agent i obtains
a payoff of φi,tXi,t, with Xi,t ∈ {0, XH}, and player i’s total expected (normalized and
discounted) payoff is given by
(1− δ)E
[ ∞∑
t=1
δt−1φi,tXi,t
]
, (1.1)
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where the expectation is taken w.r.t. pi,t and φi,t. Players are restricted to pure strategies
that only depend on payoff relevant information. In the complete network this corre-
sponds to the Markov perfect equilibrium with the common posterior belief as the state
variable. In incomplete network structures the agents’ strategies depend on the state of
the world as described by the past beliefs of the agents and additional information about
the network structure and the positions of the agents in the network. In what follows we
restrict attention to equilibria in which agents who are symmetric with respect to their
position in a network use symmetric strategies.
1.3 The empty and the complete network
Before we analyze experimentation in incomplete networks we first explain how the ex-
perimentation problem is solved by a single agent. After that, we look at the model with n
agents, where each individual can observe everyone else. Expressed in terms of networks
this corresponds to the empty and the complete network.
1.3.1 The empty network
The agent maximizes expected payoffs by choosing a sequence of actions {φi,t}Tt=1 in t = 1,
where φi,t+1 is the effort chosen in t+1 conditional on not having observed a breakthrough
until time t. The expected payoff at time t can be written recursively as
U(pt) = φi,t(1− δ)Ept + δE1ptφi,tpi + δ(1− ptφi,tpi)U(pt+1), (1.2)
with Ep = E1p+ (1− p)E0. The agent’s posterior belief is given by
pi,t+1 =
pi,t(1− φi,tpi)
1− pi,tφi,tpi (1.3)
if she does not observe a breakthrough. The posterior jumps to 1 after a success. In
expression (1.2) the first part, φi,t(1−δ)Ept , is the expected and normalized current payoff
the agent obtains in period t by exerting effort φi,t. A good risky arm generates a payoff
of E1, while a bad risky arm gives E0. The remaining terms represent the discounted
expected continuation payoff. The continuation payoff is E1 with the probability ptφi,tpi
that the risky arm is good and a breakthrough occurs. If the agent does not observe a
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success she can experiment again in t+1. The probability of not observing a breakthrough
consists of the probability that the risky arm is bad, 1 − pt, and the probability that it is
good, but the agent nevertheless did not have a breakthrough, pt(1− φi,tpi).
For a given prior the expected (normalized) payoff can also be written as
U(p1) = (1− δ)
{
(1− p1)E0
T∑
t=1
δt−1φi,t + p1E1
(
1 +
δpi
1− δ
) T∑
t=1
δt−1φi,t
t−1∏
r=1
(1− φi,rpi)
}
, (1.4)
and consists of two parts. First, the player obtains a low expected payoff E0 in every
period she experiments, if the state of the world is bad. Second, if the state of the world is
good, the agent may obtain a high payoff. More precisely,
t−1∏
r=1
(1−φi,rpi) is the probability of
not having had a success up to period t andE1 δpi1−δ is the discounted expected continuation
payoff after a breakthrough. The expected payoff is linear in the prior p1 and in effort, i.e.,
linear in each element of the sequence {φi,t}Tt=1. Linearity in effort implies that in case
expected payoffs of experimenting in period t are strictly positive, the risky option is
strictly preferred to the safe option and the agent allocates the entire resource to the risky
option, i.e., φi,t = 1. If expected payoffs of experimenting are negative it is optimal not to
experiment and the agent chooses φi,t = 0. In case expected payoffs of experimenting are
equal to zero, the agent is indifferent between all φi,t ∈ [0, 1].
Expected payoffs are increasing in the belief and the belief decreases over time in the
absence of a success. Thus, the agent experiments for optimistic beliefs and stops for
pessimistic beliefs. At time T the continuation payoff U(pT+1) = 0 if there was no success
so far and the payoff of experimenting one more time, (1− δ)EpT + δpiE1pT , is higher than
the expected payoff of stopping for any belief pT greater or equal to
pa =
(1− δ)|E0|
(1− δ)[|E0|+ E1] + δE1pi , (1.5)
where a stands for autarky. Using backward induction we can solve for φT−1 given φT
and show that it is never optimal to postpone experimentation as future payoffs are dis-
counted. This means that for pessimistic prior beliefs the agent never experiments, for
more optimistic priors the agent experiments only in t = 1, and so forth, where experi-
menting one more time at time t is optimal if pt ≥ pa (see Figure 1.3).
Lemma 1.1. Each period a single agent either uses the safe arm exclusively or the risky arm
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exclusively, and for t ≤ T her action only depends on the belief in the given period, that is,
φai,t =
 1 for pt ≥ pa,0 otherwise.
U(·)
p1
p1 = p
a p1 = p
∗
U(1, 1)
U(1, 0)
Figure 1.3: Expected payoffs of experimenting for the single agent. U(1, 0) represents
the expected payoff of experimenting in t = 1 only and U(1, 1) the expected payoff of
experimenting in t = 1, 2 only. The point of intersection of U(1, 0) with U(1, 1), denoted
by p1 = p∗, is the prior belief at which p2 =
p∗(1−pi)
1−p∗pi = p
a.
The single agent’s strategy depends only on the current belief, as this belief captures
all payoff-relevant information. Agents stop experimenting at pa > 0, which means that
it is possible that they abandon the risky arm although it is good. The cut-off belief pa
decreases in δ, which means that as agents are getting more patient, complete learning
becomes more likely. That is, the final posterior belief in case all experiments fail is smaller
and hence the probability of mistakenly switching from the risky to the safe arm although
the risky arm is good decreases. We will subsequently refer to this final posterior also as
the precision of learning and say that learning is more precise the lower this final posterior.
1.3.2 The complete network
In a complete network each player maximizes her expected utility given her belief and
the strategies of the other players. Let φ˜−i,t denote
n∏
j=1
(1 − φj,tpi) for all j 6= i. That is,
φ˜−i,t represents the probability that none of the agents j 6= i has a breakthrough at time t.
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Agent i’s expected payoff at time t is given by
Ui(pt) = φi,t(1− δ)Ept + δE1pt(1− φ˜−i,t(1−φi,tpi)) + δ
(
1− pt(1− φ˜−i,t(1− φi,tpi))
)
Ui(pt+1),
(1.6)
where
pt+1 =
ptφ˜−i,t(1− φi,tpi)
ptφ˜t(1− φi,tpi) + 1− pt
. (1.7)
The continuation payoff of agent i now also depends on the actions of the other players.
Otherwise, the problem is similar to the single agent, that is, payoffs are linear in the belief
and in effort. Proposition 1.1 describes the optimal experimentation effort in a symmetric
equilibrium.
Proposition 1.1. In the symmetric equilibrium in a complete network with n agents
(i) the common strategy for t ≤ T is given by
φct =

1 for pt ∈ [pc, 1],
1
pi
− 1
pi
(
(1−δ)|E0|
δE1pipt
− (1−δ)(|E0|+E1)
δE1pi
) 1
n−1
for pt ∈ (pa, pc),
0 for pt ∈ [0, pa],
(1.8)
where
pc =
(1− δ)|E0|
(1− δ)[|E0|+ E1] + δE1pi(1− pi)n−1 ;
(ii) there is at most one time period in which φct ∈ (0, 1).
The players’ strategies depend only on the common belief pt as this belief captures
all payoff relevant information (actions and payoff realizations) up to time t. An agent’s
experimentation effort at time t depends on the current (and future) actions of the other
players which are determined by the current belief. Any deviation will be captured by
the belief and we assume that after a deviation every agent plays optimally given the
common posterior.
There exists an interval of beliefs such that in a symmetric equilibrium players simul-
taneously use both arms. In this interval φct is chosen such that agents are indifferent
between the risky and the safe arm, or to be more precise between all φt ∈ [0, 1]. There
exists an upper cut-off belief, pc,which is the belief above which agent i experiments with
intensity 1 even if all others also experiment with full intensity. Starting from pc agents
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decrease their experimentation intensity as the belief decreases, down to the point where
φct = 0, which holds for any belief below pa. Figure 1.4 depicts the equilibrium strategy.
1
1p¯cpa
φct
pt
Figure 1.4: Experimentation effort in a symmetric equilibrium in the complete network
(pi = 0.2, δ = 0.9, n = 12, E1 = 1, E0 = −1, pa ≈ 0.26 and p¯c ≈ 0.46).
Several features of the equilibrium experimentation strategy are worth noting. First,
there is at most one time period in which agents simultaneously use both arms. In fact,
for any n ≥ 2, n failed experiments from p¯c generate a posterior belief below pa, and the
common effort φc(pt) at beliefs pt ∈ (pa, p¯c) also causes the posterior to fall below the sin-
gle agent cut-off if there is no success. Second, agents do not have an incentive to delay
any experiments: if φct > 0, then φct−1 = 1. Third, the upper cut-off p
c is increasing in n,
whereas the lower threshold is given by pa. Social optimality requires experimentation
beyond the single agent cut-off, pa, since agents benefit from each others experimenta-
tion effort. However, agents do not experiment below pa and even stop experimenting
with full intensity earlier as the number of agents increases, which is a particularly stark
manifestation of the free-riding effect (see also HRS or KRC).
1.4 The ring network
Let us now turn to the strategic experimentation problem when agents are located on a
ring. In the ring network every agent has two direct neighbors. As players are symmetric
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there again exists a symmetric equilibrium. The underlying structure is illustrated in
Figure 1.1b for n = 6.
Expected payoffs in the ring network for a given prior and strategy profile are
Ui(p1) = φi,1(1− δ)Ep1 + δE1p1[1− (1− φj,1pi)2(1− φi,1pi)]
+δ[1− p1 + p1(1− φj,1pi)2(1− φi,1pi)]Ui(p2);
as we are solving for symmetric equilibria, we are assuming here that all agents j 6= i use
the same strategy. The term
Ui(p2) = φi,2(1− δ)Ep2 + δE1p2[1− (1− φj,2pi)2(1− φi,2pi)(1− φj,1pi)2]
+δ[1− p2 + p2(1− φj,2pi)2(1− φi,2pi)(1− φj,1pi)2]Ui(p3),
as well as Ui(p3), Ui(p4) and so on, is determined by the information about past exper-
iments traveling through the network. In t = 1 the agents start with a prior belief p1,
choose their experimentation intensity φi,1 and receive their payoffs. Then each agent
either knows that the state of the world is good if there was a breakthrough in her neigh-
borhood, or she chooses her optimal experimentation intensity φi,2 based on her updated
belief pi,2. That is, with the probability that at least one experiment agent i learns about in
t = 1 is successful, p1[1− (1− φj,1pi)2(1− φi,1pi)], she gets a continuation payoff of E1 from
the next period onwards. These are the two experiments of the neighbors as well as the
own experiment. In case all these experiments were unsuccessful, she and her neighbors
can experiment again in t = 2. Further there is the chance that neighbors of neighbors
had a breakthrough in t = 1 about which agent i will learn in t = 2. That is, in t = 2 the
agent receives information about the outcome of the first period experiment of the neigh-
bors of neighbors. In Ui(p2), the factor (1− φj,1pi)2 in 1− (1− φj,2pi)2(1− φi,2pi)(1− φj,1pi)2
represents the experiments of neighbors of neighbors in t = 1, (1− φj,2pi)2 the two exper-
iments of the direct neighbors in t = 2, and 1 − φi,2pi the own experiment in t = 2. This
process continues until either all agents stopped and all information has reached agent
i, or every agent knows that the state is good. The information transmission takes the
longer the more players there are. The posterior belief of an agent, who did not observe a
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breakthrough so far, for symmetric actions is given by
pi,t+1 =
pi,t(1− φri,tpi)3
min{t−1,d−1}∏
l=1
(1− φri,t−lpi)2
1− pi,t + pi,t(1− φri,tpi)3
min{t−1,d−1}∏
l=1
(1− φri,t−lpi)2
, (1.9)
where d denotes the diameter of the network.
In contrast to the complete network, equilibrium cut-off beliefs vary with time. This
can be ascribed to the fact that after one period of experimentation, information is travel-
ing through the network and agents anticipate that this information will reach them. For
example, in t = 2 the lower cutoff belief pr
2
is above pa, because of the two experiments
conducted by neighbors of neighbors in t = 1 that agent i learns about in t = 2. In or-
der to analyze the equilibrium behavior of the agents we introduce the expression Irt . Irt
represents the difference in expected payoffs from experimenting with full intensity and
not experimenting at all for symmetric actions of the other players in period t with no
experimentation in t+ 1. This means that Irt > 0 implies that payoffs from experimenting
are higher than payoffs from not experimenting in t and at Irt = 0 agents are indifferent.
Proposition 1.2 describes the symmetric equilibrium in the ring network. The expression
for Irt and the equilibrium cut-off beliefs can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 1.2. In the symmetric equilibrium in the ring network for t ≤ T each player chooses
the following action:
• φrt = 1 for pi,t ∈ [prt , 1],
• φrt = 0 for pi,t ∈ [0, prt ], where pr1 = pa and,
• φrt ∈ (0, 1) is defined uniquely by the root of Irt on [0, 1] for pi,t ∈ (prt , prt ) and chosen
such that each player is indifferent between all φt ∈ [0, 1] for symmetric actions of the other
players. There is at most one time period in which φrt ∈ (0, 1).
The agents’ actions depend on their belief about the state of the world. In contrast to
the complete network, agents in the ring network do not hold a common posterior belief.
The threshold beliefs of the agents depend on the state of the world in period t − d + 1,
where the state of the world is described by a vector of beliefs and corresponding network
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positions for each agent. The diameter of the network, d, determines the maximum delay
in the network. Consequently at time t the belief (together with the network position) of
each agent in the network at time t − d + 1 is common knowledge and all information
up to time t − d + 1 can be ignored.6 The best response of agent i depends on the state
of the world at time t − d + 1 as well as on her private information, i.e., her own private
belief at time t, the beliefs of her direct neighbors in t− 1 and so forth. When anticipating
the actions of the other players, each player assumes that everyone plays a best response
given the commonly known state in t− d+ 1.7
As can be seen in Proposition 1.2 the lower cut-off below which experimentation
ceases in the first period is equal to the single agent cut-off. The upper cut-off in the
ring
pr1 =
(1− δ)|E0|
(1− δ)(|E0|+ E1) + δE1pi[(1− pi)2 − [1− (1− pi)2]
∑d−1
t=1 δ
t(1− pi)2t]
is smaller than the upper cutoff in the complete network pc with the difference pc − pr1
monotonically increasing in n. This difference increases in the number of players because
information needs longer to be transmitted in the ring. The longer agents have to wait
for information, the more likely they will find it optimal to experiment themselves in the
meantime.
We are interested in the difference between the complete network and the ring in terms
of experimentation effort in equilibrium. Proposition 1.3 below shows that in the ring
network effort is never lower than in the complete network. In t = 1 for high beliefs
all agents in both networks experiment, for pessimistic beliefs no one experiments and
for intermediate beliefs where agents use both options, the experimentation intensity is
higher in the ring. This shows that agents compensate a worse possibility to learn from
others through increased own effort. Figure 1.5 illustrates this finding.
If all experiments in t = 1 fail, beliefs in the two networks in t ≥ 2 are different as
agents in the complete network are already more pessimistic. Taking the difference in
6For t < d it is the state of the world in t = 1 that is commonly known by all agents.
7Note that this implies that the threshold belief does in fact not depend on time and is constant for any
d ≤ t ≤ T.
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11p¯cp¯r1p
a
φ1
p1
Figure 1.5: Equilibrium experimentation effort in a ring network (dashed line) and the
complete network (solid line) in t = 1 (pi = 0.2, δ = 0.9, n = 12, E1 = 1, E0 = −1,
pa ≈ 0.26, p¯c ≈ 0.46 and p¯r1 ≈ 0.34).
posterior beliefs into account, it can be shown that experimentation effort in the ring and
the complete network is either the same, or that effort is higher in the ring. To compare
efforts in t ≥ 2 across different networks, we express beliefs in terms of pct . This means
that we make use of the fact that in equilibrium the relationship between the posterior
beliefs in the two networks is given by
pct =
prt (1− pi)yt−1
prt (1− pi)yt−1 + 1− prt
, (1.10)
where
yt = (n− 3)t− 2
min{t−1,d−1}∑
x=1
(t− x) (1.11)
is the difference between the number of experiments an agent in the complete network
observed and the number of experiments an agent in the ring observed until time t (if
everyone experiments until time t with full intensity).8
8Note that the expression for yt in (1.11) describes the situation when n is odd. For an even number of
players the term 1{t>d}(t− d) has to be added.
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Proposition 1.3. Experimentation intensities in the symmetric equilibrium in the ring network
are at least as high as in the symmetric equilibrium in the complete network. More precisely,
φrt > φ
c
t
φrt = φ
c
t
for pct ∈ (p˜rt , pc),
for pct ∈ [0, p˜rt ] ∪ [pc, 1],
for t ≤ T , where
p˜r
t
=
pr
t
(1− pi)yt−1
pr
t
(1− pi)yt−1 + 1− pr
t
≤ pa.
Over certain intervals of beliefs agents in the ring network exert higher effort than
agents in the complete network. Further, agents in the ring network experiment in t ≥ 2
at beliefs for which the posterior after tn failed experiments is below pa. That is, p˜r
t
is the
posterior belief in the complete network pct at time t that corresponds to a posterior of prt
in the ring network. If information arrives with delay, agents might be better off experi-
menting themselves instead of waiting for information generated by others. However, as
this information will eventually reach them, the final posterior belief in the ring network
can be more pessimistic than in the complete network. That is, the probability of mis-
takenly abandoning a good risky project decreases and learning is more accurate. This
is in line with the finding of Bimpikis and Drakopoulos (2014) that delaying information
revelation increases experimentation. The speed of learning, measured by the number of
time periods until information has traveled to every node in the network, decreases due
to the incomplete network structure. Free-riding, however, is reduced as players increase
effort over certain intervals of beliefs when information arrives with a delay.
1.5 The star network
To obtain a better understanding of the role of different interaction structures, we now
turn to the star network to explore the impact of asymmetric positions on equilibrium
experimentation. In the star network one player, called the hub, is located in the center
and has a link to each of the other n − 1 players. The players at exterior positions, also
called peripheral players, are only connected to the hub. The expected payoff of the hub
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is given by
Uh(pht , p
s
t) = φ
h
t (1− δ)Epht + δE1pht
(
1− (1− φht pi)
∏
i 6=h
(1− φsi,tpi)
)
+
δ
(
1− pht + pht (1− φht pi)
∏
i 6=h
(1− φsi,tpi)
)
Uh(pht+1, p
s
t+1),
where
pht+1 =
pht (1− φht pi)
∏
i 6=h
(1− φsi,tpi)
1− pht + pht (1− φht pi)
∏
i 6=h
(1− φsi,tpi)
,
and
pst+1 =
pst(1− φht pi)(1− φsi,tpi)
∏
j 6=i,h
(1− φsj,t−1pi)
1− pst + pst(1− φht pi)(1− φsi,tpi)
∏
j 6=i,h
(1− φsj,t−1pi)
.
For the agents in the periphery we have
U si (p
s
t , p
h
t ) = φ
s
i,t(1− δ)Epst + δE1pst
(
1− (1− φht pi)(1− φsi,tpi)
∏
j 6=i,h
(1− φsj,t−1pi)
)
+
δ
(
1− pst + pst(1− φht pi)(1− φsi,tpi)
∏
j 6=i,h
(1− φsj,t−1pi)
)
U si (p
s
t+1, p
h
t+1).
Players are no longer symmetric and hence an equilibrium in which all players use the
same strategy does not exist. In Proposition 1.4 we construct an equilibrium where pe-
ripheral players use symmetric strategies and the hub exerts less effort than agents in a
symmetric equilibrium in the complete network. More precisely, the hub exerts full effort
until pc and does not experiment at all for beliefs below pc. The peripheral players exert
higher effort than the players in the complete network in equilibrium.
In the star network the cutoff beliefs in t = 1 differ from later periods in which the
peripheral agents anticipate the arrival of information generated by unobserved players
in the previous period. For t ≥ 2 in every period the peripheral agents learn about n − 2
experiments with one period delay. The diameter of the star network d = 2 and conse-
quently the state of the world in t− 1 is commonly known by all players. Proposition 1.4
describes the equilibrium where Ist is the respective counterpart to Irt for the peripheral
players in the star network. The expressions for the cut-off beliefs and Ist can again be
found in Appendix A.
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Proposition 1.4. The strategic experimentation game in the star network where peripheral agents
use symmetric strategies has an equilibrium in which the experimentation intensity of the hub for
t ≤ T satisfies
φht =
 1 for pt ∈ [pc, 1],0 otherwise.
For the peripheral players equilibrium experimentation intensities in t = 1 are
• φs1 = 1 for p1 ∈ [ps1, 1],
• φs1 = 0 for p1 ∈ [0, pa],
• φs1 ∈ (0, 1) is defined uniquely for p1 ∈ (pa, ps1) by the root of Is1 on [0, 1] and is chosen such
that each peripheral player is indifferent between all φ1 ∈ [0, 1] for symmetric actions of the
other peripheral players and φh1 = 0.
Experimentation intensities for t = 2, .., T are
• φst = 1 for pt ∈ [ps2, 1],
• φst = 0 for pt ∈ [0, ps2],
• φst ∈ (0, 1) is defined uniquely for pt ∈ (ps2, ps2) by the root of Is2 on [0, 1] and is chosen such
that each peripheral player is indifferent between all φt ∈ [0, 1] for symmetric actions of the
other peripheral players and φht = 0.
In equilibrium there is at most one time period in which φst ∈ (0, 1).
Agents are no longer in symmetric positions and the hub faces a different problem
than the peripheral players. In particular, the central player is completely informed about
all experiments like in a complete network. Hence, it is optimal for the hub to experiment
with full intensity for any belief above p¯c. If the peripheral players exert higher effort than
agents in the complete network, that is if φst > φct , the best response for the hub is not to
experiment at all. As it can be shown that p¯s1 < p¯c, we know that in the interval [p¯s1, p¯c) the
hub does not experiment. Further, the best response for the peripheral players to φh1 = 0
in (pa, p¯c) is to exert higher effort than agents in the complete network. We will refer to
a strategy profile in which some agents experiment while others do not exert any effort
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also as specialization.9 For priors above or below the interval (pa, p¯c) there will be full or
no experimentation respectively. This is illustrated in Figure 1.6.
1
1p¯cp¯s1p
a
φ1
p1
Figure 1.6: Equilibrium experimentation effort of the peripheral players in the star net-
work (bold dotted line), the central player in the star network (dashed line) and in a
complete network (solid line) in t = 1 (pi = 0.2, δ = 0.9, n = 12, E1 = 1, E0 = −1,
pa ≈ 0.26, p¯c ≈ 0.46 and p¯s1 ≈ 0.42).
Remark 1. For some values of the model parameters there exists a second equilibrium in which the
peripheral players use symmetric strategies. In t = 1 in this equilibrium the hub exerts full effort
for beliefs p1 ∈ [pa, ps1) ∪ [pc, 1] and no effort for p1 ∈ [0, pa) ∪ [ps1, pc). This means that the effort
of the hub is non-monotonic in the belief. The peripheral agents exert full effort for beliefs above
ps1. For any belief in [pa, ps1) their experimentation intensity is lower than the experimentation
intensity that makes the hub indifferent, that is, φs1 < φc1. The second equilibrium only exists if
n is small and δ and pi are large. For this reason we will subsequently restrict attention to the
equilibrium described in Proposition 1.4 which exists for all parameter values.
Whether there will be more experiments in the star or the complete network depends
on the possibility of the peripheral agents to counterbalance the decreased experimenta-
9This terminology is taken from BK, who also refer to equilibria in the star network where some agents
contribute to the public good and others do not contribute as specialized.
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tion intensity of the hub. In the equilibrium described in Proposition 1.4 the experimenta-
tion effort of the hub is below or equal to the effort level of the peripheral players, that is
φht ≤ φst . For beliefs close to p¯c (i.e., pc− ε) the agents in the complete network experiment
almost with full intensity while hub does not experiment and the agents in the star net-
work cannot increase their effort any more. Consequently, for beliefs right below pc, total
experimentation effort is higher in the complete network. The interesting interval are
beliefs at which agents in both networks invest in both arms simultaneously. As will be
shown in Proposition 1.5, except for a combination of parameter values where n is small
and δ and pi are large, overall experimentation intensities in the star network are higher
or equal to experimentation effort in the complete network in this interval of beliefs.
Proposition 1.5. Comparing effort exerted in the symmetric equilibrium in the complete network
and in the equilibrium in the star network of Proposition 1.4 we obtain
(n− 1)φs1 + φh1 = nφc1 for all p1 ∈ [0, pa] ∪ [pc, 1]
and
(n− 1)φst + φht = nφct for all pct ∈ [0, p˜s2] ∪ [pc, 1]
where
p˜s
2
=
ps
2
(1− pi)n−2
ps
2
(1− pi)n−2 + 1− ps
2
< pa.
For p1 ∈ (pa, ps1) there exists a strict subset Sn(p1) of [0, 1]2 such that
(n− 1)φs1 + φh1 > nφc1 if and only if (δ, pi) ∈ Sn(p1).
Moreover, λ(Sn(p1))→ 1 as n→∞ with λ denoting the Lebesgue measure on R2. Similarly, for
t ≥ 2 and pct ∈ (p˜s2, p˜s2), where
p˜s2 =
p¯s2(1− pi)n−2
p¯s2(1− pi)n−2 + 1− p¯s2
,
there exists a strict subset Sn(pt) of [0, 1]2 such that
(n− 1)φst + φht > nφct if and only if (δ, pi) ∈ Sn(pt)
and λ(Sn(pt))→ 1 as n→∞.
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The first part of Proposition 1.5 states the intervals of beliefs in which experimentation
effort in equilibrium in the complete network is equal to the star network, because there is
either no experimentation or all agents exert full effort. For beliefs outside these intervals
we know that φht = 0. The region Sn(p1) is defined as all combinations of δ and pi for which
total effort in t = 1 in the complete network is strictly smaller than in the star network for
p1 ∈ (pa, p¯s1). By analyzing this expression (see Appendix A) numerically, one can see that
the value for δ below which (n− 1)φs1 ≥ nφc1 is in general "quite close" to 1. For example,
for n = 3, (n− 1)φs1 ≥ nφc1 as long as δ ≤ 89 even if pi takes values arbitrarily close to 1. As
n increases, the threshold value for δ increases and already for relatively small n (n = 6)
δ ≤ 0.99 suffices to guarantee that (n− 1)φs1 ≥ nφc1 again assuming values of pi close to 1.
The lower pi, the higher is δ below which (n− 1)φs1 ≥ nφc1.
The total experimentation intensity in the interval where agents use both arms in the
star network, is higher in the star network except for a combination of parameter values
with high δ, high pi and small n. That is, unless agents are very patient, effort in the star
is higher even though the hub does not experiment. This indicates that the peripheral
agents increase own efforts accordingly to outweigh the missing experimentation of the
hub as well as the payoff disadvantage that arises from delayed information transmission.
We now turn to a comparison of experimentation intensities in the ring and the star
network. As the number of agents increases, more information arrives with a greater
number of time lags in the ring. In the star network on the other hand, the delay does
not change if the number of players changes. Restricting attention to intervals of beliefs
in which neither φrt = φst = 0 nor φrt = φst = 1, we show in Proposition 1.6 that for small n,
experimentation intensities in the star network are no smaller than those in the ring while
for a large number of players it depends on δ and pi.
Proposition 1.6. Comparing φst to φrt for all pt from the interval in which at least in one of the
two networks agents are indifferent between the safe and the risky option, we have that
(i) there exists nt ∈ N such that for all n < nt, φst ≥ φrt for all (δ, pi) ∈ [0, 1]2 and
(ii) as n→∞ the region of (δ, pi) in which φst ≥ φrt is a strict subset of [0, 1]2.
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Figure 1.7: Equilibrium experimentation effort in t = 1 in the ring network compared to
the star network for n→∞. In the light region φs1 > φr1 and in the dark region φs1 < φr1.
The first point of Proposition 1.6 tells us that for a small number of players effort in
the star is higher (in the interval of beliefs where agents use both arms) or equal to effort
in the ring. For a larger number of agents this is no longer true in general. Part (ii) of
the proposition says that as n becomes large, the set of (δ, pi) for which effort in the star
network is higher becomes a strict subset of [0, 1]2. As a consequence of part (ii) and the
fact that φrt and φst intersect only at one belief (e.g., in t = 1 at pa), we can conclude that
there exists some finite natural number such that for all n above this number there exists
a non-empty set of parameters (δ, pi) for which φst < φrt .
Proposition 1.6 shows that the effect of incomplete network structures on experimen-
tation intensities depends on the discount factor δ and the success rate pi. Suppose in both
networks all agents experiment in t = 1. Then, in t = 1 peripheral agents in the star net-
work learn about one experiment fewer than agents in the ring network. For δ close to 1
this does not matter to these agents as it makes little difference to them at which point in
time information arrives. On the other hand, the closer δ is to zero, the more agents in the
star network care about this one experiment, making them increase own effort. Figure
1.7 compares φs1 and φr1 for n → ∞. In the light region φs1 > φr1 and vice versa in the dark
region. For example, φr1 > φs1 only if pi is not too large. If the probability of a breakthrough
is low, it is relatively more likely that agents will learn about a breakthrough later in the
ring than in the star network. Thus, agents in the ring increase their effort to balance this
effect.
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Before turning to the question which network generates the highest welfare among
the three structures considered, let us briefly repeat the main findings of the previous
sections. First, we showed that agents increase own effort if information arrives with
delay as they are better off experimenting themselves instead of waiting for information
generated by others. Second, in irregular structures there can be specialization over some
intervals of beliefs where some agents experiment while others free-ride. Experimenting
agents increase their effort to outweigh the missing experiments as well as the delay in
the information transmission.
1.6 Welfare analysis
In the preceding sections it was shown that effort exerted in equilibrium varies with the
network structure. In this section we want to analyze the implications of these differences
for expected payoffs in equilibrium.
1.6.1 The optimal network
Assuming that it is costly to establish a communication or interaction structure, we are
now interested in which of the three networks would be chosen (before the agents engage
in the experimentation game) by a social planner who aims to maximize welfare given
the strategic behavior of the players. There are fixed costs k ≥ 0 per link that have to be
paid ex ante. The total number of links in network g depends on the network structure
and is n(n − 1)/2 in the complete network, n in the ring and n − 1 in the star network.
The main criterion to measure the performance of different structures are equilibrium
payoffs. Welfare is defined as the total expected payoff in equilibrium minus total costs
for building the infrastructure. For the complete network this is
W c(p1) = nU
c(p1)− n(n− 1)
2
k.
For the other networks it is defined in an analogous way, that is W r(p1) = nU r(p1) − nk
and W s(p1) = (n − 1)U s(p1) + Uh(p1) − (n − 1)k. A network g ∈ {c, r, s} is optimal for a
given prior belief p1 and set of parameters (δ, pi, k, n) if and only if
W g(p1) ≥ W g′(p1), for all g′ ∈ {c, r, s}.
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We write g  g′ if network g generates strictly higher welfare than network g′ and g ∼ g′
if W g(p1) = W g
′
(p1).
Proposition 1.7 below states which network is optimal when k = 0 and the prior belief
p1 is such that in case all experiments in t = 1 fail, there are no experiments in t = 2,
that is, p2 ≤ pg2 for all g. For simplicity of exposition, in the subsequent analysis we
impose E1 = 1 and E0 = −1. Note that we do not include the empty network in our
analysis, which would be optimal for very high costs. Without the empty network, the
star network is optimal for sufficiently high costs. Moreover, the star network is strictly
optimal for a certain interval of priors even if links do not incur any costs.
Proposition 1.7. The following conditions determine which network is optimal for k = 0 and for
p1 such that in case all experiments in t = 1 fail, p2 ≤ pg2 for all g :
(i) For p1 ∈ [0, pa] : c ∼ r ∼ s;
(ii) for p1 ∈ (pa, ps1] : s  c, r and the relation between c and r is given in (iii);
(iii) c ∼ r for p1 ∈ [0, pr1] and c  r for p1 ∈ (p¯r1, 1];
(iv) for p1 ∈ (ps1, pc] : c  s if and only if
(1− δ)(2p1−1)+ δp1[(1−pi)n−1[1+ δ(n−1)]+(1− δ)(n−1)(1−pi)−n(1−φc1pi)n] > 0.
(v) For p1 ∈ (pc1, 1]: c  r, s.
For p1 ∈ (pa, ps1] the complete network is never optimal even if costs for links are zero.
This result is somewhat surprising as one might think that it is optimal to have as many
links as possible if they are costless to allow a fast flow of information. However, in this
interval of beliefs the star network is strictly optimal for two reasons. First, average ex-
pected payoffs in the star (where the hub does not experiment) are higher than in the
complete network or the ring, because the hub does not bear the costs of experimenta-
tion but receives the informational benefits. Second, up to ps1 the peripheral players can
increase their experimentation effort so as to fully compensate for both the lack of exper-
imentation of the hub as well as the delay in the information transmission. Therefore, up
to this threshold, therefore, welfare in the star network is strictly higher than in the ring or
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the complete network. At some belief above this threshold this result is reversed and the
missing experiment of the central player implies that average expected payoffs are lower
in the star network than in the other networks. Corollary 1.1 summarizes this result.
Corollary 1.1. Specialization in the star network, where φh1 = 0 and φs1 > 0, can be beneficial as
well as detrimental to overall welfare.
Another interesting observation can be made by comparing the complete network to
the ring. For beliefs in the interval (pa, p¯r1] agents exert higher effort in the ring network
than in the complete network (see Section 1.4). More precisely, agents increase their effort
to exactly offset the payoff disadvantage resulting from the delay with which information
arrives. This means that expected payoffs in the ring and the complete network are iden-
tical for beliefs at which the players in the ring use interior experimentation intensities if
there are no costs for links.10 If all agents in both networks experiment with full intensity
agents learn faster in the complete network and are better off. This implies that, as stated
in Corollary 1.2, there exists a trade-off between delay and free-riding.
Corollary 1.2. In the selection of the optimal network structure there exists a trade-off between
the speed of learning and the accuracy of learning.
This trade-off is also apparent when looking at a situation where some agents exper-
iment in t = 2 after a round of failed experimentation in t = 1. It is possible that in
equilibrium in t = 2 only the peripheral players in the star network experiment. One
main advantage of the complete network compared to incomplete structures lies in the
speed of learning, making it increasingly attractive the stronger future payoffs are dis-
counted. In the interval of beliefs in which only the peripheral players experiment in
t = 2, whereas agents in other networks experiment only in t = 1, it can be shown that for
values of the discount factor δ close to 1, the star network is always optimal. On the other
hand, for δ close to 0, the complete network is optimal for k = 0. This comparison stresses
again the existing trade-off between learning faster and more precisely, or put differently,
between delay and free-riding. How this trade-off is resolved depends on the discount
factor.
10For k > 0 the ring network is strictly optimal in the interval (pa, p¯r1].
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Figure 1.8: Optimal networks for k = 0, n = 4 and p1 such that p2 ≤ pg2 for all g if all
experiments in t = 1 fail, for different intervals of the prior. The dotted line between p¯s1
and p¯c1 indicates the belief at which peripheral players in the star network can no longer
compensate for the missing experiment of the hub and the delay in information transmis-
sion.
Whether a certain network is optimal, depends on the agents’ possibility to increase
their experimentation effort in order to compensate for the disadvantage of delayed in-
formation arrival in incomplete structures. For costs of links equal to zero, the complete
network can only be optimal for prior beliefs p1 such that φs1 = φr1 = 1, as otherwise
agents can increase their experimentation effort in order to outweigh the delayed arrival
of information. In the star network an additional effect comes into play, namely the pay-
off advantage of the non-experimenting hub, which explains why even for zero costs the
star is strictly preferred for low priors. At some belief in the interval (ps1, p
c
1] the periph-
eral players in the star can no longer compensate for the nonexperimenting hub and total
experimentation effort is lower than optimal. Figure 1.8 graphically illustrates for n = 4
which of the three networks is optimal on different intervals of priors.
A fast flow of information does not necessarily maximize welfare even if informa-
tion can be distributed to all players immediately at no cost due to the strong incentive to
free-ride. This contradicts the findings of Teece (1994) that innovation has to be associated
with a fast transmission of information. Information is a public good and the underpro-
vision of this public good can be ameliorated by delaying the arrival of information. Our
analysis confirms two results of BK. First, it shows that under certain circumstances spe-
cialization (that is, some agents exert effort while others free-ride) might benefit society,
and second, welfare can be higher in incomplete interaction structures. However, we can
also show the opposite effect, namely that for certain beliefs specialization can have a
negative impact on overall welfare.
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Network structures can also be interpreted as organizational structures that determine
the flow of information within an organization. When deciding on the optimal organiza-
tional structure (for example, centralized vs. decentralized structures), decision-makers
might pursue various objectives. For instance, if the objective is to minimize the costs
of information transmission, a centralized structure such as the star network is optimal.
Centralization enables a comparatively fast flow of information at lowest possible costs.
From the perspective of the management of a firm centralization additionally offers the
advantage that a central authority can accumulate and disseminate information.
1.6.2 The complete network with a specialist
The star network is strictly optimal for low prior beliefs in the interval where the hub does
not experiment, i.e., in the interval where the asymmetry of the network structure leads
to an asymmetry of actions. Asymmetric equilibria in the complete (or ring) network
will most likely generate higher welfare than the symmetric one (see KRC or Bramoullè,
Kranton, D’Amours, 2014). Consequently, it is not clear whether the star is still strictly
preferred once the restriction to symmetric actions in the complete network or the ring
is relaxed. In this section we want to find out whether the star network is still optimal
in case we allow for some asymmetry in the complete network. There are potentially
many asymmetric equilibria and a thorough characterization of these equilibria is in gen-
eral difficult. Hence, instead of focusing on asymmetric equilibria directly we introduce
asymmetry by exogenously imposing specialization: One agent in the complete network,
who will be referred to as the "specialist", never exerts any effort and this is commonly
known. All other agents choose the optimal experimentation effort prescribed by the
symmetric equilibrium of the experimentation game given the specialist.
For beliefs where the hub does not experiment, expected utility in the star network
is strictly higher than in the complete network with one specialist . To be more precise,
the expected payoff of the peripheral players in the star network is equal to the expected
payoff of the working agents in the complete network. Hence, any difference in payoffs
results from the difference between the hub and the specialist. Both of them have the
same number of direct neighbors, n − 1, and can observe them directly. The peripheral
agents, however, exert higher effort than agents in the complete network to counterbal-
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ance the delay with that information arrives. Thus, the probability of a success in the star
network is higher and as a consequence the hub obtains higher expected payoffs than the
specialist.
Proposition 1.8. For p1 ∈ (pa, ps1] expected payoffs in the star network are strictly higher than
expected payoffs in the symmetric equilibrium in the complete network with one non-working
specialist.
Proposition 1.8 implies that the star network is optimal for pessimistic priors even if
we allow for some asymmetry in the complete network. Thus, the star network does not
only generate higher welfare than the complete network because the network structure
leads to specialization, but because of a combination of specialization and delay.
1.6.3 Numerical example
In this section we present numerical results that complement the preceding analytical
discussion. While up to this point we focused on the role of the prior, we now want
to obtain a better understanding of the role of different parameters. In our numerical
example we show which network is optimal in a (pi, δ)-grid given fixed values of the
other parameters.
Figure 1.9 illustrates the results. It shows which network is optimal for E0 = −1
and E1 = 1 if agents can only experiment in t = 1, 2. The results are calculated for
pi ∈ [0.01, 0.99] and δ ∈ [0.01, 0.99] both in steps of 0.01. In white areas all networks are
optimal as in this region there is no experimentation (that is, we have indifference). Light
gray areas indicate all combinations of δ and pi in which the ring network is optimal,
in dark gray the star network is optimal, and black means that the complete network is
optimal. The three panels on the left display the results for n = 5, while those on the
right have n = 25. In the first row p1 = 0.45 and k = 0, in the second row the prior belief
is increased to p1 = 0.96 while k = 0, and in the last row we look at p1 = 0.96 for costs
k = 0.001.
In Figure 1.9a we see that for low values of δ and pi no network is strictly optimal,
as no agent experiments. For medium values of δ, e.g., δ = 0.4, we have indifference
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(a) p1 = 0.45, k = 0, n = 5.
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(b) p1 = 0.45, k = 0, n = 25.
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(c) p1 = 0.96, k = 0, n = 5.
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(d) p1 = 0.96, k = 0, n = 25.
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(e) p1 = 0.96, k = 0.001, n = 5.
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(f) p1 = 0.96, k = 0.001, n = 25.
Figure 1.9: Optimal networks for E0 = −1 and E1 = 1.
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for low values of pi and the star network dominates for high pi. As δ and pi increase,
expected welfare is highest in the complete network. More precisely, in 1.9a the complete
network is optimal in 37.4% of the cases, the star in 17.6%, the ring network in 7.4%
and in 37.6% of the cases we have indifference. If we increase n to 25 (see Figure 1.9b)
the ring network is never optimal and the complete network is optimal for values of the
parameters where for n = 5 the star is optimal. The percentages change to 61.2% for
the complete network, 1.3% for the star and 37.5% for indifference. This implies that
although agents face better opportunities to free-ride on the experimentation of others in
the complete network, welfare is higher than in the incomplete networks.
In Figures 1.9c and 1.9d agents are very optimistic and experiment with certainty. That
is, there is no region of indifference. As expected, the complete network is optimal in this
case for a large combination of parameters (92.4% in 1.9c and 97.6% in 1.9d). However,
for intermediate values of pi there exists an area in which the star network or the ring
generate higher welfare. Increasing the number of players to n = 25 shifts the region in
which the star network dominates to the left, that is, to lower values of pi. Moreover, the
ring network is never optimal as there is too much delay.
In the last row in Figures 1.9e and 1.9f we introduce positive costs for links. Naturally,
the region in which the complete network is optimal shrinks for n = 5 and completely dis-
appears for n = 25. In fact, for n = 25 and k ≥ 0.001 the complete network is suboptimal
for all δ, pi, and p1.
1.7 Discussion
In this chapter we analyzed a dynamic game of strategic experimentation in three dif-
ferent network structures, the complete network, the ring network and the star network.
Relative to the complete network agents in the ring network increase their experimen-
tation effort to balance the payoff disadvantage resulting from the delay in information
transmission. In the star network there is an equilibrium where the hub experiments with
full intensity up to a threshold belief and then stops completely. Although the peripheral
players increase their effort relative to the complete network in the interval where the
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hub stops "too early", for some beliefs they are not able to fully compensate for the non-
experimenting hub. Hence, depending on the belief this specialization where the hub
does not experiment can be beneficial as well as detrimental for society.
The obtained results offer insights into the incentives that drive the behavior of ratio-
nal agents. Taking research or innovation as examples, a welfare analysis of the model
provides insights which might be relevant to government authorities or companies for
structuring and subsidizing research projects. Objectives of decision makers can be man-
ifold as for instance, cost minimization, utility maximization, the maximization of the
speed of learning through fast information transmission or completeness (that is, more
precise learning which implies that the probability of mistakenly abandoning a good
risky arm is minimized). Different network structures have different effects on the out-
come of the experimentation game and consequently on welfare. While the star network
minimizes the costs for links, the complete network maximizes the speed of learning. In
which of the three networks learning will be most accurate depends on the prior belief
as well as the parameters of the model. In general, there exists a trade-off between faster
learning and more accurate learning.
Our analysis showed that it is possible to investigate details of rational learning pro-
cesses in a network without being restricted to focus on asymptotic results or introduce
some form of myopia or bounded rationality. Nevertheless, the model considered here
captures very particular learning situations due to its special structure with fully reveal-
ing breakthroughs. This implies that our results cannot be easily generalized to other
payoff generating processes. Another shortcoming of the analysis is the restriction to
symmetric equilibria which may not be innocuous. However, comparing expected pay-
offs in the star network to payoffs in the complete network with one non-working "spe-
cialist" showed that allowing for some degree of asymmetry does not change the basic
intuition of our results. In incomplete network structures the delay mitigates free-riding
and increases the probability of success, which may increase welfare. An incomplete net-
work generates strictly higher payoffs than the complete network only in case both forces,
delay and specialization, are present.
Despite the complexity network structures can create, we showed that they affect the
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behavior of agents in an intuitive way. This offers some suggestions as to how equilibrium
outcomes and strategies could be characterized in other settings (e.g., for other payoff
generating processes) as well. Further, the network structures considered in this chapter
can be understood as specific monitoring structures, and it would be possible to analyze
the strategic experimentation game for monitoring structures which are not derived from
networks. What should be clear, however, is that the empty and the complete network are
two opposite ends of the spectrum. Consequently, for symmetric monitoring structures
we expect the main conclusions of the network case to remain valid. Of course, it would
be desirable to obtain a generalization of the results for irregular structures as well, which
seems to be considerably more involved and will most likely imply specialization as in the
star network. The second equilibrium in the star network in which the central player uses
a strategy that is non-monotonic in the belief already points at the potential complexity
of equilibria in more complex network structures.
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Chapter 2
Innovation, intersectoral R&D spillovers
and intellectual property rights1
2.1 Introduction
The importance or profitability of a new idea or innovation often depends on how in-
novations in different areas complement each other. For example, the effectiveness of a
new drug in the treatment of a certain disease might depend on the availability of ma-
chines or tests to diagnose the disease at an early stage. The diffusion of new software or
applications depends on the ability of existing hardware to operate such programs. Pro-
duction of a new product might be facilitated if new machines are available or progress in
resource extraction lowers the costs of production. Park (2004) shows that manufacturing
R&D has a substantial intersectoral R&D spillover effect on the productivity growth of
the nonmanufacturing sector. Consequently, the profitability of innovation activities in
one field is linked to the success of developments in other areas and these intersectoral
R&D spillovers are the subject of our research.
In this chapter we offer a model to analyze situations in which the aforementioned
complementarities in the innovation process are present. We consider a situation where
firms operate in one of two sectors (for example, software and hardware). Each firm
can engage in research in its respective field of specialization where the profit that can
1This chapter originated from a joint research project in collaboration with Michael Metzger on comple-
mentarities in models of strategic experimentation.
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be earned from an invention depends not only on own effort or R&D investment, but
also on innovation efforts and outcomes in the other field. More precisely, we analyze
a game of strategic experimentation with externalities between different sectors. Our
model is based on the discrete time version of the exponential bandit model by Keller et
al. (2005) as offered in Heidhues et al. (2015). In games of strategic experimentation2 firms
commonly face identical two-armed bandit machines where the outcomes of the arms are
uncertain. Firms learn about the type of the arms by playing repeatedly and observing the
outcomes. This active learning is also called experimentation. In our interpretation firms
can invest in research projects of unknown quality which is either good or bad. A bad
project never leads to an invention and it is optimal not to invest, whereas investment in
a good project leads to a discovery with positive probability and investment is profitable.
Such a setup describes situations in which firms invest in research where they do not
know whether the research will be successful at all and if so, when they will observe a
success. Besanko and Wu (2010) refer to this as research projects facing "if" and "when"
uncertainty.
In what follows we analyze the innovation processes in two sectors where innovation
activities within one sector are considered as substitutes as in Keller et al. (2005). Inno-
vation activities in one sector, however, are complements to innovation activities in the
other sector. To be more specific, we assume that the payoffs in the first sector are in-
dependent of what happens in the second sector, while payoffs that can be earned from
an invention in the second sector are higher if there was a discovery in the first sector.
Hence, we will refer to the first sector as the independent sector and to the second sector
as the dependent sector.3
Economic policies that influence the R&D activities of firms can have unexpected con-
sequences if the policy maker is not aware of spillovers across sectors. For instance, the
2See Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) for a survey on multi-armed bandit models and their application
in economics.
3Given the findings of Park (2004) that manufacturing R&D has an intersectoral spillover effect on non-
manufacturing productivity growth while nonmanufacturing R&D does not have the same effect on man-
ufacturing productivity, we find it plausible to assume an asymmetric relationship between innovations
in the two sectors. This allows us to compare research projects that have a complementary character to
research projects without this feature.
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Federal Trade Commission (2011) [FTC] states that especially in the IT sector, patent no-
tification is characterized by a lack of transparency which might cause firms to postpone
investing. At the same time the U.S. National Science Foundation invests into ICT re-
search emphasizing the importance of this research for other fields.4 Hence, if policies are
implemented that increase transparency in the ICT sector, this affects other research areas
as well. In this chapter it is shown what effects one can expect to observe in the presence
of spillovers across sectors, which seems to be particularly relevant given the inter- and
multidisciplinary character of present day research. More precisely, besides analyzing the
effects of a change in intellectual property rights [IPR] on investment within a sector, we
as well study the impact on investment in a complementary sector. In particular, we want
to know how project choice (that is, which sector a firm selects) is influenced by intersec-
toral R&D spillovers, and how IPR that guarantee the optimal choice for independent
sectors differ from those for dependent sectors.
To answer these questions we analyze a dynamic two-firm model of R&D investment
with inter- and intrasectoral R&D spillovers. Our first finding is that whether a firm in
the dependent sector invests more in research in the presence of intersectoral spillovers
depends on how fast firms reach a belief about the viability of the research at which in-
vestment is no longer profitable. If the firm in the independent sector learns fast, it stops
investing earlier after a history of failures. This implies that a firm in the dependent sec-
tor knows sooner that it will not be able to obtain the high profit that results from two
complementary inventions. The firm then invests the same amount as without comple-
mentarities. On the other hand, if the firm in the independent sector makes a discovery or
learns comparatively slowly, research investment in the dependent sector in the presence
of complementarities exceeds investment without complementarities.
Similarly to Besanko and Wu (2010, 2013) we allow for different levels of intrasectoral
spillovers. Without intrasectoral spillovers only the firm making the discovery can profit
from it, while positive spillovers allow the unsuccessful firm to copy an invention and
4See CIF21 (Cyberinfrastructure Framework for 21st Century Science and Engineering). Also in the UK,
the (2010) report of the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills on the allocation of research funding
shows that research funds are dedicated to bring together ICT research with other areas (as e.g., medicine)
to enable multidisciplinary research.
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generate profits as well. The easier it is to imitate the invention of another firm (i.e., the
higher the level of intrasectoral spillovers), the more firms should invest in R&D from the
perspective of a welfare-maximizing social planner. However, R&D investment of strate-
gic firms decreases in the level of intrasectoral spillovers, because the easier it becomes to
imitate, the stronger is the incentive of firms to reduce own R&D investment and free-ride
on the R&D investment of the other firm.
After analyzing R&D investment for a given choice of sectors or research lines, we
concentrate on the interplay between inter- and intrasectoral R&D spillovers when firms
select the line of research in the beginning of the game. If welfare does not depend on
the level of intrasectoral R&D spillovers, a social planner prefers joint research in the
independent sector (to increase the probability of a discovery) for beliefs where strategic
firms pursue different lines of research. Whether the social planner prefers joint research
in the dependent sector depends on the level of intersectoral spillovers. More precisely,
the social planner faces a trade-off between increasing the probability of success in the
dependent sector through joint research, and having firms work in different sectors which
allows the firm in the dependent sector to obtain a higher payoff after two complementary
discoveries. Which effect dominates depends on the extra payoff associated with two
complementary innovations and the probability of a discovery. If welfare is increasing in
intrasectoral spillovers, the social planner prefers diversification if firms face a winner-
takes-all competition to avoid too much competition on one line. For perfect positive
spillovers the social planner prefers joint research in the independent sector, while joint
research in the dependent sector is only preferred if intersectoral spillovers are low.
Finally, we ask how firms can be encouraged to choose the socially optimal research
line. We assume that this decision can be influenced through the design of IPR, which
are interpreted as policies that influence the level of intrasectoral spillovers. If consumer
surplus is decreasing in the level of intrasectoral spillovers, imitating a successful inven-
tion in the dependent sector is exacerbated to encourage an entering firm to locate in the
independent sector and thereby create positive intersectoral R&D spillovers. If welfare
is increasing in intrasectoral spillovers, imitating an invention in the dependent sector is
facilitated to foster joint research.
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This chapter is the first to study intersectoral R&D spillovers in a model of innovation
with uncertainty. While Steurs (1995) studies intersectoral spillovers without uncertainty,
Besanko and Wu (2010, 2013) focus on the impact of uncertainty on R&D investment, if re-
search is concentrated in one sector only. The combination of intersectoral R&D spillovers
and uncertainty determines not only R&D investment within a sector but also the selec-
tion of research lines. Knowing how such spillovers affect a firm’s decision to invest in
a certain research line offers insights into how intellectual property rights interact with
intersectoral spillovers and how they can be used to influence the firms’ investment deci-
sions.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the model. In Section 2.3
we analyze strategic and and socially optimal R&D investment after firms have selected a
sector. After that, in Section 2.4, we analyze the decision of selecting a sector in the begin-
ning of the game, before discussing IPR in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 contains a discussion
and conclusion. All proofs are relegated to Appendix B.
2.1.1 Related literature
Intersectoral R&D spillovers have been studied by Steurs (1995) in a two-industry, two
firms-per-industry model. Intersectoral spillovers affect R&D investment directly and
indirectly through changing the influence of intrasectoral spillovers. Further, research co-
operatives across sectors might be more socially beneficial than cooperatives in one sector.
Unlike in the model considered subsequently R&D in Steuers (1995) is not associated with
uncertainty regarding feasibility or timing. That is, research leads to a cost reduction with
certainty. Moreover, while Steurs (1995) focuses on the impact of intersectoral spillovers
on output and profits, we concentrate on the selection of research lines and investigate
how intrasectoral spillovers (or IPR) can be used to encourage firms to select optimally
between research lines.
A few papers consider complementarities in innovation and the consequences of com-
plementarities for the design of intellectual property rights (see e.g., Gancia and Zilibotti,
2005 or Young, 1993). More recently, Chen (2012) analyzes the innovation frequency of
durable goods that are perfect complements and shows that interdependencies of inno-
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vation decisions lead to coordination failures between producers. While Chen (2012)
focuses on product complementarity Bessen and Maskin (2009) consider technological
complementarities. More precisely, they show that when innovation is sequential (each
successive innovation builds on its predecessors) and complementary (each innovator
takes a different research line), patent protection is not necessarily useful for encouraging
innovation. Hunt (2004) also studies sequential innovation in a model with endogenous
industry structure and shows that there is a unique patentability standard that maximizes
the rate of innovation. Our model differs from these papers in the following ways. First,
we explicitly assume that, while inventions might complement each other, a success in
one sector is not necessary to generate profits from innovations in other fields, so we do
not have perfect complements. Second, we do not consider a sequential setting in which
innovations build on each other. That is, a success in one sector does not affect the prob-
ability of success in the other sector.
Amir et al. (2003) analyze cooperative and non-cooperative R&D investment and char-
acterize the profit-maximizing R&D cartel when both R&D investment and intrasectoral
spillovers are cooperatively chosen. In the profit-maximizing cartel the spillover is either
maximal and firms cooperatively choose their R&D investment or only one firm invests
and the spillover is minimal. Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002) analyze the impact of uncer-
tainty on cooperative R&D in the presence of "when"-uncertainty and show that firms
want to coordinate R&D investment but not necessarily share the innovation.
Besides this, the chapter relates to the literatures studying the role of competition in
models of strategic experimentation. Akcigit and Liu (2015) investigate the effect of com-
petition if firms can choose between a risky and a safe research line and do not observe the
actions and failures of others. Two types of inefficiencies arise; one due to firms switch-
ing to the safe alternative too early and one due to wasteful duplication of R&D effort.
Besanko and Wu (2010, 2013) and Das (2013) study investment in an exponential bandit
framework with payoff externalities. Acemoglu et al. (2011) show that patents improve
the allocation of resources in a model of experimentation. These models differ from ours
in that they consider only one sector and there are no intersectoral R&D spillovers or
complementarities between different lines of research.
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2.1.2 Examples
Firms can invest in uncertain research in different fields or sectors. For instance, the
development of a new drug in the pharmaceutical industry or medical sciences, and new
techniques for data analysis in the field of computer sciences or statistics. In general, it
is not clear whether a success can be achieved or when it will be achieved. While firms
invest in research (e.g., on the drug), they become more and more pessimistic that the
development of a new drug is feasible if they do not achieve a breakthrough. After the
first discovery both firms know that this research line is viable and, for example, a cure
of the disease is possible. If one firm conducts research on a new drug while the other
develops new tools for data analysis, a success of either one does not tell the other firm
whether it will be successful as well. New techniques for data analysis or advances in
ICT might, however, facilitate the analysis of clinical trials and thereby lower the costs
of development for the drug. This example incorporates several features of our model.
First, the discovery of a new drug does not affect the profitability of new data analysis
techniques. Second, even without progress in data analysis a drug that was found to be
effective can be profitably sold, and third, improvements in data analysis alone do not
generate any profit for the pharmaceutical firm if it cannot develop the drug.
There are several empirical examples of inventions that feature intersectoral R&D
spillovers. For instance, researchers at the Mayo clinic conducted a study on gene ex-
pression in the brain to improve understanding of Alzheimer’s disease. The researchers
used genetic interaction studies in which effects of pairs of gene changes are studied. This
process involves the analysis of billions of DNA base pairs and requires substantial com-
putational processing time. By using the Blue Waters supercomputer the computation
time was reduced from more than a year to merely two days.5
2.2 Model
The model is based on the discrete time strategic experimentation model of Heidhues
et al. (2015) with the main difference that there are two sectors (research lines, projects)
5See U.S. National Science Foundation (2015).
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s = 1, 2. There are two firms i = 1, 2 that can invest in R&D in discrete time in t = 1, 2, ..., T
and discount future payoffs by a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
2.2.1 Timing
The game proceeds in three stages.
Stage 1: Selecting a sector
In the first stage of the game, in t = 0, firms decide which research line to pursue, i.e., they
decide in which of the two sectors to locate. This decision is irreversible and determines
in which of the two research lines a firm can invest in stage 2. For example, high sunk
costs to start research on a particular research line might make a later change to a different
field too costly.
Stage 2: R&D investment
In the second stage, the research stage, in each sector s = 1, 2 firms can invest up to one
unit of an available resource (e.g., money or effort) in research in each period of time until
time T < ∞. The action or investment decision at time t is denoted by ks,t ∈ [0, 1].6 If
ks,t = 0 the firm does not invest in research, and ks,t = 1 means that the firm invests its
entire resource. Firms are not allowed to experiment after time T , that is, ks,t is restricted
to be 0 for all t > T .7 R&D investment is costly and costs c > 0 are proportional to
investment meaning that a firm choosing investment level ks,t pays costs ks,tc at time t.
R&D investment can lead to a discovery depending on the state of the world. The
state of the world in sector 1 is independent of the state in sector 2 and for each sector it
can be either good or bad. If it is bad no discovery can be made and benefits of research
are zero. If it is good discoveries occur with probability ks,tλs. Discoveries in sector 1 and
sector 2 are independent of each other and independent across time and across players.
Upon the first discovery (also called breakthrough) firms know that a sector is good. A
6Clearly ks,t depends on i as well, but we do not make this explicit in the notation (unless necessary) to
enhance readability.
7This assumption allows us to solve for the optimal strategy using backward induction. Moreover, in
many instances research funds are granted for a limited period of time and are only prolonged in the case
of a success, so that arbitrarily long experimentation without success is not possible.
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discovery is the beginning of the third stage in which the invention is sold in the product
market. That is, a discovery in period t generates profits from period t+ 1 onwards.
Stage 3: Product market competition
The profit firms earn from an invention depends on the situation in the product market
and we distinguish two scenarios. First, each firm can be in a different sector and hence
acts as a monopolist in this sector. Second, firms compete in the product market in the
same sector.
Upon discovery a monopolist in sector s = 1, 2 sells one unit each period at zero
marginal costs and price xs. We assume that the monopolist is able to reap the entire
consumer surplus and hence the price equals the consumers’ willingness to pay for the
discovery. Payoffs in sector 1 are unaffected by sector 2 and conditional on a successful
discovery the monopolist receives a per period profit of x1 which we normalize to 1. In
sector 2 we have the following situation. If sector 2 is good a monopolist obtains x in case
there was a discovery in sector 1, and x in case there was no discovery in sector 1, where
we assume that x > x. Subsequently we will refer to sector 1 as the independent sector
and to sector 2 as the dependent sector.
In case both firms are in the same sector competition in the product market affects
profits and consumer surplus. We assume that after a discovery every period each firm
sells one unit and collusive behavior is prohibited. We denote the consumer surplus in
sector s if both firms compete in this sector in the product market by ψs and assume
ψs > 0. Further, competition lowers the profit each firm obtains to αxs, where α ∈ (0, 1).
2.2.2 Intrasectoral R&D spillovers
If both firms work on the same research line intrasectoral R&D spillovers determine how
easily the discovery of one firm can be imitated or used by the unsuccessful firm. In the
benchmark models by Keller et al. (2005) or Heidhues et al. (2015), all firms benefit equally
from one success so that it does not matter who achieves the breakthrough. While this
seems to be a plausible assumption if players are members of a team who share a com-
mon goal, we might as well find situations in which the agent who has a breakthrough
receives some sort of reward. For example, firms might enjoy some periods of monopoly
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profits in which other firms are not allowed or able to copy their innovation, employees
might receive a bonus on top of their salary, or players might simply gain utility from the
achievement of a discovery itself.
More precisely, we assume that the firm who has the breakthrough receives αxs, while
the other firm receives γsαxs in sector s = 1, 2, with γs ∈ [0, 1]. If γs = 0 we have a winner-
takes-all race in which only the inventor receives a high profit, while γs > 0 corresponds
to a situation in which a discovery has positive spillovers and can be profitably imitated
by the unsuccessful firm. In case both firms simultaneously make a discovery, payoffs
have to be shared and each firm obtains a share of 1+γs
2
. Besanko and Wu (2010) use the
same way to model intrasectoral spillovers, whereas in Besanko and Wu (2013) nega-
tive spillovers are possible because an invention has a negative impact on an established
product of the unsuccessful firm.8
The parameter γ can also be interpreted as a measure of intellectual property rights.
A small γ reflects a situation in which an invention cannot be imitated by a competitor
easily. This can be due to long patent periods or strong patent protection in which patents
are wide in scope. A high γ corresponds to an environment in which an innovation can
be easily copied and profitably used by an imitator, for example, because patent periods
are short or patents are narrow so that an imitator can sell a similar product. In particular,
inventions might be adapted for sale in a different geographical region or the technique
of the inventor might be applied by the imitator in a different context.
2.2.3 Beliefs and informational externalities
Firms attach a probability to each sector being good and we assume that they start with
common priors. At time t the probability firms attach to sector s = 1, 2 being good is
denoted by ps,t. We assume that all actions and outcomes are perfectly observable by all
players. When talking about firms in different sectors this assumption might seem unre-
alistic. One can, however, simply consider the problem of a corporation with subsidiaries
being active in different branches interpreting player 1 as an employee in one department
8Negative spillovers correspond to γs < 0 and are not considered in the subsequent analysis.
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or subsidiary and player 2 as an employee in another one. Apart from that, players can
also be interpreted as researchers in different institutes or departments at one university.
Beliefs depend on the occurrence of a breakthrough and in a situation where all ac-
tions and outcomes are perfectly observable common posterior beliefs prevail. Beliefs are
updated according to Bayes’ rule meaning that the subjective probability that sector s is
good after investing ks,t without a discovery is given by
ps,t+1 =
ps,t(1− ks,tλs)
ps,t(1− ks,tλs) + 1− ps,t , (2.1)
where 1− ks,tλs is the probability of experimenting without success in s conditional on s
being good. In case of a breakthrough the posterior belief jumps to 1. Every time firms
experiment without success, they become more pessimistic about the research being vi-
able. Firms are risk neutral expected profit maximizers and a firm is said to experiment
(or invest in R&D) if it invests (chooses ks,t > 0) before knowing the state of the world.
In a good sector 2 the expected profit is x2 = x+ (x− x)p1,tqt, where qt equals k1,tλ1 +
λ1
∑T
r=t+1 δ
r−tk1,r
∏r−1
l=t (1 − λ1k1,l) if there was no breakthrough in sector 1 up to time t,
and 1 otherwise. Denoting x−x by x˜, x2 = x+ x˜p1,tqt equals x if there was a breakthrough
in sector 1, as in this case qt = 1 and p1,t = 1. To avoid the trivial case where it is never
optimal to invest in R&D we impose
δλsxsα > c(1− δ), (2.2)
which implies that in a good sector expected profits exceed the costs of research. That is,
in each sector it is optimal to invest (ks,t = 1) in case the state of the world is good and
choose ks,t = 0 if the state is bad.
2.2.4 Producers, consumers and welfare
Producer surplus is increasing in γs, i.e., producers are better off, the easier it is to imitate
the invention of the other firm. Consumer surplus, however, might be decreasing in γs.
In what follows we will distinguish two possible cases. First, we consider the case where
consumer surplus is decreasing in γs and welfare does not depend on γs. This means
that γs shifts the available surplus between consumers and producers. Suppose the con-
sumers’ valuation of two units is given by xs(1 + α) and the firms generate a profit of
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xsα(1 + γs), which also equals the price that has to be paid by the consumers. Then the
consumer surplus ψs is given by xs(1− αγs) and welfare Ws = xs(1 + α). Second, we an-
alyze the case where consumer surplus does not depend on intrasectoral R&D spillovers
and hence welfare is increasing in γs. This means that γs does not simply shift the surplus
between consumers and producers, but determines the size of the surplus. Subsequently
we will focus on the results for ψs = 0.9
2.2.5 Investment strategies and equilibrium concept
Starting from t = 1 firms choose their R&D investment ks,t ∈ [0, 1] given their own loca-
tion as well as the location of the other firm. An investment strategy for a firm in sector
1 is a mapping that assigns to each belief p1,t a player can have about sector 1 an action
k1,t ∈ [0, 1] for t = 1, 2, ..., T . In sector 2 a pure strategy assigns to each tuple (p1,t, p2,t)
an action k2,t ∈ [0, 1] for t = 1, 2, ..., T . We focus on equilibria in Markovian strategies.
Moreover, if both firms are located in the same sector they are restricted to symmetric
strategies. In the next section we analyze R&D investment for a given choice of sectors,
before turning to the selection of a sector in Section 2.4.
2.3 R&D investment with intersectoral R&D spillovers
As a first step we derive the investment strategy for a given sector, that is, we start our
analysis in stage 2. We start by analyzing the R&D investment of firms when each firm is
located in a different sector in the presence of intersectoral R&D spillovers from the inde-
pendent sector (e.g., computer sciences) to the dependent sector (e.g., medical research).
After that, we look at the situation where both firms research in the same sector. Strate-
gic R&D investment is compared to the welfare-maximizing R&D investment of a social
planner who takes the profit of both firms and the consumer side into account.
9The results do not change qualitatively if we consider a different payoff specification as long as welfare
is increasing in γs. For example, suppose the consumers value two units at x(1+α), and the price they have
to pay equals 2αx, which means that consumer surplus is given by x(1 − α). Moreover, the imitator has
to pay costs for imitating the discovery that are decreasing in γs and given by xα(1 − γs). Then producer
surplus equals xα(1 + γs) and welfare x(1 + αγs).
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2.3.1 One firm in each sector
First, we analyze the behavior of firms when one firm is located in each sector, where we
assume that firm 1 is located in sector 1 and firm 2 in sector 2.
Strategic R&D investment
Let us start by looking at the independent sector 1. The firm maximizes its total expected
profit given by
(1− δ)E
[ ∞∑
t=1
δt−1(δX1,t − k1,tc)
]
(2.3)
by choosing an optimal action profile {k1,t}Tt=1. The expectation is taken w.r.t. the belief
p1,t and the strategy, and X1,t ∈ {0, 1} is the profit resulting from research in sector 1
at time t. By Bellman’s Principal of Optimality we can rewrite the profit maximization
problem recursively so that the value function of the firm in the independent sector at a
given point in time satisfies
u1(p1,t) = max
k1,t∈[0,1]
{−(1− δ)k1,tc+ δE[u1(p1,t+1)|p1,t, k1,t]}. (2.4)
The first term on the r.h.s., −(1− δ)k1,tc, represents the normalized costs of research. The
second term, δE[u1(p1,t+1)|p1,t, k1,t], represents the discounted expected continuation pay-
off. This continuation payoff equals 1 with the probability p1,tk1,tλ1 that the sector is good
and the firm has a breakthrough at time t. The continuation payoff equals u1(p1,t+1) with
the probability 1− p1,tk1,tλ1 that there is no breakthrough, where p1,t+1 = p1,t(1−λ1k1,t)1−p1,tλ1k1,t . If a
firm invests without success its belief declines, and as expected payoffs are increasing in
the belief, expected payoffs from investing decrease over time in the absence of a break-
through. Consequently, the firm invests for high or optimistic beliefs and stops for low
or pessimistic beliefs. Lemma 2.1 states the optimal investment strategy for a monopolist
in sector 1. The firm follows a time-invariant cutoff strategy with cutoff belief pa1. This
threshold belief is increasing in costs and decreasing in δ and λ1. That is, as firms become
more patient or the probability of a success increases, firms invest more in R&D and the
likelihood of a discovery increases.
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Lemma 2.1. In the independent sector the monopolist’s optimal investment strategy for t ≤ T is
ka1,t =
 1 for p1,t ∈ [pa1, 1],0 otherwise,
where
pa1 =
(1− δ)c
δλ1
.
Let us now turn to the dependent sector. The firm’s value function satisfies
u2(p1,t, p2,t) = max
k2,t∈[0,1]
{
−(1− δ)k2,tc+ δE[u2(p1,t+1, p2,t+1)|p1,t, p2,t, k1,t, k2,t]
}
. (2.5)
The first term in braces on the r.h.s. again represents the costs of R&D. The continua-
tion payoff is x2 = x+ x˜p1,tqt with the probability p2,tλ2k2,t that firm 2 observes a success,
u2(1, p2,t+1) with the probability (1−p2,tλ2k2,t)p1,tλ1k1,t that firm 2 does not make a discov-
ery but firm 1 does, and u2(p1,t+1, p2,t+1) with the probability (1− p2,tλ2k2,t)(1− p1,tλ1k1,t)
that neither makes a discovery. As above, we can derive the belief below which invest-
ing is no longer optimal in the dependent sector. This belief depends on the actions and
outcomes in the independent sector as can be seen in Lemma 2.2.
Lemma 2.2. In the dependent sector the monopolist’s optimal investment strategy for t ≤ T is
ka2,t =
 1 for p2,t ∈ [p
stop
2 (p1), 1],
0 otherwise,
where
pstop2 (p1) =
(1− δ)c
δλ2(x+ p1,tqt(p1)x˜)
,
and
qt(p1) =
 1 for p1,t = 1,ka1,tλ1 + λ1∑Tr=t+1 δr−tka1,r∏r−1l=t (1− λ1ka1,l) otherwise.
If firm 1 stops investing before firm 2, then qt(p1) = 0 and we denote the autarky cutoff
pstop2 at qt = 0 by pa2. This is also the belief at which the firm in sector 2 stops investing in
case there are no intersectoral spillovers, meaning x˜ = 0. How many time periods it takes
until the posterior belief falls below the respective cutoff depends, among others, on the
success probabilities λ1 and λ2, as they determine how strong the belief declines after ob-
serving a failure. Additionally, they specify the value of the stopping cutoff. If λ1 > λ2, p1
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declines faster than p2, but the stopping cutoff pa1 is smaller or more pessimistic than pa2. If
all parameters of the model are the same (prior, discount factor and payoffs), firms with a
higher λ might stop at an earlier or later point in time, as it is not clear which effect domi-
nates (see also Halac, Kartiv and Liu, 2013). Following a breakthrough in the independent
sector, qt = 1 and p1,t = 1 and the firm in the dependent sector experiments until p
stop
2 at
qt(p1) = 1, which we denote by pb2. In case firm 1 still experiments but there was no break-
through in the independent sector so far, qt(p1) = ka1,tλ1+λ1
∑T
r=t+1 δ
r−tka1,r
∏r−1
l=t (1−λ1ka1,l)
and the corresponding cutoff is denoted by p′2(p1). We have pa2 > p′2(p1) > pb2. The prob-
ability of making a discovery in the independent sector decreases over time and so does
qt, which means that p′2(p1) increases and goes to pa2 as qt(p1) decreases.
We are particularly interested in whether intersectoral spillovers induce firms to invest
more in research than they would in the absence of the complementarity, that is, whether
experimentation beyond the autarky solution is possible. From Lemma 2.2 we see that
a breakthrough in the independent sector increases expected profits from a discovery in
the dependent sector and causes firm 2 to experiment longer. Experimentation below
pa2 in the dependent sector without a breakthrough in the independent one is, however,
only possible if pa1 is reached after the firm in the dependent sector reaches pa2. This can
happen if, for example, firm 1 is sufficiently more optimistic in the beginning. Further, it
is possible that firm 2 already stopped experimenting, but invests again if firm 1 makes a
discovery after firm 2 stopped. Corollary 2.1 summarizes these results.
Corollary 2.1. A firm in the dependent sector experiments for beliefs below the autarky cutoff pa2
if and only if one of the following is satisfied:
(i) There is a breakthrough in the independent sector.
(ii) In the absence of a breakthrough, the firm in the independent sector reaches the cutoff belief
pa1 after the firm in the dependent sector reaches pa2.
Welfare-maximizing R&D investment
Suppose now that a welfare-maximizing social planner, who takes the profits of the firms
and the benefits to consumers into account, can choose the optimal R&D investment of
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both firms. With one firm in each sector consumer surplus is zero and the socially optimal
R&D investment coincides with the optimal R&D investment of firms in a research coop-
eration aiming to maximize joint profits. Expected aggregate payoffs from action profile
(k1,t, k2,t) after a history of failures are given by
W (p1,t, p2,t, k1,t, k2,t) = −(1− δ)c(k1,t + k2,t) + δp1,tλ1k1,t + δp2,tλ2x2k2,t +
δ(1− p1,tλ1k1,t)u1(p1,t+1) + δ(1− p2,tλ2k2,t)u2(p1,t+1, p2,t+1).
Expected aggregate payoffs W (p1,t, p2,t, k1,t, k2,t) are linear in k1,t and k2,t. Therefore, the
socially optimal strategy can be found by calculating and comparing the aggregate payoff
for (k1,t, k2,t) = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)} assuming there are no experiments in t + 1.
Denoting W as a function of (k1,t, k2,t) only, we see that the same cutoff beliefs as for
strategic R&D investment, pa1 and pa2, determine when W (1, 0) ≥ W (0, 0) and W (0, 1) ≥
W (0, 0) respectively. Furthermore, W (1, 1) ≥ W (1, 0) if p2 ≥ p′2(p1), which is as well the
same cutoff as in the strategic setting. Finally, W (1, 1) ≥ W (0, 1) if p1 is greater than or
equal to
(1− δ)c
δλ1(1 + λ2p2x˜)
< pa1. (2.6)
In the dependent sector strategic and welfare-maximizing R&D investment coincide, that
is, firms experiment until the same cutoff belief. In the independent sector, however, the
social planner experiments beyond the single firm cutoff, because of the positive effect
on expected payoffs in the dependent sector (see also Figure 2.1). A strategic firm in
the independent sector does not take the effect of its investment on the other firm into
account and stops at too optimistic a belief. This inefficiency can be completely ascribed
to the complementarity between sectors.
2.3.2 Two firms in one sector
Let us now analyze R&D investment if both firms are in the same sector. In this case
intrasectoral spillovers γs indicate how easily the discovery of one firm can be imitated
by the other firm and moreover competition in the product market decreases profits to
αxs and αγsxs respectively. We assume that also for γs = 0 (which implies a profit of zero
for the imitator) the unsuccessful firm imitates the inventor and the consumer surplus in
sector s is positive.
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pa2
pa1
p2,t
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(0, 0) (1, 0)
(1, 1)(0, 1)
Figure 2.1: Action profiles (k1, k2) for different combinations of beliefs. In the dark region
the socially optimal action profile (1, 1) differs from the strategic one (0, 1) or (0, 0) for
parameter values δ = 0.8, c = 0.3, λ1 = 0.2, λ2 = 0.25, x = 0.75 and x˜ = 0.5.
Strategic R&D investment
Subsequently we characterize the symmetric equilibrium when both firms are in the same
sector so that intersectoral spillovers are irrelevant. In this equilibrium both firms choose
ks,t = 1 above a certain threshold belief ps and ks,t = 0 for beliefs below ps > pas . In
between each firm invests ks,t ∈ (0, 1) to make the other firm indifferent towards its level
of R&D investment.
Proposition 2.1. If both firms are in the same sector s = 1, 2 in the symmetric equilibrium each
firm chooses
k∗s,t =

1 for ps,t ∈ [ps, 1],
−(1−δ)c+δps,tλsxsα
δps,tλ2s
1+γs
2
xsα
for ps,t ∈ (ps, ps),
0 otherwise,
for t ≤ T , where x1 = 1, x2 = x,
p
s
=
(1− δ)c
δλsxsα
, and Hps =
(1− δ)c
δλs
(
1− λs 1+γs2
)
xsα
.
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Figure 2.2: R&D investment in equilibrium if both firms are in sector 1 for δ = 0.8, c = 0.3,
α = 0.95, λ1 = 0.2 and γ1 = 1.
Two failed experiments from ps yield a posterior belief below ps. Similarly, if both firms
choose k∗s,t ∈ (0, 1) for beliefs ps,t ∈ (ps, ps), the posterior belief is below the lower cutoff
belief in the absence of a success. This implies that in the symmetric equilibrium there
is at most one time period in which firms choose k∗s,t ∈ (0, 1). Further, as future payoffs
are discounted firms do not have an incentive to postpone experimentation. Figure 2.2
depicts the relationship between the belief and R&D investment in equilibrium.
R&D investment increases if firms become more patient or if the profit from a dis-
covery rises. An increase in the costs of R&D increases the cutoff and hence decreases
investment. While the lower cutoff belief is decreasing in the success probability λs, the
effect on the upper cutoff is ambiguous. The upper cutoff decreases in λs if intrasectoral
spillovers are small. Moreover, we see that ps is increasing in γs, which implies that R&D
investment is lower the higher γs. As it becomes easier to imitate the success of the other
firm, each firm reduces its own investment in equilibrium. Compared to the monopolist
firms invest less, i.e., p
s
> pa, because competition in the product market reduces the
expected profits from a discovery (note that p
s
= pas for α = 1).
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Welfare-maximizing R&D investment
To compare the R&D investment of strategic firms to the socially optimal investment, we
also restrict the social planner to symmetric strategies. If both firms are in sector s, welfare
is given by Ws = ψs + xsα(1 + γs), where xsα(1 + γs) is the producer surplus if each firm
sells one unit.
Proposition 2.2. The R&D investment of a welfare-maximizing social planner, who is restricted
to symmetric strategies, is given by
kws,t =

1 for ps,t ∈ [pws , 1],
−(1−δ)c
δpsWsλ2s
+ 1
λs
for ps,t ∈ (pws , pws ),
0 otherwise,
for t ≤ T , where
pw
s
=
(1− δ)c
δλsWs
, and Hpws =
(1− δ)c
δλs(1− λs)Ws ,
and Ws = x(1 + α) for ψs = x(1− αγs) and Ws = xα(1 + γs) for ψs = 0.
Comparing the lower cutoff belief of a social planner to the respective threshold used
by strategic firms, we see that the social planner experiments until a more pessimistic
belief after a history of failures. This is independent of the specification of consumer
surplus. Furthermore, socially optimal R&D investment is (weakly) increasing in intra-
sectoral spillovers γs. This is the main difference to strategic investment for which we
obtained the opposite result. While the social planner invests more if both firms can ben-
efit from one successful discovery, for strategic firms the incentive to free-ride increases
and investment decreases.10
The upper cutoff belief of the social planner lies below the one for strategic firms if
intrasectoral spillovers are high or the success probability λs is small. For high levels
of γs, for example γs = 1, kws ≥ k∗s for all ps ∈ [0, 1]. In this case the probability of
a discovery is higher under the socially optimal R&D investment than if firms choose
their R&D investment strategically. In a winner-takes-all competition (γs = 0), welfare-
maximizing investment can be higher or lower than strategic investment, depending on
the parameters of the model.
10See e.g. Bolton and Harris (1999), Heidhues et al. (2015), or Keller et al. (2005) for more details on the
free-riding problem in games of strategic experimentation.
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Let us briefly summarize the main points of this section. If firms are in different sec-
tors intrasectoral spillovers are irrelevant, but intersectoral spillovers affect R&D invest-
ment. The firm in the independent sector does not invest enough from the perspective
of a social planner, as it ignores the effect of its investment on profits in the dependent
sector. When firms are in the same sector, the complementarity is irrelevant and intrasec-
toral spillovers determine the difference between strategic and welfare-maximizing in-
vestment. For high intrasectoral spillovers welfare-maximizing R&D investment exceeds
strategic investment as strategic firms free-ride on the R&D investment of the competitor.
2.4 Selecting a sector
Now we want to analyze the effects of inter- and intrasectoral R&D spillovers on the se-
lection of research lines, that is, when firms choose one of the two sectors in the beginning
of the game. Firms are not allowed to change their decision later on. Together with the
assumption that firms cannot invest simultaneously in both research lines, this reflects the
idea that selecting a certain research line is associated with high sunk costs, for instance,
because specialized equipment has to be bought or staff has to be trained. R&D invest-
ment after sector choice is assumed to be given by the optimal strategic R&D investment
as described in Lemma 2.1, Lemma 2.2 and Proposition 2.1.11
First, consider the choice of research lines in t = 0 for strategic firms. The expected
profit of firm i if both firms are in sector s is
T∑
t=1
δt−1k∗s,t
(
ps
(
δα(1 + γs)λs
(
1− k
∗
s,tλs
2
)
− (1− δ)c
) t−1∏
r=1
(1− k∗s,rλs)2 − (1− δ)c(1− ps)
)
.
The first term describes the expected profit if the state of the world is good, while the last
term represents the bad state of the world. If the state of the world is bad, no discovery
will occur and the firm pays the costs of R&D until it stops to invest. If firms invest in
different sectors the firm in the independent sector obtains
T∑
t=1
δt−1ka1,t
(
p1 (δλ1 − (1− δ)c)
t−1∏
r=1
(1− ka1,rλ1)− (1− δ)c(1− p1)
)
,
11The main results stated in Propositions 2.3 and 2.4 do not change if R&D investment after sector choice
is the socially optimal R&D investment. This only shifts the intervals of beliefs in which the social planner
decides differently from the firms.
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while the firm in the dependent sector receives
T∑
t=1
δt−1ka2,t
(
p2 (δλ2(x+ x˜p1qt(p1))− (1− δ)c)
t−1∏
r=1
(1− k2,rλ2)− (1− δ)c(1− p2)
)
.
Firms are more likely to choose the same sector s, the higher ps and xs and the higher
α and γs. The belief and the expected profit xs increase the likelihood that a firm invests
in a given sector independently of strategic considerations. The other two parameters,
α and γs, reflect how competition affects the firms’ decisions. If competition is fierce
and imitation difficult, i.e., if α and γs are both low, agents are more likely to invest in
different sectors. Intersectoral R&D spillovers increase the likelihood that a firm invests
in the dependent sector instead of joining a firm in the independent sector.
Let us now compare which research line is chosen by strategic firms to the choice of
a social planner. In the sequel we assume that the social planner can only influence the
selection of a research line, but not R&D investment after sector choice. Let us,n denote
the individual expected payoff of a firm in sector s if the other firm is in sector n and
Ws,n(ps, pn) denotes welfare if one firm is in sector s and the other in sector n for s = 1, 2
and n = 1, 2. First, we consider the case where consumer surplus is decreasing in γs and
welfare does not depend on γs, i.e., ψs = xs(1 − αγs) and Ws = xs(1 + α). The results for
this case are summarized in Proposition 2.3. Second, we analyze the case where consumer
surplus ψs = 0 (see Proposition 2.4).
If welfare does not depend on γs, the social planner prefers joint research in the in-
dependent sector for beliefs, where strategic firms research in different sectors. Whether
there exists an interval of beliefs for which the social planner prefers joint research in
the dependent sector depends on the level of intersectoral spillovers. If intersectoral
spillovers are high, i.e., if x˜ is large, the social planner lets the firms pursue different
lines of research for beliefs at which the strategic firms both invest in the dependent line.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose one firm chooses the line of research in t = 0 for a given choice of the
other firm and consumer surplus is given by ψs = xs(1−αγs). Then the strategic choice coincides
with the choice of a social planner except that for all γs ∈ [0, 1]
(i) for sufficiently optimistic priors, p1 ≥ p1, the social planner lets the firm join the indepen-
dent sector for beliefs where a strategic firm starts research in the dependent sector;
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(ii) if x˜ is small the social planner lets the firm join the dependent sector for beliefs at which a
strategic firm starts research in the independent sector, and if x˜ is large the social planner
lets the firm start research in the independent sector for beliefs at which a strategic firm joins
the dependent sector.
Part (i) of Proposition 2.3 states that there exists an interval of beliefs for which the
social planner prefers if the firm joins the independent sector while a strategic firm starts
research in the dependent sector. The reason for this is the following: If both firms invest
in R&D in the same sector, they benefit from each others’ investment as this increases the
probability of a discovery. A firm choosing the sector strategically does not take the posi-
tive effect of its R&D investment on the other firm and consumers into account. However,
when deciding whether to start research in the dependent sector both the strategic firm as
well as the social planner account for the positive impact of R&D investment in the inde-
pendent sector on expected profits in the dependent sector. Hence, intersectoral spillovers
do not lead to any difference between the choice of the strategic firm and the social plan-
ner in a situation where one firm is already located in the independent sector and the
other firm decides whether to join. Differences in the selection of research lines are then
driven by intrasectoral spillovers and consumer surplus. Note that for pessimistic priors
p1 close to pa1 each firm invests very little into R&D and joint research does not increase
the probability of a success. In fact the probability of a discovery if both firms invest little
in R&D is lower than if one firm invests its entire resource. Thus, for pessimistic beliefs
the social planner prefers diversification over joint research in the same sector.
In part (ii) the firm decides whether to join the dependent sector. It depends on the
complementarity between sectors x˜ whether the social planner is more likely to start re-
search in the independent sector. If the benefit associated with two complementary suc-
cesses is high, there exists an interval of beliefs for which the social planner lets the firm
start research in the independent sector while a strategic firm joins the dependent sec-
tor, and vice versa if this benefit is rather small. This means that the social planner faces
a trade-off between letting firms experiment jointly in the dependent sector, which in-
creases the probability of a discovery, and experimenting in different sectors to potentially
exploit the complementarity.
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If welfare is increasing in the level of intrasectoral spillovers, it depends on the combi-
nation of inter- and intrasectoral R&D spillovers whether the social planner is more likely
to let firms research jointly in the same sector.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose one firm chooses the line of research in t = 0 for a given choice of the
other firm and consumer surplus is given by ψs = 0. Then the strategic choice coincides with the
choice of a social planner except that
(i) for sufficiently optimistic priors, p1 ≥ p1, there exists an interval of beliefs for which the
social planner lets firms research jointly in the independent sector while a strategic firm
starts research in the dependent sector if γ1 = 1 and vice versa if γ1 = 0;
(ii) a strategic firm joins the dependent sector for beliefs where the social planner lets firms
research in different sectors if γ2 = 0. For γ2 = 1 the social planner prefers joint research
in the dependent sector for beliefs where the strategic firm starts research in the independent
sector if and only if x˜ is small.
If consumer surplus is zero, the decision of the social planner and strategic firms dif-
fers because of the diverse influence of intrasectoral spillovers. For γ1 = γ2 = 0 the
social planner lets firms research in different sectors for beliefs where strategic firms en-
ter the same sector. If only one firm can obtain the profits from a discovery there exists
an interval of beliefs where aggregate expected profits are higher if firms do not work
on the same research line and thereby compete for the breakthrough. In case of perfect
spillovers, γs = 1, the social planner prefers joint research in the independent sector for
beliefs where strategic firms pursue different lines of research. Joint research in the de-
pendent sector is, however, only preferred if x˜ is small. In this case specialization in
which all research efforts are concentrated in one field yields higher expected payoffs
than investing in two complementary sectors. If the extra payoff is small firms are bet-
ter off increasing the probability of success in the dependent sector than exploiting the
complementarity.
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2.5 Intersectoral R&D spillovers and intellectual property
rights
Finally, we want to explore how firms can be induced to select the socially optimal re-
search line. We assume that the social planner can design IPR, which we interpret as
policies that determine the level of intrasectoral spillovers γs. As a measure of IPR γs
can, for instance, be influenced through changes in the duration or strength of patents,
or the transparency of the patent system. While a rise in patent duration or strength
corresponds to a decrease in γs, an increase in transparency reduces the likelihood of
duplication, which can be modeled through an increase in γs.
We are interested in finding γs such that the decision of strategic firms which research
line to pursue is aligned with the decision of a social planner. As the exact value of this
γs depends on how long firms experiment in equilibrium, we focus on the difference be-
tween IPR designed for two independent sectors and IPR that take the complementarity
into account. IPR that guarantee the socially optimal selection of research lines in t = 0
for complementary sectors are denoted by γ˜∗s and for independent sectors by γ∗s .
Proposition 2.5. Intellectual property rights that ensure that in t = 0 strategic firms select the
same research line as a social planner are such that γ∗1 = γ˜∗1 and
(i) γ∗2 > γ˜∗2 if consumer surplus is decreasing in γ2 while welfare does not depend on γ2;
(ii) γ∗2 < γ˜∗2 if consumer surplus does not depend on γ2, while welfare is increasing in γ2.
Intrasectoral spillovers in the independent sector that align the socially optimal choice
of sectors with the strategic choice are unaffected by the complementarity. This is intu-
itive as a firm deciding between joining the independent sector or starting research in the
dependent sector benefits from the complementarity and hence takes the positive impact
of investment in the independent sector on the dependent sector into account. For sector
2 it depends on the impact of intrasectoral spillovers (or IPR) on consumer surplus and
welfare, whether they are higher or lower for dependent sectors. Due to the intersectoral
spillovers research in different sectors becomes more attractive compared to joint research
in the dependent sector. If consumer surplus is decreasing in γ2, the social planner prefers
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research in different sectors and IPR are designed such that it is more difficult to imitate
an invention in the dependent sector if there is a complementary. Hence, IPR that induce
firms to select the socially optimal line of research encourage firms to work in different
sectors. If welfare is increasing in γ2, imitating an invention is facilitated to encourage
firms to both research in the dependent sector.
2.6 Discussion
In this chapter we analyzed a model of innovation in which the profitability of an in-
vention depends on the success of another research project. First, we showed that the
number of time periods until firms reach their stopping belief determines whether the
complementarity encourages additional R&D investment. Second, we compared strate-
gic and welfare-maximizing R&D investment for a given choice of sectors. In addition to
the free-riding inefficiency that occurs for high intrasectoral spillovers, there is another
source of inefficiency. If firms work on different research lines, the firm working in the in-
dependent sector ignores the positive effect of its investment on profits in the dependent
sector.
After that we analyzed the impact of inter- and intrasectoral R&D spillovers on the
decision of a firm which research lines to pursue. The social planner prefers more joint
research in the independent sector than strategic firms, but more joint research in the de-
pendent sector is only preferred if intersectoral spillovers are small. There exists a trade-
off between working in different sectors to exploit the complementary and experimenting
jointly which increases the probability of success.
Further, we investigated the possibility to encourage firms to select the socially opti-
mal line of research in the beginning of the game. Intrasectoral R&D spillovers in the
dependent sector that align the socially optimal and the strategic choice are lower in
case sectors are dependent if consumer surplus is decreasing in the level of intrasectoral
spillovers, that is, it is more difficult to imitate an invention in the dependent sector. The
complementary leads to an interval of beliefs in which it is socially optimal to work in
different sectors and exploit the complementary, but strategic firms enter the same sector.
By decreasing intrasectoral spillovers in the dependent sector joint research becomes less
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attractive and the strategic firm is more likely to start research in the independent sector.
If welfare is increasing in the level of intrasectoral spillovers, imitation in the dependent
sector is facilitated to foster joint investment.
Our results emphasize that research and innovation are influenced by both inter- and
intrasectoral spillovers, and especially their combination determines which research lines
are and should be pursued. Based on the report of the FTC (2011), the U.S. government
might consider implementing policies to increase the transparency of patents in the IT
sector: on the one hand to encourage investment within the sector, and on the other hand
to create positive spillovers to other sectors. Our model suggests that investment in the
IT sector can additionally be fostered by decreasing intrasectoral spillovers in a depen-
dent sector (e.g., medicine) to discourage firms from jointly pursuing research in the de-
pendent sector and encourage them to research in different fields. Hence, strong patent
protection, long patent periods or financial incentives solely available to inventors in the
dependent sector might lead to the same desired effects as an increase in transparency
in the independent sector. Such measures at the same time also increase strategic R&D
investment within the dependent sector and hence the likelihood of a discovery.
In this chapter we focused on positive intersectoral R&D spillovers in which profits in-
crease due to a complementary discovery. The opposite case, however, can arise as well.
That is, new inventions in one sector might have a negative impact on the profitability
of another invention. Negative intersectoral spillovers can be modeled by reversing the
order of x and x. This implies that x˜ is negative and the results in Section 2.3 are reversed.
More precisely, if a firm in the independent sector makes a discovery, the firm in the de-
pendent sector experiments less. Similarly, under the socially optimal R&D investment
firm 1 experiments less when it takes the negative impact of its investment on firm 2 into
account. Also the results of Section 2.4 are reversed. Negative intersectoral spillovers
strengthen the result that the social planner prefers firms to experiment jointly for beliefs
where strategic firms separate. Further, the social planner faces a trade-off between let-
ting firms compete for a discovery in the same sector and separating, where the firm in
the dependent sector suffers in case both make a discovery. As for positive spillovers it
depends on the magnitude of the profit reduction and success probabilities which effect
dominates.
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Chapter 3
The transparency of the patent system
and its impact on innovation
3.1 Introduction
Innovation benefits society by creating novel products and processes that raise the stan-
dard of living, meet unsatisfied needs, and offer solutions to society’s challenges in areas
such as energy, health or economic growth. The main goal of the patent system is to foster
innovation by granting exclusivity rights to the inventor, taking into account that inno-
vation is a complex process which can be expensive, risky and highly unpredictable (The
Federal Trade Commission [FTC], 2011). To promote innovation and enhance consumer
welfare the patent system and competition policies have to be synchronized. One area of
patent law that affects how well the patent system and competition policy work together
is notice, i.e., "how well a patent informs the public of what technology is protected" (FTC, 2011,
p. 2).
According to the FTC (2011) a clear patent notice promotes innovation by spurring
collaboration and by helping firms to identify relevant technologies. A patent notice that
lacks clarity might be unable to fulfill these tasks. In particular, uncertainties regarding
the scope or content of a patent might cause firms to hesitate to invest in innovative ac-
tivities or encourage them to engage in expensive clearance searches. Besides this, the
risk for post-launch patent assertions and litigation is high and, moreover, a clear patent
notice reduces wasteful duplication of research efforts. For these reasons the FTC (2011)
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identifies the need to improve the transparency of the patent notice.
While there have been numerous discussions in the economics literature whether,
when and what kind of patents are necessary to appropriate R&D investment and pro-
mote innovation, limited attention has been paid to issues arising from uncertainty as-
sociated with granted patents. This is somewhat surprising given that the incentives to
invest in R&D are determined by the reliability of patent protection. Thus, to understand
the incentives to invest in risky activities it is necessary to investigate the underlying
mechanisms explaining how R&D investment reacts to uncertainties in the patent system.
To this end, we develop a theoretical model to analyze how the level of transparency af-
fects R&D investment and to find out under which conditions more transparency indeed
increases welfare. Once we know how strategic firms react to changes in the level of
transparency, we can analyze whether the patent office can increase welfare by changing
the level of transparency and characterize the optimal information disclosure policy of
the patent office.
To answer these questions we consider a dynamic model of R&D investment in which
two firms invest in R&D of uncertain quality (i.e., it is not clear whether research can lead
to a discovery and if so, when a discovery will occur). The firms choose a stopping time
at which they irrevocably stop investing if they did not observe a success up to this point
in time. Each firm’s investment decision is private, i.e., unobservable by the competitor.
Upon a discovery a firm files a patent application at the patent office. In a transparent
system the patent office grants the patent and releases a notice that informs the public
(that is, the unsuccessful firm) about the discovery and the patent. In an intransparent
system the content of a patent can lack clarity (implying that firms might not be able to
identify patents relevant to them) and the scope of protection can be uncertain (meaning
that it is not clear whether new inventions lead to a patent and whether new inventions
infringe the existing patent).
First, we characterize the optimal stopping times of a monopolist and of firms that
cooperate in R&D. In both cases only intransparencies regarding the scope of a patent af-
fect the firms’ investment decisions, as in the absence of competition firms always know
which patents exist. A lack of clarity regarding patent scope reduces the expected profit
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of a patent and consequently R&D investment and welfare are increasing in the level of
transparency. When firms compete for patents, different degrees of R&D spillovers are
possible. First, we consider a winner-takes-all competition in which only the first discov-
ery obtains a patent and the game ends afterward. If no follow-up inventions are pos-
sible, intransparencies regarding the scope of the patent are irrelevant and the stronger
firm (i.e., the firm that is more likely to make a discovery) invests more in R&D. Further-
more, the R&D investment of the weaker firm is increasing in the level of transparency,
while for the stronger firm it depends on the difference in the firms’ R&D productivities.
If the two firms are relatively equally strong, the R&D investment of both firms increases
in the level of transparency. If, however, the stronger firm is considerably more likely
to innovate, her R&D investment is decreasing in the level of transparency. The reason
for this is the following. The probability that the weaker firm has an unobserved patent
is higher the less transparent the system. At the same time a lack of transparency de-
creases the R&D investment of the weaker firm and thereby the probability that this firm
has an unobserved patent. Depending on which of these two effects dominates, the R&D
investment of the stronger firm is increasing or decreasing in the level of transparency.
Second, we consider positive spillovers meaning that the unsuccessful firm can ben-
efit from an invention of the innovator. In this case there does not necessarily exist a
(unique) pure strategy equilibrium for certain levels of transparency. While for low and
high levels of transparency there exists a unique equilibrium, for intermediate levels no
equilibrium in pure strategies exists or two equilibria exist. More precisely, for certain
levels of transparency each firm wants to invest in R&D if the competitor does not invest.
As firms cannot observe each others’ R&D investment, it is possible that both invest, none
of them invests or each one of them. In the unique equilibrium the firms’ stopping times
are non-monotonic in the level of transparency and maximal in a perfectly intransparent
patent system in which firms never observe a patent by the rival.
The findings of the FTC further suggest that firms try to influence the clarity of the
patent notice through their patent application. Hence, we are interested in knowing what
happens if firms can influence the level of transparency, and whether firms have an in-
centive to do so, e.g., by obscuring their patent applications. In a winner-takes-all com-
petition the weaker firm has no incentive to change the level of transparency, while the
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stronger firm wants to be as intransparent as possible to discourage the R&D investment
of the weaker firm. If firms can profit from an invention of the competitor, both firms
want their competitor to invest as long as possible and select the level of transparency so
as to encourage the other firm to invest. As each firms’ investment is maximal under full
intransparency, high levels of intransparency prevail.
Furthermore, we want to know when the patent office (acting as a benevolent so-
cial planner) prefers full transparency. In a winner-takes-all competition the patent of-
fice prefers full transparency if the firms are similar in terms of their R&D productivities
(which implies that the R&D investment of both firms is increasing in the level of trans-
parency). However, if one firm is considerably more likely to make a discovery and ad-
ditionally also invests more in R&D in equilibrium, full transparency is not necessarily
optimal. A lack of transparency increases welfare if the R&D investment of the stronger
firm is decreasing in the level of transparency, while the weaker firm’s R&D investment
increases. In general, the optimal level of transparency depends on the difference be-
tween the expected costs of R&D (which are decreasing in the level of transparency) and
the value of a discovery. The higher the value of a discovery, the more the patent office
wants to encourage the firms to invest in R&D and thereby increase the chances of an
innovation. For perfect positive spillovers, the firms’ R&D investment is maximal in a
perfectly intransparent system. Hence, the patent office prefers high levels of intrans-
parency as long as the consumer surplus is sufficiently high compared to the costs of
R&D.
Finally, we consider the case of sequential innovation, where the first discovery paves
the way for follow-up inventions (as e.g., improvements of the original technology). This
means that intransparencies regarding patent scope and patent content affect R&D in-
vestment simultaneously. Depending on the value of the follow-up invention, sequential
innovation is similar to positive spillovers (if this value is high), or to a winner-takes-all
competition (if this value is low). If firms are uncertain whether new discoveries will
lead to a patent because the patent office might see them as a duplication of the exist-
ing technology, the likelihood that firms invest in R&D as well as the expected value of
the follow-up invention decrease. The risk of ex post legal disputes on the other hand
increases the likelihood that the inventor invests in R&D to obtain a second discovery
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despite its negative effect on the expected profit of the firm. By investing in R&D the
inventor might be able to prevent the imitator from infringing the first patent. A similar
observation can be made for a lack of clarity regarding patent content. In the presence of
positive R&D spillovers firms are more likely to invest in R&D for follow-up inventions
if the probability of not observing a patent of the competitor is high, because firms cannot
as easily free-ride on the R&D investment of the competitor.
A thorough economic analysis of R&D investment has to take into account the risky
nature of innovation as well as uncertainties stemming directly from the patent system.
Intellectual property rights as an instrument to promote innovation heavily depend on
how reliable those instruments are and ignoring possible uncertainties may lead to mis-
leading conclusions. For example, if the inventor has to fear infringement, the starting
situation for follow-up inventions for the inventor and the imitator is not the same and
their incentives to invest or obscure their patent application differ. This in turn implies
that R&D investment for the original discovery is affected and contrary to what one might
conjecture, R&D investment and welfare are not inevitably higher if this risk is elimi-
nated. Our results suggest that certain types of uncertainties can actually encourage R&D
investment. Thus, in any attempt to increase the transparency of the patent system, it
is important to carefully consider different types of intransparencies separately and how
each of them interacts with the market situation (e.g., the heterogeneity of the firms, com-
petition and R&D spillovers).
3.1.1 Related literature
In a broader context, this chapter is related to the literature studying the impact of intel-
lectual property rights on innovation.1 In particular, it relates to work focusing on optimal
disclosure of information, i.e., whether or when firms patent and thereby disclose novel
technologies. For example, Scotchmer and Green (1990) study how the stringency of the
novelty requirement affects the pace of innovation, while more recently, Hopenhayn and
Squintani (2016) analyze optimal patents with respect to the timing of information dis-
closure. So far, optimal information disclosure and the timing of information disclosure
1See, e.g., Rocket (2010) for a survey.
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were studied under the presumption that information disclosure and patent protection
are perfect in the sense that there is no uncertainty associated with the patent once it
is granted. Only limited attention has been dedicated to questions related to the trans-
parency of the patent system. One exception is Lemley and Shapiro (2005), who discuss
uncertainty associated with intellectual property rights, propose reforms to reduce this
uncertainty and finally discuss the effects of uncertainty on the incentives of firms to set-
tle disputes or litigate. Bessen and Meurer (2008) discuss problems of uncertainty (or
intransparency) of intellectual property rights as well as reform suggestions to improve
patent notice. Similar to the FTC (2011) the authors argue that clarity is central to attain
efficiency. However, none of these papers investigates the linkages between (strategic)
R&D investment, uncertain patent protection and competition in detail.
Furthermore, this chapter is related to the growing literature on strategic experimenta-
tion, which offers a suitable framework for modeling situations where uncertainty plays
a crucial role in the innovative process.2 The modeling framework employed in this chap-
ter is closely related to the model of Bonatti and Hörner (2011), where innovations arrive
in the form of fully revealing breakthroughs. In Bonatti and Hörner (2011) discoveries
are public while R&D investment (or effort) is private.3 Many models of strategic exper-
imentation (including Bolton and Harris, 1999, Keller et al., 2005, Keller and Rady, 2010,
Bonatti and Hörner, 2011, Bimpikis and Drakopolous, 2014, Heidhues et al., 2015) study a
team problem in which the discovery of one team member has perfect positive spillovers
to the other members of the team. In these models severe forms of free-riding arise due
to the public goods character of information. More recently, competition has been intro-
duced into these models to study situations in which the inventor has some advantage
compared to the unsuccessful imitators. Examples include Besanko and Wu (2010, 2013),
Acemoglu et al. (2011), Das (2013), Akcigit and Liu (2015) and Wong (2015), where the
last three also allow for heterogeneity across agents. Akcigit and Liu (2015) study pri-
vate R&D investment of firms that compete for patents when an arrival can either lead
to a patent (which is publicly observable) or to a dead-end (which is only privately ob-
2See, e.g., Bergemann and Välimäki (2008) for a survey.
3In Bonatti and Hörner (2015), R&D investment is also private, but information arrives in the form of
fully revealing publicly observable breakdowns.
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served). Firms do not only compete on a risky research line, but also on a safe line and
thus have an incentive to keep any dead-end findings secret to avoid competition on the
safe line. Wong (2015) studies optimal patent protection in a setting without informa-
tional spillovers and shows that strict patent protection can lead to duplication of R&D,
while loose patent protection fosters free-riding.
Subsequently, we study a model in which two heterogeneous firms compete in R&D.
Additional to R&D investment being private as in Bonatti and Hörner (2011), also dis-
coveries may be private in case the patent system lacks transparency. In contrast to most
papers on strategic experimentation future payoffs are not discounted.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Investment in uncertain research projects
There are two firms n = i, j that can invest in R&D in continuous time t ∈ [0,∞). R&D
investment is risky, meaning that the research in which firms can invest is of one of two
types, θ = {0, 1}. A bad research project, θ = 0, never leads to a discovery. In a good
project, θ = 1, discoveries occur at exponentially distributed random times, where the ar-
rival is independent across firms. Investment in research is costly and the marginal costs
of R&D are denoted by c, so that firm n pays cdt if she invests in R&D in the time interval
[t, t+dt). The probability that a firm makes a discovery is λnθdt if the firm invests in R&D,
where λn > 0 is a constant that can be interpreted as firm-specific R&D productivity and
is known to both firms. In what follows we assume that λi > λj and hence refer to firm
i also as the stronger firm and to firm j as the weaker firm. An arrival represents a dis-
covery or invention and the reward of a discovery (that is, the profit a firm obtains) is
determined by the value of the patent.
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3.2.2 The value of a patent and R&D spillovers
After a discovery, the firm files a patent application at the patent office.4 Once the patent
office grants patent y = 1, 2, ... the firm obtains a flow profit piy for length τ , so that the
value of patent y at the time of approval is piyτ. Furthermore, the discovery of one firm
might have positive R&D spillovers to the other firm that determine whether an imita-
tor can profit from the discovery as well. The unsuccessful firm obtains a flow profit of
ωy ≥ 0 also for length τ 5 and we distinguish two possibilities. First, piy = ωy, which means
we have perfect positive R&D spillovers, where a discovery by firm n can be profitably
used by firm −n as well. For example, firms might sell different products using similar
technologies and consequently are able to serve different markets. Second, ωy = 0 mean-
ing that firms face a winner-takes-all competition, where only the inventor profits from a
discovery. For example, a discovery might lead to the formation of a natural monopoly.
The total profit of the first discovery in a transparent patent system is given by
W1 = pi1τ + ω1τ. (3.1)
After the first patent is granted, firms can continue to invest in R&D to obtain further
patents. Subsequent innovations occur on the same research line, that is, innovations are
sequential and one discovery builds on the previous discovery.6 We make the simplifying
assumption that there are at most two patents granted for discoveries in one research area
so that the game ends after the patent office grants the second patent.
3.2.3 Beliefs and informational spillovers
Firms have a belief about the research line being viable and both firms start with a com-
mon prior p. An arrival on the research line reveals that it is good and the firm’s belief
4For simplicity we assume that without applying for a patent, the new technology is immediately imi-
tated by many firms and payoffs are driven to zero. Hence, upon discovery firms always apply for a patent.
Moreover, an application is filed at the time of discovery and the patent office decides immediately whether
the patent is granted.
5This assumption is w.l.o.g. as we assume that the imitator obtains this payoff independently of the level
of transparency and the results would not change if we assumed τpi 6= τω instead.
6New inventions on the same line might replace existing technologies. As this happens independently
of the level of transparency of the patent system, we abstract from this possibility here and assume that
there are no negative externalities from a new discovery on existing technologies.
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jumps to 1. As long as firms invest in research without a success, they become increas-
ingly pessimistic about the feasibility of the project. Firms are said to experiment if they
invest in research before knowing the type of the project. To exclude trivial cases in which
investing is never optimal we assume that the ex ante expected benefits of R&D exceed
the costs.
Assumption 1. pi1τpλn > c for n = i, j.
The types of the research project of firm i and firm j are assumed to be perfectly pos-
itively correlated. This means that a discovery of firm i reveals to firm j that the project
is good and vice versa. The idea is that two firms working in the same industry, e.g., the
pharmaceutical industry, both can potentially work on the same research line, as e.g., the
discovery of a new drug against a certain disease. If one firm succeeds this reveals to
the other firm that this research line is good and, say, a cure of this disease is achievable.
Possible interpretations are that firms use a similar approach or that the unsuccessful firm
can easily imitate the approach or technology of the inventor. Moreover, we assume that
the first success indicates that a second success is possible. That is, the first arrival is the
breakthrough or fundamental discovery that the project is good, while the second arrival
can be interpreted as an improvement of the existing technology. In the case of phar-
maceuticals this could be a reduction of side effects or better understanding of the right
dose.
3.2.4 Information structure and timing
In a perfectly transparent patent system a patent (notice) provides a clear indication of
what it protects. Hence, duplications as well as ex post legal disputes are ruled out.
Subsequently full transparency is interpreted as follows:
• The patent application is public information and consequently so is a discovery;
• the approval of the patent is public information;
• the inventor knows that her invention is protected and she obtains piyτ with cer-
tainty, that is, there is no risk of ex post legal disputes;
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• an imitator can modify her own invention such that a new patent can be obtained.
As the imitator is perfectly informed about the extent of protection, she can assess
which changes to the original discovery are necessary to avoid a violation of the in-
tellectual property of the inventor. This means that in fact every arrival (discovery)
obtains a patent.
Based on the FTC (2011) report two types of intransparencies can arise:
1. Unclear patent content: If the content of a patent is unclear, it is difficult for firms
to assess what innovations already exist. A transparent and effective patent notice
enables firms to identify the patents relevant to them. Even though there are online
databases providing this information, especially in the IT sector clearance searches
are almost prohibitively expensive, because of the large number of potentially rel-
evant patents. Additionally, the language used is often ambiguous and moreover
product life cycles in the IT industry are usually short implying that a thorough
search might be too time consuming. The FTC (2011, p. 90) refers to this as "dif-
ficulties in sifting through a multitude of patents". We capture this intransparency by
assuming that a patent is observed by the rival with probability 1 − ε. A firm that
does not observe a patent of the competitor at the time it is granted only learns
about it in case of an own success.
2. Unclear patent scope: Even if firms are able to identify all relevant patents, the scope
of a patent (or patent claim), which defines the extent of protection, might be un-
clear. That is, firms exhibit "difficulties in interpreting the boundaries of issued claims"
(FTC, 2011, p. 81). The main problems reported to the FTC were a lack of clarity
of the language, varying nomenclature, functional claiming (i.e., explaining what
the invention does rather than what it is), and institutional concerns7. We consider
two possible consequences of a lack of clarity regarding patent scope. First, a patent
holder does not know how well her invention is protected by the patent. That is,
with probability α an existing invention loses value if a second innovation obtains
a patent, for instance, because the firm has to enforce its intellectual property rights
7Litigation as the only available mechanism to test what a patent really covers is highly uncertain, ex-
pensive and causes delays.
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by law resulting in additional expenses. In this case the profit is reduced to pi′1 < pi1.8
Second, a firm with a new discovery does not know whether this invention will ob-
tain a patent. To be more precise, a new patent is granted with probability 1 − β,
while with probability β it is seen as a duplication of an existing patent.
Let us now turn to the timing of the game. The game can be divided into two stages:
1. Stage 1, the experimentation stage: The firms start with prior belief p and decide how
long to experiment. That is, each firm n = i, j chooses a stopping time Tn at which
she stops to invest in R&D in case she does not observe a discovery (from her own
research or the research of the competitor). Each firm’s investment decision is pri-
vate, i.e., unobservable by the other firm. In a transparent patent system patents
are always observed, while in an intransparent system a patent of the competitor
is observed with probability 1 − ε. This stage ends for a firm if she stops to invest
once and for all or if she observes a success. After making a discovery, the firm files
an application at the patent office. If the patent is granted, the firm proceeds to the
second stage.
2. Stage 2, follow-up inventions: The first discovery always obtains a patent. The firm
with patent 1 receives the expected profit from this patent and can still research to
obtain a second patent which is granted with probability 1 − β. If the unsuccessful
firm is aware of the existing patent, she can as well invest in research to obtain the
second patent (which is granted with probability 1− β and reduces the profit of the
inventor with probability α). In case the unsuccessful firm is unaware of the existing
patent, she is still in stage 1 (or exited the game) and invests either until reaching
her stopping time in stage 1 or until an own discovery. The imitator receives ωy
conditional on knowing about patent y.
The game ends after the second patent is granted, after both firms have reached their
stopping times without a discovery in stage 1 or if both firms have unsuccessfully applied
for a patent in stage 2.
8Note that only the inventor faces the risk of litigation and consequently the imitator obtains ωy inde-
pendently of any intransparencies regarding patent scope.
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3.2.5 Strategies and equilibrium concept
Firms are risk neutral expected profit maximizers and are restricted to pure stopping
strategies. Let T sn ∈ [0,∞) denote the stopping time of firm n in stage s, meaning that
at T sn firm n irrevocably stops to invest in R&D conditional on not having observed a
success in this stage. A strategy of firm n consists of a pair of stopping times (T 1n , T 2n), one
for each stage of the game.9 In equilibrium the stopping times jointly maximize the firm’s
expected profit given the stopping times of the competitor. A firm chooses its stopping
time in stage 1 anticipating the optimal decisions in stage 2. The solution concept is
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
3.2.6 Consumers
So far we only discussed the firm side, ignoring the impact of an invention on consumers.
Let ψy denote the value of discovery y for consumers. The consumer surplus of a discov-
ery is determined by the difference between its value and its price. We assume that the
price equals the profit of the firm (which implies that the marginal costs of production are
zero) and the consumer surplus can be written as CSy = ψy − piyτ − ωyτ . The producer
surplus for the two firms is the difference between the profit earned from a discovery and
the costs of development. As the price (=profit) is merely a transfer between firms and
consumers, a social planner who aims to maximize total welfare maximizes
E[ψy − Cy],
where Cy denotes the costs of development.
3.3 The monopolist
Let us start by considering the R&D investment decision of a single firm that acts as
a monopolist. In this case there is no competition and consequently intransparencies
regarding the content of a patent (i.e., ε) as well as ex post legal disputes (i.e., α) are
irrelevant. However, an unclear patent scope makes it difficult for a firm to evaluate
9For simplicity of exposition the superscript indicating the stage will be dropped in the remaining chap-
ter and Tn refers to the stopping of firm n in stage 1.
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whether additional inventions will lead to a new patent. We start in stage 2 assuming
that the monopolist already holds one patent and decides whether to invest in R&D to
obtain a second patent.
Stage 2: Suppose firm n holds patent 1. This patent generates a flow profit pi1 for length
τ . As described in Section 2 we assume that the type of the first and the second discovery
are perfectly positively correlated. The firm knows that the risky project generates posi-
tive arrivals (p = 1) and compares the expected benefit of the next arrival with the costs
of research. As there is no learning or belief updating, investing in R&D in stage 2 for the
monopolist yields an expected payoff of
vmn = −cdt+ (1− β)pi2τλndt+ (1− λndt)vmn .
The first term on the r.h.s. are the costs of research the firm pays in the interval [t, t + dt).
The second term describes the continuation payoff in case the firm obtains patent 2, which
happens with probability (1−β)λndt. With probability 1−λndt the firm does not observe
a success and invests again in the next period. The expected payoff from investing until
a discovery is given by
vmn =
λn(1− β)pi2τ − c
λn
. (3.2)
If the expected benefit of patent 2 exceeds the costs of R&D, the firm invests in R&D in
stage 2. As beliefs do not change, the firm either does not invest at all in stage 2 or invests
until a discovery. The expected payoff associated with the second patent is increasing in
the arrival rate of the discovery and decreasing in the costs. Besides this, it is decreasing
in β, and hence it is less likely that a firm invests the higher the level of intransparency.
Stage 1: The expected payoff of firm n for a given prior p and stopping time Tn is
Un = −(1− p)cTn + p(λnWmn − c)
1− e−λnTn
λn
, (3.3)
where Wmn = pi1τ + max{0, vmn }.10 The first term on the r.h.s. captures the bad state of the
world, which occurs with probability 1− p. As in this case no discovery can be made, the
firm pays the costs of R&D until reaching her stopping time Tn. If the state of the world is
10In case the expected payoff of R&D in stage 2 is negative (vmn < 0), firm n does not invest in R&D in
stage 2 and obtains only pi1τ after a success in stage 1.
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good, the firm pays -cdt and makes a discovery with probability λndt in any time interval
of length dt until Tn as long as there was no discovery before. Maximizing the expected
payoff w.r.t. the stopping time Tn we obtain the first order condition
−(1− p)c+ p(λnWmn − c)e−λnTn = 0. (3.4)
At the time of stopping the firm has to be indifferent between the expected payoff of
experimenting one last time and the payoff of stopping right now which equals zero.
Hence, for a monopolist the optimal time to stop investing in stage 1 equals
Tmn = −
1
λn
[
ln
(
1− p
p
)
+ ln
(
c
λnWmn − c
)]
. (3.5)
The stopping time Tmn is increasing in the prior p and Wmn and decreasing in the costs c.
The effect of an increase in the arrival rate λn on the stopping time is ambiguous. A higher
λn leads to a faster updating of beliefs, meaning that the firm becomes more pessimistic
in the absence of a success. At the same time a higher λn decreases the belief at which a
firm stops investing and it is not clear which effect dominates.11
Firm n experiments in stage 1 until it makes a discovery or stops at Tmn . The stopping
time is higher in a transparent system, because the expected benefit of R&D, Wmn , is de-
creasing in β. That is, firms invest more and the probability of mistakenly abandoning a
good project is smaller the higher the level of transparency. However, this is only true if
the firm invests in stage 2 (i.e., if vmn > 0). If there is no investment in stage 2, the optimal
stopping time in stage 1 does not depend on the level of transparency.
In the case of a monopolist who is able to reap the entire consumer surplus, maxi-
mizing welfare is equivalent to maximizing expected monopoly profits. Thus, increas-
ing transparency increases welfare. If the monopoly profit lies below the valuation of
consumers, increasing transparency increases welfare as R&D investment and thus the
probability of an invention are increasing in the level of transparency.
3.4 Research cooperation
Now we turn to the optimal R&D investment of two firms in a research alliance, i.e., firms
that cooperatively maximize aggregate expected payoffs. Cooperation is restricted to the
11See also Halac et al. (2013).
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research stage meaning that firms remain competitors in the product market. If firms
cooperate, arrivals are always revealed as it can never be optimal to hide information
about a discovery. Hence, again only intransparencies about patent scope matter and ex
post legal disputes are precluded. In contrast to the previous section, positive spillovers
might allow the imitator to earn profits from a discovery of the inventor. As before, we
start in stage 2, where one firm already holds a patent.
Stage 2: The expected payoff of research in stage 2 in a research alliance where both
firms invest is given by
va = −2cdt+ Λ(1− β)(pi2 + ω2)τdt+ (1− Λdt)va,
where Λ = λi + λj and in contrast to the monopolist profits for the imitator, ω2, enter as
well. The expected payoff of R&D in stage 2 is
va =
Λ(pi2 + ω2)τ(1− β)− 2c
Λ
, (3.6)
if both firms invest in R&D, and
van =
λn(pi2 + ω2)τ(1− β)− c
λn
,
if only firm n invests, but the imitator also obtains profits in case of a success. As firm i
is stronger in the sense that λi > λj , it follows that vaj < va < vai . Therefore, in a research
alliance only the stronger firm invests invest in R&D in stage 2 or none of the firms invests
in R&D.12
Stage 1: Let W a denote the sum of the total profit in stage 1 and the expected value of
research in stage 2 in a research alliance, that is, W a = pi1τ + ω1τ + max{0, vai }. The total
expected payoff of firms in a research alliance is given by
Uai + U
a
j = pW
a(1− e−λiTi−λjTj)− (1− p)c(Ti + Tj)−
pc
(
2
1− e−ΛTmin
Λ
+ e−λminTmin
e−λmaxTmin − e−λmaxTmax
λmax
)
, (3.7)
where Tmin = min{Ti, Tj}, Tmax = max{Ti, Tj} and λmin is the arrival rate corresponding to
the firm with the earlier stopping time, that is, if Tj = Tmin, then λj = λmin and λi = λmax.
12Homogenous firms, i.e., when λi = λj , either both invest or none of the two firms invests in R&D.
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The first term is the expected benefit of R&D investment. With the probability that the
state of the world is good and there will be at least one discovery, p(1 − e−λiTi−λjTj), the
firms obtain W a. If the state of the world is bad, both firms pay the costs of R&D until
reaching their stopping times. Moreover, firms also pay the costs of R&D in the good
state of the world as long as no one made a discovery. Here 21−e
−ΛTmin
Λ
refers to the time
interval in which both firms invest, and the last term describes the time interval in which
one of the two firms already stopped investing, while the other firm still continues.
The firms maximize the sum of their expected profits given in (3.7) w.r.t. their stopping
times Ti and Tj . As stated in Lemma 3.1 in a research alliance also in stage 1 all R&D
investment is carried out by the stronger firm.
Lemma 3.1. The optimal stopping times of firms in a research alliance are T aj = 0 and
T ai = −
1
λi
[
ln
(
1− p
p
)
+ ln
(
c
λiW a − c
)]
.
Similar as in stage 2, only the stronger firm invests in R&D in a research cooperation.
Expected payoffs are higher if the stronger firm invests in two consecutive time periods
than if both firms invest simultaneously. The rate at which firms update their belief in
the absence of a success in a research alliance is the same as for the monopolist firm i.
The stopping time T ai equals the stopping time of the monopolist firm i, i.e., T ai = Tmi
if W a = Wmi . Note that for T ai = Tmi also the final posterior belief in case there is no
discovery is the same in both situation. For W a > Wmi cooperating firms invest more in
R&D, because the expected benefit of research is higher when both firms can profit from
one invention due to the positive spillovers.
In stage 2, if the benefits of R&D exceed the costs only the stronger firm invests and
hence similar patterns of R&D investment as for the monopolist are possible. If vai =
vmi , i.e., if the expected payoff a monopolist earns from investing in stage 2 equals the
expected payoff that both firms in a research alliance earn, the research alliance and the
monopolist firm i are equally likely to invest in R&D. If vai exceeds vmi it is more likely
that the research alliance invests in R&D and if vai < vmi , the monopolist is more likely to
invest.
If consumer surplus equals zero (ψy = piyτ + ωyτ ), the research alliance acts socially
optimally and as profits are increasing in the level of transparency, welfare is increasing
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in the level of transparency. If the consumer surplus is positive, i.e., for ψy > piyτ +
ωyτ , the more firms invest, the higher is the probability of a discovery and hence more
transparency is welfare enhancing.
3.5 Research competition
Commonly firms compete for patents and hence do not (or at least not fully) disclose their
research activities publicly. In contrast to R&D cooperation, competing firms choose their
R&D investment strategically without observing the R&D investment of the competitor.
Furthermore, in an intransparent patent system, a patent is not necessarily revealed to
both firms. The unsuccessful firm observes a discovery of the competitor with probability
1−ε,where ε ∈ [0, 1]. Here ε = 0 implies full transparency where discoveries are revealed
publicly immediately. A firm who does not observe the discovery of the competitor only
learns about it in case she makes a discovery herself. We assume that a firm is being
informed about an existing patent when filing an application at the patent office.
3.5.1 Winner-takes-all competition
Let us start by considering the simplest case in which only one patent can be obtained
and there are no positive R&D spillovers between the two firms. That is, the patent race
is a winner-takes-all race in which the first discovery receives a patent and the game
ends afterwards. If no follow-up inventions are possible, uncertainties about patent scope
(α and β) are irrelevant and only a lack of clarity regarding patent content affects R&D
investment.
Full transparency
First, we characterize the optimal stopping times for ε = 0. Suppose j follows a stop-
ping strategy with stopping time Tj . We are interested in finding i’s best response. The
expected payoff of firm n for a given combination of stopping times is given by
Un = p(piλn − c)
(
1− e−ΛTmin
Λ
+ e−λ−nTmin
e−λnTmin − e−λnTn
λn
)
− c(1− p)Tn, (3.8)
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where pi is the profit associated with the patent, i.e., pi = pi1τ and ω1 = 0. At the time of
stopping each firm has to be indifferent between experimenting one last time and stop-
ping immediately given the stopping time of the competitor. For firm i this implies
−c(1− p+ pe−λiTi−λjTmin) + ppiλie−λiTi−λjTmin = 0. (3.9)
The first term represents the costs of R&D the firm pays in case it will indeed experiment
in this last instant, which happens with the probability that there was no discovery up to
this point in time. The second term is the expected continuation payoff the firm obtains
in case of a success. With the probability that the state of the world is good even though
no one made a discovery so far, the firm obtains a patent with instantaneous probability
λi. Similarly, at the time of stopping for firm j the following first order condition has to
be satisfied
−c(1− p+ pe−λiTmin−λjTj) + ppiλje−λiTmin−λjTj = 0. (3.10)
From equations (3.9) and (3.10) the optimal stopping times in equilibrium can be derived.
Furthermore, it can be shown that in equilibrium the stronger firm experiments longer,
i.e., Ti > Tj .
Lemma 3.2. The optimal stopping times of firms in a winner-takes-all competition with one patent
and full transparency (ε = 0) are given by
Tj = − 1
Λ
[
ln
(
1− p
p
)
+ ln
(
c
λjpi − c
)]
,
and
Ti = − 1
λi
[
ln
(
1− p
p
)
+ ln
(
c
λipi − c
)
+ λjTj
]
= − 1
Λ
[
ln
(
1− p
p
)
+ ln(c)− Λ
λi
ln(λipi − c) + λj ln (λjpi − c)
]
.
In this equilibrium
(i) the stronger firm invests more in R&D, i.e., Ti > Tj ;
(ii) in the absence of a discovery firms learn as much as under cooperation, i.e., the final posterior
belief
pf =
pe−λiTi−λjTj
1− p+ pe−λiTi−λjTj ,
is the same under competition and cooperation as λiTi + λjTj = λiT ai + λjT aj .
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Let us compare the optimal stopping times of competing firms to their respective
counterparts in the previous sections (assuming a winner-takes-all competition in which
only one patent is granted). The weaker firm j invests more than under cooperation but
less than as a monopolist, that is, 0 = T aj < Tj < Tmj . Further, the stopping time of the
weaker firm j is independent from the stopping time of the stronger firm i (it does how-
ever depend on λi), while the optimal stopping time of the stronger firm is decreasing in
the stopping time of the weaker firm. The stronger firm i invests less than under cooper-
ation, i.e., Ti < T ai = Tmi , where the difference between Ti and T ai is determined solely by
Tj. As Ti is decreasing in Tj and Tj > T aj this implies that Ti < T ai . Compared to the R&D
investment in a research alliance firm j invests too much, while firm i invests too little.
Each firm invests less than as a monopolist, because they can learn from each others
lack of success. Not observing a discovery from the opponent reduces the likelihood that
the state of the world is good. In equilibrium the firms correctly anticipate each others
stopping times. As firm j knows that firm i experiments until Ti, firm j learns more than
in autarky, i.e., her final posterior belief is more pessimistic. In particular, both firms have
the same final posterior belief at Ti, which equals the posterior of firm i in autarky.13
Imperfect transparency
Suppose ε > 0, which means that a firm that did not observe the patent of the competitor
at the time it is granted, only learns about it in case of an own discovery. The expected
payoff of firm n is given by
Un = ppiλn
(
1− eΛTmin
Λ
+
e−ΛTmin − eλnTn−λ−nTmin
λn
)
− c(1− p)Tn − cpε1− e
−λnTmin
λn
−cp(1− ε)1− e
−ΛTmin
Λ
− cp (ε+ (1− ε)e−λ−nTmin) e−λnTmin − e−λnTn
λn
. (3.11)
13Deviations cannot be observed unless one of the two firms makes a discovery after reaching her stop-
ping time Tn. If this happens both firms know that the state of the world is good and the game ends. If
firm n stops before reaching her stopping time Tn, the other firm will never know about this deviation and
interpret the absence of a discovery mistakenly as a lack of success. Thus, the deviator will be more opti-
mistic than the firm that did not deviate. If a firm continues to invest after reaching her stopping time she
will be more pessimistic than the firm that did not deviate.
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The first term is the expected benefit of R&D investment, while the remaining terms rep-
resent the expected costs.14 As the costs are increasing in ε, the expected payoff Un is
decreasing in ε, i.e., the lower the level of transparency the lower is the expected payoff
for a given combination of stopping times. The optimal stopping times in equilibrium
have to satisfy
−c (1− p+ pe−λiTi (ε+ (1− ε)e−λjTmin))+ ppiλie−λiTi−λjTmin = 0, (F1)
and
−c (1− p+ pe−λjTj (ε+ (1− ε)e−λiTmin))+ ppiλje−λiTmin−λjTj = 0. (F2)
Now not observing an invention up to time Tn can either be due to the absence of a success
or due to a discovery of the competitor that was unobserved by firm n. Then firm n, being
unaware of the competitor’s success, continues to invest (pay c), but will never obtain a
patent as pi can only be realized if there was no discovery.
Solving for the optimal stopping times explicitly as for ε = 0 is not possible, how-
ever, in the appendix it is shown that a solution to equations (F1) and (F2) exists and is
unique. In this equilibrium the stronger firm invests more in R&D than the weaker firm.
Furthermore, by making use of the implicit function theorem the impact of the level of
intransparency ε on the stopping times, that is, ∂Ti/∂ε and ∂Tj/∂ε can be derived. As
stated in Proposition 3.1 the stopping time of the weaker firm is decreasing in ε, while for
the stronger firm it depends on the difference in the firms’ R&D productivities.
Proposition 3.1. The optimal stopping times of firms in equilibrium in a winner-takes-all com-
petition with one patent and transparency level ε are uniquely determined by equations (F1) and
(F2). In this equilibrium
(i) the stronger firm invests more, i.e., Ti > Tj for all ε ∈ [0, 1];
(ii) the R&D investment of the weaker firm j is decreasing in ε, i.e., ∂Tj/∂ε < 0;
(iii) the R&D investment of the stronger firm i is decreasing in ε, i.e., ∂Ti/∂ε < 0 if and only if
(1− e−λjTj)(e−λiTjΛ(λjpi− c+ cε)− εcλj) > λj(λipi− c+ εc)(1− e−λiTj)e−λjTj . (3.12)
14In the appendix the payoff function is derived and explained in more detail.
87
The higher ε, the higher is the probability that the opponent has an unobserved patent
and hence the lower is the expected profit from experimenting. To be more precise, the ex-
pected costs of R&D increase in εwhile the expected benefit decreases. If inequality (3.12)
is satisfied the R&D investment of both firms is increasing in the level of transparency (or
decreasing in the level of intransparency ε). Otherwise the R&D investment of firm i in-
creases in ε. Inequality (3.12) holds if λi is close to λj and is reversed if λi is large relative
to λj . This implies that if the stronger firm is considerably more likely to make a discov-
ery, her stopping time is increasing in ε. If, however, the two firms are relatively equally
strong, then the stopping times of both firms are decreasing in ε. The intuition for this
result is the following. The probability that the opponent had an unobserved discovery
up to a certain point in time is increasing in ε and this decreases the expected benefit of
R&D investment. As a response, firms reduce their investment. However, for firm i at
the time of stopping the probability that firm j had an unobserved discovery is higher
the more j invested, i.e., the higher Tj . As Tj is decreasing in ε, there are two opposing
forces at play. On the one hand the probability that firm j had an unobserved discovery
increases in ε. On the other hand, the probability that firm j had an unobserved discovery
decreases, because firm j stops earlier the higher ε. If inequality (3.12) is satisfied (mean-
ing if firms are almost equally strong) the former effect dominates the later and vice versa
if the difference in the firms’ R&D productivities is more pronounced.
Do firms have an incentive to influence the level of transparency?
The FTC (2011) report suggests that firms deliberately try to influence the level of
transparency, for example, through vague formulations of their patent application, by
describing what the innovation does instead of what it is and so forth. Besides the patent
application itself, firms may have other possibilities to disclose more or less informa-
tion about their research activities (e.g., releasing information about research projects and
progress). To find out whether firms have an incentive to influence the level of trans-
parency (e.g., by obscuring the patent application) we have to analyze the impact of the
level of intransparency ε on expected payoffs in equilibrium. We assume that firms can
solely influence the transparency level (and hence the stopping time) of the competitor.
That is, each firm cannot influence overall ε but only the level of transparency faced by
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the opponent.15 Let εn denote the level of intransparency faced by firm −n (determined
by firm n) and let us see whether firms have an incentive to influence the level of trans-
parency. The expected equilibrium payoffs for a given combination of stopping times Ti
and Tj where Ti > Tj are
Ui = −c(1− p)Ti + p(piλi − c(1− εj))1− e
−ΛTj
Λ
− cpεj 1− e
−λiTj
λi
+
pλipi
e−ΛTj − e−λjTj−λiTi
λi
− cp (εj + (1− εj)e−λjTj) e−λiTj − e−λiTi
λi
, (3.13)
and
Uj = −c(1− p)Tj + p(piλj − c(1− εi))1− e
−ΛTj
Λ
− cpεi1− e
−λjTj
λj
. (3.14)
The weaker firm (i.e., the firm stopping earlier) has no incentive to influence the stopping
time of the stronger firm, as Ti has no impact on firm j’s payoffs. To be more precise,
the weaker firm does not care about the level of transparency faced by its opponent. The
expected profit of the stronger firm i, however, is decreasing in the stopping time of the
competitor Tj . Hence, firm i has an incentive to increase the level of intransparency, as Tj
is decreasing in εi. Firm i prefers to be as intransparent as possible to discourage firm j’s
investment.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose firms face a winner-takes-all competition with one patent only and both
firms start with the same level of intransparency, εi = εj = ε, ex ante so that Ti > Tj . Then
(i) the stronger firm has an incentive to decrease the level of transparency;
(ii) the weaker firm has no incentive to change the level of transparency.
The stronger firm wants to discourage the weaker firm from investing by increasing
uncertainty and thereby decreasing the expected profit of R&D. As the R&D investment
of the firms is monotonic w.r.t. ε, the stronger firm would choose the highest possible level
of intransparency. If increasing intransparency does not incur any costs, the stronger firm
prefers high levels of intransparency, while the weaker firm is indifferent towards the
level of intransparency.16 Hence, ε∗i = 1, while ε∗j ∈ [0, 1] constitutes an equilibrium of
15We abstract here from the fact that changing the level of transparency might be associated with costs
as, for instance, a reduced probability of obtaining a patent.
16If the ex ante level of intransparency is not the same for both firms, Tj > Ti is possible. Then the weaker
firm has an incentive to increase the level of intransparency, while the stronger firm is indifferent.
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the game in which εn is chosen ex ante, if there are no bounds on the maximal level of
intransparency. Note that after a discovery firms are indifferent whether to reveal their
success to the competitor.
Is welfare maximal under full transparency?
Taking the benefits to consumers as well as the costs of R&D into account, the optimal
level of transparency from the perspective of a welfare maximizing social planner (e.g.,
the patent office) can be determined. We assume that the patent office commits to a certain
level of intransparency ε ex ante and that this level is the same for both firms. The patent
office aims to maximize welfare, which is given by
Ω = pψ(1− e−λiTi−λjTj)− c(1− p)(Ti + Tj)− cpε
(
1− e−λjTj
λj
+
1− e−λiTj
λi
)
−cp
(
2(1− ε)1− e
−ΛTj
Λ
+
(
ε+ (1− ε)e−λjTj) e−λiTj − e−λiTi
λi
)
. (3.15)
Welfare Ω equals the sum of the firms individual expected equilibrium payoffs, where
profit pi is replaced by ψ, the value of a discovery for consumers. The welfare-maximizing
level of transparency depends on the difference between the costs of R&D and consumer
surplus, and the difference in the firms’ R&D productivities. In particular, if firms are
sufficiently heterogeneous in terms of their R&D productivities, positive levels of intrans-
parency can be optimal.
Proposition 3.3. If the patent office aims to maximize welfare by committing to the level of in-
transparency ε ex ante, then in a winner-takes-all competition with one patent,
(i) full transparency (ε∗ = 0) is optimal for ∂Ti/∂ε < 0 and ∂Ω/∂Tj > 0;
(ii) positive levels of intransparency (ε∗ > 0) are optimal for ∂Ti/∂ε > 0 while ∂Ω/∂Tj < 0, if
the costs of R&D are sufficiently low.
By analyzing the derivative of the welfare function w.r.t. ε, we can determine when
full transparency maximizes welfare. This derivative has the following form
∂Ω
∂ε
=
∂Ω
∂Ti
∂Ti
∂ε
+
∂Ω
∂Tj
∂Tj
∂ε
+ k. (3.16)
The last term k represents the direct increase in costs that occurs if ε increases and is
always negative. Moreover, welfare is increasing in the stopping time of the stronger firm
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(i.e. ∂Ω/∂Ti > 0), and the stopping time of the weaker firm is decreasing in ε (∂Tj/∂ε < 0).
If ∂Ti/∂ε < 0 while ∂Ω/∂Tj > 0, the derivative is negative for all ε ∈ [0, 1], welfare is
monotonically decreasing in ε and ε∗ = 0. From Proposition 3.1 we know that ∂Ti/∂ε < 0
if the two firms are roughly equally strong in terms of their R&D productivities λi and λj .
Now let us see under which condition welfare is increasing in the stopping time of the
weaker firm.
∂Ω
∂Tj
> 0⇔ λi(ψ − pi)e−λiTi > c(1− ε)(e−λiTj − e−λiTi).
This inequality is satisfied if ψ is sufficiently large compared to c, if ε is high or if Ti is
close to Tj . Hence, if firms are relatively equally strong and have similar stopping times,
then welfare is maximal under full transparency. Yet, if the stronger firm is considerably
more likely make a discovery and also invests more in R&D in equilibrium, ∂Ti/∂ε > 0
while ∂Ω/∂Tj < 0 and the first two terms on the r.h.s. of (3.16) are positive. Hence,
depending on the parameters of the model, it is possible that welfare is not necessarily
maximal under full transparency, particularly if the costs of R&D are small (as this implies
that k is small). If firms are sufficiently heterogeneous, then by increasing ε the R&D
investment of the weaker firm can be reduced, while the R&D investment of the stronger
firm increases. This increases welfare if the social planner wants to replace some of firm
j’s investment by the investment of the stronger firm i. Firms that are similar in terms
of their research productivities both decrease their R&D investment if ε increases and the
risk of not observing a discovery of the competitor is higher.
3.5.2 Perfect R&D spillovers
Up to now we analyzed how the level of transparency affects R&D investment when firms
compete for a patent in a winner-takes-all competition. However, the invention of one
firm often creates positive R&D spillovers that also benefit other firms.17 In this section
we analyze the impact of transparency on R&D investment in the presence of positive
R&D spillovers but retain the assumption that the game ends after the first patent.
17See, e.g., Griliches (1992) or Henderson and Cockburn (1998).
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Full transparency
For now suppose ε = 0, and pi1 = ω1, i.e., we have perfect positive spillovers. Let pi again
denote the profit from a discovery, i.e., pi = pi1τ = ω1τ. The expected payoff of firm n is
given by
Un = p(Λpi − c)1− e
−ΛT−n
Λ
+ ppie−λnTn(e−λ−nTmin − eλ−nT−n) +
p(λnpi − c)e−λ−nT−n e
−λnTmin − e−λnTn
λn
− (1− p)cTn. (3.17)
Now both firms can profit from one invention. Thus, the firm stopping earlier can still
obtain a positive payoff (as an imitator) after she stopped investing, if the other firm
makes a discovery. This is captured through the second term on the r.h.s. of Equation
(3.17). Furthermore, while both firms invest, the instantaneous probability of a discovery
is Λ as an own success is not necessary to generate profits. Taking the derivative of Ui and
Uj w.r.t. Ti and Tj respectively, the first order conditions for perfect spillovers are
−c(1− p+ pe−λiTi−λjTmin) + ppiλie−λiTi−λjTj = 0, (3.18)
and
−c(1− p+ pe−λiTmin−λjTj) + ppiλje−λiTi−λjTj = 0. (3.19)
From Equations (3.18) and (3.19) the optimal stopping times in equilibrium can be de-
rived. In this equilibrium the weaker firm experiments longer, i.e., Tj > Ti.
Lemma 3.3. The optimal stopping times of firms in equilibrium for perfect R&D spillovers and
full transparency (ε = 0) with one patent are given by
Ti = − 1
Λ
[
ln
(
1− p
p
)
+ ln
(
λipi
λjpi − c − 1
)]
,
and
Tj = − 1
λj
[
ln
(
1− p
p
)
+ ln
(
c
λjpi − c
)
+ λiTi
]
= − 1
Λ
[
ln
(
1− p
p
)
− ln(λjpi − c)
]
− 1
λj
ln(c) +
λi
λjΛ
ln(pi(λi − λj)− c).
In this equilibrium
(i) the weaker firm invests more, i.e., Tj > Ti;
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(ii) the firms learn less than under cooperation, i.e., their final posterior belief in the absence of
a success is more optimistic as λiTi + λjTj < λiT ai + λjT aj .
In a winner-takes-all race the stronger firm invests more, while for positive spillovers,
the weaker firm invests more in R&D in a transparent patent system. The reason for this
is the following. The probability of a discovery is higher for the stronger firm and so are
the expected benefits of R&D. This implies that at the time of stopping the probability of
paying the costs c (and thus the probability of not having observed a success so far) has
to be lower for the weaker firm j, which implies that Tj has to be higher than Ti.
Also for positive spillovers, in a research alliance only the stronger firm invests in
R&D. Hence, similar to the winner-takes-all competition firm j invests too much (now
even more than firm i), and firm i free-rides on j’s research efforts when firms compete for
patents. For positive spillovers this free-riding is so severe that firms learn less (meaning
their final posterior at the time of stopping is more optimistic) than under cooperation.
Imperfect Transparency
Now suppose ε > 0. Then the expected payoff of firm n is
Un = ppi((1− ε)(1− e−λ−nT−n−λnTn) + ε(1− e−λnTn))− (1− p)cTn −
pc
(
ε
1− e−λnTn
λn
+ (1− ε)
(
1− e−ΛT−n
Λ
+ e−λ−nT−n
e−λnTmin − e−λnTn
λn
))
.(3.20)
In contrast to the winner-takes-all competition, a firm can profit from her discovery even
if the competitor had an unobserved success before and from a success of the competitor
after stopping herself. Hence, the optimal stopping times of firms in equilibrium have to
satisfy
−c(1− p+ pe−λiTi(ε+ (1− ε)e−λjTmin) + ppiλie−λiTi(ε+ (1− ε)e−λjTj) = 0, (F3)
and
−c(1− p+ pe−λjTj(ε+ (1− ε)e−λiTmin) + ppiλje−λjTj(ε+ (1− ε)e−λiTi) = 0. (F4)
Equations (F 3) and (F 4) together with Un for n = i, j can be used to analyze the equilibria
of the stopping game. For perfect positive R&D spillovers there does not exist a (unique)
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equilibrium for all levels of transparency. To be more precise, for ε sufficiently low and
sufficiently high there always exists a unique equilibrium, while for intermediate values
of ε two equilibria in pure strategies or no equilibrium exist.
Proposition 3.4. For perfect positive spillovers and transparency level ε ∈ [0, 1],
(i) the optimal stopping times of firms in equilibrium are determined by equations (F3) and
(F4). There exist ε and ε such that for all ε < ε and for all ε > ε there exists a unique pure
strategy equilibrium, where
ε =
c
λipi
λipip− c− (λi − λj)pi
λjpip− c and ε =
c
λjpi
λjpip− c+ (λi − λj)pi
λipip− c .
For ε ∈ [ε, ε] there exist two pure strategy equilibria if and only if there exists Tn such that
1− p
εp
(
c
λ−npi − c
1− ε
ε+ (1− ε)e−λnTn −
c
λnpie−λnTn
)
+
λnpi − c
λnpi
≥ c(1− ε)
λnpiε
e−λ−nTn
(3.21)
for at least one n = i, j, otherwise there does not exist a pure-strategy equilibrium such that
(F3) and (F4) are satisfied;
(ii) the R&D investment of firms in equilibrium is non-monotonic w.r.t. the level of intrans-
parency ε. More precisely, there exist ε̂n < 1 for n = i, j and ε˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that
∂Tn(ε̂n)/∂ε = 0, limε→ε˜ |∂Tn(ε˜)/∂ε| =∞ and
∂Tn
∂ε
=

> 0 for ε < min{ε̂n, ε˜},
< 0 for min{ε̂n, ε˜} < ε < max{ε̂n, ε˜},
> 0 for max{ε̂n, ε˜} < ε.
For perfect positive R&D spillovers there does not exist a (unique) equilibrium for all
levels of transparency. For ε < ε the equilibrium is unique and the weaker firm invests
more in R&D, while for ε > ε depending on the parameter values the stronger or the
weaker firm invests more in the unique equilibrium. Note that ε = ε for λi = λj and the
difference between the two threshold values is increasing in the difference of the firms’
R&D productivities. In the interval [ε, ε] there exist two equilibria if (3.21) is satisfied
and zero otherwise. To be more precise, if (3.21) fails each firm wants to invest in R&D
if the competitor does not invest and vice versa. If firm n chooses Tn = 0 while the
competitor plays T−n = Tm−n, this pair of stopping times constitutes an equilibrium. As
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firms cannot observe each others actions, they cannot coordinate on who invests and
hence, there might be no equilibrium in pure strategies (because both or none of them
invests). At ε = 1 each firm chooses Tmn (the stopping time of a monopolist), because
they cannot learn anything from the competitor. This is the highest possible level of R&D
investment, as there is no combination of ε and T−n such that firm n invests more than
Tmn .
The firms’ R&D investment is non-monotonic in the level of transparency. Changes
in the level of transparency have a direct effect on expected profits and an indirect effect
through a change in the stopping time of the competitor. A higher level of intransparency
reduces the probability of observing a success from the competitor and this causes firms
to increase their own R&D investment. However, if the competitor increases her R&D
investment, this increases the probability of observing a success from her and hence each
firm has an incentive to decrease her own investment. As firms are heterogeneous in
terms of their R&D productivities, the magnitude of these effects is different for each
firm.
Do firms have an incentive to influence the level of transparency?
As before we are interested in whether firms have an incentive to influence the level of
transparency faced by their rival. The positive spillover allows firms to profit from a dis-
covery of the competitor. Consequently expected payoffs are increasing in the stopping
time of the competitor and each firm is better off the more the competitor invests.
Proposition 3.5. Suppose both firms start with the same level of transparency, εi = εj = ε, and
only one patent is granted. For perfect positive spillovers each firm n = i, j has an incentive to
influence the level of transparency faced by the competitor to maximize the stopping time of the
opponent as ∂Ui/∂Tj > 0 and ∂Uj/∂Ti > 0 for n = i, j.
Now both firms (i.e., also firm j) have an incentive to influence the stopping time of
the competitor. In contrast to the winner-takes-all competition where the stronger firm
wanted to discourage the R&D investment of the weaker firm, for positive spillovers
both firms want to encourage their competitor to invest. Hence, the level of transparency
is chosen so as to maximize the R&D investment of the competitor. If both firms choose
ε∗n = 1, then in the resulting equilibrium both firms invest as much as in autarky. This is
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the highest possible level of R&D investment that can be attained and none of the firms
can observe a patent of the competitor. This also constitutes an equilibrium in terms of
the level of intransparency as none of the firms has an incentive to change to a lower
level of intransparency given the choice of the opponent. In fact, if firm n chooses ε∗n = 1,
firm −n is indifferent towards the level of transparency faced by firm n. Hence, every
combination of εi and εj in which at least one of them chooses εn = 1 is an equilibrium
of the stopping game in which εn is chosen ex ante. As it is not clear what happens if ε is
between ε and εwe assume that firms do not choose a level of transparency in this region.
This is w.l.o.g. as it is always weakly optimal for each firm to choose ε∗n = 1 given that the
R&D investment of the competitor is maximal at ε = 1.
As described in Proposition 3.4, the R&D investment of the firms is non-monotonic
w.r.t. the level of transparency. Hence, if firms cannot choose εn = 1, because there are
bounds on the maximum level of intransparency, it is not clear whether firms would
choose this upper bound, as the R&D investment of the competitor might be higher at
lower levels of intransparency. The main difference to the winner-takes-all competition is
thus that both firms want to encourage each other to invest and that R&D investment is
non-monotonic in the level of transparency.
Is welfare maximal under full transparency?
Now we again turn to the optimal information disclosure policy of the patent office.
As we assume that the value of a discovery for consumer has to be at least as high as the
profit both firms can earn jointly, i.e., ψ ≥ 2pi, welfare for perfect spillovers is given by
Ω = pψ(1− e−λnTn−λ−nT−n)− c(1− p)(Tn + T−n)− cp
(
ε
1− e−λ−nTn
λ−n
+ ε
1− e−λnTn
λn
)
−cp
(
2(1− ε)1− e
−ΛTn
Λ
+
(
ε+ (1− ε)e−λnTn) e−λ−nTn − e−λ−nT−n
λ−n
)
, (3.22)
for Tn < T−n. This is the same as in a winner-takes-all competition except that now it is
not necessarily true that Ti > Tj. The welfare-maximizing level of transparency depends
on the difference between the value of a discovery for consumers ψ and the costs of R&D
and can be positive if the consumer surplus is sufficiently large.
Proposition 3.6. If the patent office aims to maximize welfare by committing to the level of in-
transparency ε∗ ex ante, for positive spillovers welfare is not necessarily maximal under full trans-
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parency. If consumer surplus is sufficiently large, i.e., for ψ sufficiently large compared to c, wel-
fare is increasing in the R&D investment of both firms (∂Ω/∂Tj > 0 and ∂Ω/∂Ti > 0), and high
levels of intransparency (ε∗ = 1) are optimal.
Suppose Tj > Ti.18 Then the derivative of the welfare function w.r.t. ε is given by
∂Ω
∂ε
=
∂Ti
∂ε
λie
−λiTi
(
ψe−λjTj − pi(ε+ (1− ε)e−λjTj) + c(1− ε)(e
−λjTi − e−λjTj)
λj
)
+
∂Tj
∂ε
λje
−λjTj (ψe−λiTi − pi (ε+ (1− ε)e−λiTi))+ k.
As before (in the winner-takes-all competition), the last term k is negative and represents
the increase in costs associated with an increase in ε. Now ∂Ω/∂Tj > 0 if
ψe−λiTi > pi(ε+ (1− ε)e−λiTi),
which is satisfied if ψ is sufficiently large compared to pi, ε is small or Ti small. Thus, it
may depend on the stopping time of firm i whether welfare is increasing or decreasing
in the stopping time of firm j. If it is likely that firm i does not make a discovery until
reaching her stopping time, welfare is increasing in the R&D investment of firm j. If firm
i is likely to make a discovery, welfare can be decreasing in Tj. Furthermore, welfare is
increasing in Ti, if
ψe−λjTj − pi(ε+ (1− ε)e−λjTj) + c(1− ε)(e
−λjTi − e−λjTj)
λj
> 0,
where the last term represents the costs that are saved if firm i invests more and thereby
replaces the R&D investment of firm j. For ψ sufficiently high welfare is increasing in
Ti and Tj (for Ti > Tj and Tj > Ti). Therefore, if consumer surplus is high, the patent
office might prefer high levels of intransparency to encourage both firms simultaneously
to invest in R&D.
The situation differs from the previous section (i.e., the winner-takes-all competition)
in the following ways. In a winner-takes-all competition for high levels of ψ welfare is
increasing in Ti and Tj. However, as Tj is monotonically decreasing in ε it was not clear
whether the negative effect of ε on Tj and c is outweighed by an increase in Ti. For positive
spillovers a higher ψ means that both firms should invest more in R&D. Furthermore,
18The corresponding expressions for Ti > Tj can be found in the appendix.
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-n R&D -n no R&D
n R&D β˜(λnpi+λ−nω−(1−e
−Λτ )λ−nαpi)−c
Λ
, β˜(λ−npi+λnω)−c
Λ
β˜λnpi−c
λn
, β˜(1− ε)ω
n no R&D β˜((1− ε)ω − (1− e−λ−nτ )αpi), β˜λ−npi−c
λ−n
0, 0
Table 3.1: Payoff matrix for R&D investment in stage 2 when firm n holds patent 1.
now welfare is not necessarily increasing in Ti (it depends j’s R&D investment and on
ε). Moreover, R&D investment is non-monotonic w.r.t. ε. Hence, it is possible that there
are high levels of ε for which Ti and Tj are high (both are maximal at ε = 1) and this
also increases welfare. This is particularly likely if ψ is sufficiently large and c sufficiently
small.
3.5.3 Sequential innovation
So far we analyzed the impact of transparency on strategic R&D investment for perfect
spillovers as well as in a winner-takes-all competition if the game ends after the first
patent is granted. Now we want to briefly discuss what changes if one innovation may
lead to follow-up innovations, i.e., innovation has a sequential character and after the first
patent is granted firms can invest in R&D to obtain another patent.
Stage 2: We start our analysis in the second stage and assume that firm n holds the first
patent. Now it is possible that both firms are aware of the patent or that the unsuccessful
firm −n is unaware of n’s success. If firm −n is not aware of the existing patent (meaning
she is still in stage 1 or exited), she is either informed about the existing patent after an
own discovery or she invests until reaching her stopping time. Suppose both firms are
aware of patent 1 and decide whether to invest in a second patent. Table 1 shows the
expected payoffs of firms in stage 2, where pi2τ is denoted by pi, ω2τ by ω and 1− β by β˜.
The patent holder (firm n) invests in R&D if (1−β)λnpi2τ ≥ c if firm−n does not invest
in R&D and if (1 − β)(λnpi2τ + (εΛ − λn)ω2τ + αpi1(Λ(1 − e−λ−nτ ) − λ−n(1 − e−Λτ )) ≥ c if
firm−n invests in R&D. For the imitator investing is optimal as long as (1−β)λ−npi2τ ≥ c
if the inventor does not invest and if (1− β)(λ−npi2τ + (εΛ− λ−n)ω2τ) ≥ c, if the inventor
invests in R&D in stage 2.
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If a firm invests in R&D in stage 2 the expected payoff of R&D is decreasing in β and
α and does not depend on ε. The expected payoff of a firm that does not invest in stage
2 is decreasing in β and ε, and for the patent holder also in α. Thus, the expected payoff
for a given strategy profile is smaller the higher the lack of clarity regarding patent scope
and patent content. However, this is not true for the likelihood with that a firm invests
in R&D. To be more precise, R&D investment is more likely the smaller β, the higher α,
and the higher ε. The possibility that a new invention does not lead to a patent because it
is seen as a duplication of an existing patent (β), reduces the probability that firms invest
in R&D and the expected value of R&D. Uncertainty about the content of a patent or ex
post legal disputes on the other hand increase the probability of R&D investment, but
decrease the expected value of R&D. To avoid legal disputes and protect the first patent,
the inventor is more likely to invest the higher α. Similarly, for positive spillovers firms
are more likely to invest the higher the probability that the competitor has an unobserved
patent.
Stage 1 - unclear patent scope:
First, suppose ε = 0, but α, β > 0 and let us see how the equilibrium stopping times of
the firms in stage 1 depend on these types of uncertainties. Let pin denote pi1τ + v1n and ωn
denote ω1τ + v2n, where v1n denotes the expected payoff in stage 2 of the inventor and v2n
the expected payoff of the imitator in stage 2. For sequential innovation the stronger firm
invests more in R&D (in a winner-takes-all competition and for perfect spillovers) as long
as there is no uncertainty about patent content.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose firms face a lack of transparency regarding patent scope, i.e., α, β > 0, but
not regarding patent content, ε = 0, and sequential innovations are possible. Then
(i) the equilibrium stopping times are given by
Ti = − 1
λi
[
ln
(
1− p
p
)
+ ln
(
c
λipii − c
)
+ λjTj
]
,
and
Tj = − 1
Λ
[
ln
(
1− p
p
)
+ ln
(
c
λipii − c
)
+ ln
(
λipii − λjωj − c
λjpij − λjωj − c
)]
;
(ii) the stronger firm invests more in R&D in equilibrium, i.e., Ti > Tj.
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In general, it depends on the model parameters whether a welfare-maximizing social
planner wants to encourage firms to invest in R&D. For now assume that consumer sur-
plus is sufficiently high and the costs of R&D are low so that the social planner wants to
maximize the probability of a discovery. The probability of a discovery (if the state of the
world is good) is 1− e−λiTi−λjTj and in order to maximize this probability, λiTi + λjTj has
to be maximized. The sum λiTi + λjTj is increasing in ωy and piy and also in v1n and v2n.
Corollary 3.1. Suppose ε = 0 and a welfare-maximizing social planner aims to maximize the
likelihood of an invention, 1 − e−λiTi−λjTj , by influencing the transparency of the patent scope,
i.e., through the choice of α and β. Then
(i) α∗ > 0, if the inventor does not invest in stage 2 for α = 0, but does so for α > 0, as this
increases v1n and consequently λiTi + λjTj;
(ii) β∗ = 0, as v1n and v2n are both decreasing in β and so is λiTi + λjTj .
While the social planner prefers β to be as low as possible, meaning high levels of
transparency are optimal, this is not certainly true for α, the probability of litigation. A
higher risk of legal disputes can motivate the inventor to invest in follow-up innovations
and thereby stimulate R&D investment.
Stage 1 - unclear patent scope and content:
Finally, let us discuss the situation where ε > 0 and α, β > 0, i.e., there is a lack of clarity
regarding patent scope and patent content. The first order conditions change to
e−λiTi
(
e−λjTminλipii + λiωi(ε− e−λjTmin + (1− ε)e−λjTj)− c(ε+ (1− ε)e−λjTmin)
)
=
1− p
p
c,
and
e−λjTj
(
e−λiTminλjpij + λjωj(ε− e−λiTmin + (1− ε)e−λiTi)− c(ε+ (1− ε)e−λiTmin)
)
=
1− p
p
c,
These expressions can be used to analyze how the expected benefits of R&D investment
vary with a lack of clarity in patent content, ε, as well as patent scope, α and β. In a
winner-takes-all competition if the expected payoff of the imitator in stage 2 v2n is low,
(e.g., because it is likely that a new discovery will not lead to a patent, meaning β is high),
the first order condition for sequential innovation is similar to a winner-takes-all com-
petition with one patent only. If v2n is high the situation is similar to the perfect positive
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spillover case, meaning a winner-takes-all competition in which sequential innovation
is possible is comparable to a situation with positive (but not necessarily perfect) R&D
spillovers. The magnitude of v2n (and particularly its difference to v1n) determines the level
of R&D spillovers between firms. In general, v1n = v2n if firm −n does not invest in R&D
in stage 2 and v1n < v2n if −n does invest (because of the risk of legal disputes α). How-
ever, at the same time for α > 0, the inventor is more likely to invest. This means that it
is possible that the firm invests in stage 2 as an inventor but not as an imitator and this
would imply that v1n > v2n. The stage 2 payoff of the imitator, v2n, is decreasing in β and
also in ε, yet the probability that the imitator invests is increasing in ε. Through the level
of transparency the patent office can to some extent control the level of R&D spillovers.
Higher levels of transparency however do not imply higher R&D spillovers. In general,
it depends on the type of intransparency and also how this intransparency interacts with
the spillover parameter ωy.
In the case of sequential innovation firms also ex post have an incentive to hide an
invention. By not disclosing a discovery the inventor can avoid infringement. If the
inventor can not profit from a follow-up invention of the imitator (as in a winner-takes-
all competition), then she will hide the first invention if possible. For positive spillovers
the inventor can profit from a second discovery even if she does not achieve this discovery
herself and hence, it is not clear whether she would like to hide the first patent to avoid
legal disputes or disclose it to increase the probability of obtaining ω2.
A benevolent social planner, who wants to maximize the likelihood of an invention,
prefers low levels of β. This means that a firm should be able to assess whether a new dis-
covery will receive a patent or what steps are necessary to guarantee that it is not seen as
a duplication of an existing patent. The picture is slightly more complex for the other two
types of uncertainty. An inventor that has to fear ex post legal disputes is more likely to
invest into improvements herself. A strong and clear patent protection (as reflected by a
low α) could then cause an inventor to rest on her primary success, while a lack of clarity
encourages further improvements. Nevertheless, the expected profit of R&D investment
is lower if a firm expects profit reductions in the future stemming from an uncertainty
of the extent of protection and this can in turn decrease the incentive to invest in R&D
ex ante. Hence, the impact of α on R&D investment is not clear (and this independently
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of the level of R&D spillovers). Similarly, a lack of clarity regarding patent content (ε)
increases the probability that firms invest in R&D in stage 2, while the expected payoff of
R&D decreases. Moreover, welfare in stage 1 is not necessarily maximal under full trans-
parency. Particularly if consumer surplus is high and costs are low, strategic firms invest
too little in R&D, because of the possibility to free-ride on the R&D investment of the
competitor. In this case higher levels of intransparency can encourage R&D investment.
On the other hand, if consumer surplus is low, the costs of R&D are high and the level
of transparency does not alter the decision of firms whether to invest in R&D in stage 2,
then welfare is increasing in the level of transparency.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the consequences of a lack of clarity regarding the scope and
the content of a patent on the incentives of firms to invest in R&D and on the optimal
information disclosure policy of the patent office. Two heterogeneous firms compete for
patents and strategically choose their R&D investment. In a winner-takes-all competition
the R&D investment of the weaker firm is increasing in the level of transparency, while for
the stronger firm this is only the case if the firms are relatively equal in terms of their R&D
productivities. For positive spillovers the R&D investment of firms is non-monotonic
w.r.t. to the level of transparency and maximal in a perfectly intransparent system.
R&D investment and welfare are not necessarily maximal under full transparency. If
an innovation has positive R&D spillovers (either because the unsuccessful firm can easily
imitate and adapt the discovery for a different market or because it may lead to follow up
innovations), firms have an incentive to free-ride on each others R&D investment. This
means that there is not enough duplication from the perspective of a welfare-maximizing
social planner. As uncertainty about the content of a patent can lead to more duplication,
it might not be optimal for the patent office to encourage full information disclosure, i.e.,
full transparency. Similarly, a higher risk of legal disputes does not necessarily discourage
the inventor from investing. Despite the negative effect on the expected profit associated
with a patent, the inventor may be more likely to invest into follow-up inventions, if she
has to fear litigation.
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The links between uncertainty in the patent system and strategic R&D investment are
complex. While some types of uncertainty seem to have mainly a negative effect (β),
others have positive as well as negative effects on R&D investment and welfare. Our
theoretical findings suggest that depending on the type of uncertainty, full transparency
is not necessarily optimal. Thus, increasing transparency might not only be associated
with advantages, and the costs and benefits of policies to increase transparency have to
be considered carefully.
During the analysis the length of a patent as well as profits pi and ω were treated as
exogenous and could not be influenced by the social planner. In reality policy makers can
of course use these instruments, which might be controlled more easily than the trans-
parency level itself. Ideally, the patent office will choose an optimal combination of the
level of transparency, patent length and competition policies that influence ω. An inter-
esting question for future research can thus be an analysis of the optimal combination of
patent breadth, patent length and the certainty of patent protection.
Finally, we restricted attention to pure strategy equilibria, which is not entirely un-
problematic as for certain parameter values there does not necessarily exist an equilib-
rium in pure strategies. By allowing firms to use mixed strategies or considering other
strategies besides stopping strategies, we could extend our analysis and also study ques-
tions related to the timing of R&D investment or the timing of information disclosure.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1.1.
Expected payoffs of the single agent are linear in effort. Thus, to calculate the optimal
effort choice in T − 1 and T we compare expected payoffs at U(φT−1, φT ) for (φT−1, φT ) =
{(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)} given that the continuation payoff U(pT+1) = 0. That is,
U(0, 0) = 0,
U(1, 0) = (1− δ)EpT−1 + δpT−1E1pi,
U(0, 1) = δ(1− δ)EpT−1 + δpT−1E1pi,
U(1, 1) = (1− δ)EpT−1 + δE1pipT−1(1 + δ − δpi) + δ(1− δ)(1− pt−1pi)EpT .
First, U(1, 0) ≥ U(0, 0) for pT−1 ≥ pa. Further, U(1, 1) ≥ U(1, 0) for pT ≥ pa and as pT ≥ pa
implies that pT−1 ≥ pa we know that U(1, 0) ≥ U(0, 1). Hence, U(1, 1) ≥ U(1, 0) implies
U(1, 1) ≥ U(0, 1). Finally, we can verify that U(1, 1) > U(1, 0) for
pT−1 ≥ (1− δ)|E0|
(1− δ)|E0|+ E1(1− pi)(1− δ + δpi) = p
∗,
where pT =
p∗(1−pi)
1−p∗pi = p
a. These arguments can be extended to show that φT−2 = 1 is
optimal if and only if pT−2 ≥ pa and so forth. Thus, the agent experiments if pt ≥ pa and
stops otherwise. 
Proof of Proposition 1.1.
We first derive the optimal experimentation effort in T − 1 and T given that there are no
experiments in T +1, i.e., we want to find the optimal values for (φT−1, φT ) in a symmetric
equilibrium. Linearity in the maximand implies that the solution to the maximization
problem is on the boundaries of [0, 1] × [0, 1]. Hence, denoting the expected payoff from
action profile (φT−1, φT ) by U(φT−1, φT ), we compare U(0, 0), U(1, 0), U(0, 1) and U(1, 1).
Comparing expected payoffs at φi,T−1 = 0 and φi,T−1 = 1 (i.e., U(0, 0) and U(1, 0)) we find
that agent i is indifferent between experimenting and not experimenting at time T − 1
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with no experimentation in T as long as
IcT−1 ≡ (1− δ)EpT−1 + δE1pT−1pi(1− φj,T−1pi)n−1
equals zero. If IcT−1 > 0 the best response is to choose φ
c
T−1 = 1 and if I
c
T−1 < 0 the safe arm
is optimal. As players are symmetric, this is true for all agents. From IcT−1 we can derive
the optimal experimentation effort in a symmetric equilibrium with no experimentation
in T as
φcT−1 =
1
pi
− 1
pi
(
(1− δ)|E0|
δE1pipT−1
− (1− δ)(|E0|+ E1)
δE1pi
) 1
n−1
which has φcT−1 = 0 as optimal solution for beliefs pT−1 below p
a and φcT−1 = 1 for any
beliefs pT−1 above
pc =
(1− δ)|E0
(1− δ)(|E0|+ E1) + δE1pi(1− pi)n−1 .
A similar analysis shows that U(0, 1) > U(0, 0) for the same threshold beliefs pa and pc for
pT . U(1, 0) and U(0, 1) intersect at a belief pT−1 which is below pa. As U(1, 0) is steeper
than U(0, 1) we can conclude that it is not optimal for agents to postpone experimenting.
Further, U(1, 1) ≥ U(1, 0) for any belief
pT ≥ (1− δ)|E0|
(1− δ)(|E0|+ E1) + E1δpi(1− piφj,T )n−1 ,
which is the same belief that determines when U(1, 0) ≥ U(0, 0) replacing pT−1 by pT and
φj,T−1 by φj,T . Finally, U(1, 1) ≥ U(0, 0) for any belief pT−1 above
(1− δ)|E0|(1 + δ)
(1− δ)(|E0|(1 + δ) + E1) + δE1(1− piφcT−1)n−1[1− δ + δpi(1− piφcT )n−1]
. (A.1)
The belief pT−1 at whichU(1, 1) intersects withU(0, 0) lies above p¯c (the belief above which
U(1, 0) > U(0, 0)) for all φcT−1, φ
c
T ∈ [0, 1]. This mean that if pT−1 is low φi,T−1 = φi,T = 0 for
all i ∈ N , for slightly more optimistic beliefs φi,T−1 > 0 while φi,T = 0 and for even more
optimistic belief φi,T−1 = φi,T = 1. As this argument extends for any two consecutive
periods in a symmetric equilibrium
φci(t) =

1 for pt ∈ [pc, 1),
1
pi
− 1
pi
(
(1−δ)|E0|
δE1pipt
− (1−δ)(|E0|+E1)
δE1pi
) 1
n−1
for pt ∈ (pa, pc),
0 for pt ∈ [0, pa],
for all i ∈ N . In general, for any two consecutive periods we have either (φct , 0) or (1, φct+1)
where φct ,φct+1 ∈ [0, 1]. That is, n failed experiments from pc yield a posterior below pa
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so that there is at most one time period in which agents do not play exclusively risky or
exclusively safe. To be more precise, updating pc by n failed experiments yields
p¯c(1− pi)n
1− p¯c + p¯c(1− pi)n =
(1− δ)|E0|(1− pi)n
(1− δ)|E0|(1− pi)n + E1(1− δ + δpi(1− pi)n−1)
which is smaller than pa. 
Proof of Proposition 1.2.
For simplicity of exposition the main arguments are first discussed for the simpler case
when n = 4. We proceed analogously to the proof of Proposition 1.1. Expected payoffs
are linear in effort and hence to find the optimal experimentation effort (in a symmetric
equilibrium) it suffices to compare the expected payoffs from experimenting with full
intensity to not experimenting at all. For n = 4 the expected payoffs of different action
profiles U(φi,T−1, φi,T ) for given (symmetric) actions of the other players are
U(0, 0) = δpT−1E1[1− a[1− δ + δb]],
where a = (1− φj,T−2pi)(1− φj,T−1pi)2 and b = (1− φj,T−1pi)(1− φj,Tpi)2(1− δφT,jpi)
U(1, 0) = (1− δ)EpT−1 + δpT−1E1[1− (1− pi)a[1− δ + δb]],
U(0, 1) = δ(1− δ)EpT (1− pT−1 + pT−1a) + δpT−1E1[1− a[1− δ + δ(1− pi)b]],
U(1, 1) = (1 − δ)EpT−1 + δE1pT−1[1 − (1 − pi)a] + δ(1 − pT−1 + pT−1(1 − pi)a)[(1 − δ)EpT +
δE1[1− (1− pi)b]].
Thus, U(1, 0) > U(0, 0) for any belief p above
(1− δ)|E0|
(1− δ)(|E0|+ E1) + δpiE1a[1− δ + δb] . (A.2)
Similarly, U(1, 0) ≥ U(0, 1) as long as
p ≥ (1− δ)|E0|
(1− δ)(|E0|+ E1) + δE1(1− (1− pi)a) . (A.3)
It can be shown that (A.2) ≥ (A.3) for all a, b ∈ [0, 1], i.e., for all φT−2, φT−1, φT ∈ [0, 1].
Similarly to the complete network, this implies that agents have no incentive to delay
experimentation. Moreover, it can be shown that the belief at which U(1, 1) ≥ U(1, 0) is
strictly above (A.2) and hence, there is at most one time period in which agents use inte-
rior experimentation intensities. A change in the number of players n affects expressions
a and b. Independently of the number of players we have a, b ∈ [0, 1] and hence the con-
clusion remains the same.
106
In the ring network we have to distinguish between an even and an odd number of play-
ers, as this determines how much information arrives in the last round where new infor-
mation reaches agent i. As the results are similar in both cases for simplicity we will only
discuss the case where n is odd here.
Let us first specify the indifference condition Irt for any point in time t, where up to time
t all agents experimented with full intensity. The amount of information (i.e., the number
of past experiments) agent i obtains in period t and subsequent periods depends on the
number of agents and on how many periods already passed. At time t we have
Irt = (1− δ)Ept + δE1ptpi{(1− φrpi)2(1− pi)2 min{t−1,d−1}(1− δ) +
δ(1− φrpi)4(1− pi)4 min{t−1,d−1}−2(1− δ) + ...+ δ n−32 (1− φrpi)n−1(1− pi)yt−1},
where we dropped the time index for φrt and yt = (n − 3)t − 2
∑min{t−1,d−1}
x=1 (t − x). If
Irt = 0 the agent is indifferent between experimenting and not experimenting at time t
given that there are no experiments in t+ 1. From this we can derive φrt as well as prt and
prt for any t ≥ 1. In contrast to the complete network an explicit simple expression for φrt
cannot be derived. A proof that the root on [0, 1] exists and is unique can be found below.
The cutoff beliefs are increasing in t. Further, three failed experiments from prt take the
posterior below the lower cutoff pr
t+1
. Hence, there is at most one period in which agents
use interior intensities in the symmetric equilibrium in the ring network.
Existence and uniqueness of φrt : The expression for φr1 can be found by analyzing Ir1 = 0,
which can be rewritten as
(1− δ)Ep1
δE1p1pi
+ (1− φ1pi)2 − [1− (1− φ1pi)2]
n−3
2∑
t=1
δt(1− φ1pi)2t = 0, (A.4)
where the expression on the l.h.s is a polynomial of order n − 1 in φ1. To show that the
root on [0, 1] is unique, it is enough to show that (A.4) is strictly monotonically decreasing
for φ1 ∈ [0, 1]. We rewrite Ir1 = 0 as
0 = (1− φ1pi)2 − δ(1− φ1pi)2 − δ2(1− φ1pi)4 − ....− δ n−12 −1(1− φ1pi)n−3 +
δ(1− φ1pi)4 + δ2(1− φ1pi)6 + ....+ δ n−12 −1(1− φ1pi)n−1 + (1− δ)Ep1
δE1p1pi
= (1− δ)
[
(1− φ1pi)2 + δ(1− φ1pi)4 + δ2(1− φ1pi)6 + ....+ δ n−12 −2(1− φ1pi)n−3
]
−
δ
n−1
2
−1(1− φ1pi)n−1 + (1− δ)Ep1
δE1p1pi
.
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Taking the derivative w.r.t. φ1 gives
(1− δ)[−2pi(1− φ1pi)− 4δpi(1− φ1pi)3 − ...]− (n− 1)δ n−32 pi(1− φ1pi)n−2,
which is negative for φ1 ∈ [0, 1]. A similar analysis can be carried out for Irt for t ≥ 2. 
Proof of Proposition 1.3.
For simplicity we first describe the proof if agents only experiment in t = 1, before we
extend the arguments for any t ≥ 2. In t = 1 if p1 ≥ pc, all agents experiment with in-
tensity 1 and if p1 ≤ pa, no agent experiments. We want to show that for p1 ∈ (pa, pc)
equilibrium experimentation intensities are higher in the ring than in the complete net-
work. For beliefs in [pr1, p
c) agents in the ring experiment with full intensity while players
in the complete network have effort levels below 1. For beliefs in (pa, pr1) we know that in
equilibrium Ir1 = 0 and Ic1 = 0. As prior beliefs are assumed to be identical it follows from
Ir1 = I
c
1 that
(1− φc1pi)n−1 − (1− φr1pi)2
(
1− δ + δ n−12 (1− φr1pi)n−3[1− (1− φr1pi)2]
1− δ(1− φr1pi)2
)
= 0. (A.5)
Equation (A.5) holds for φr1 = φc1 = 0 and in case we set φr1 = φc1 = φ1 the l.h.s. of (A.5)
is monotonically decreasing in φ1 and negative for any φ1 > 0. Consequently, for (A.5) to
hold we need
φr1 > φ
c
1.
In t ≥ 2 it has to be shown that for any prior p1 ≥ pc (which implies φr1 = φc1 = 1), the ex-
perimentation intensity in the ring, φrt , is at least as high as its counterpart in the complete
network, φct . A direct comparison is not possible, as agents hold different posteriors. For
φrt and φct that maximize the agents’ utility in the corresponding network in the interval
where agents use both arms, the corresponding beliefs are given by
prt = (1− δ)|E0|/{(1− δ)[|E0|+ E1] + δE1pi[(1− φrpi)2(1− pi)2 min{t−1,d−1}(1− δ) +
δ(1− φrpi)4(1− pi)4 min{t−1,d−1}−2(1− δ) + ...+ δ n−32 (1− φrpi)n−1(1− pi)yt−1}(A.6)
for the ring and
pct =
(1− δ)|E0|
(1− δ)[|E0|+ E1] + δE1pi(1− φctpi)n−1
(A.7)
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for the complete network. Further,
pct =
prt (1− pi)yt−1
prt (1− pi)yt−1 + 1− prt
. (A.8)
By replacing prt in Equation (A.8) by (A.6) and then solving for (A.8)=(A.7), it can be
shown that
φrt > φ
c
t .

Proof of Proposition 1.4.
Analogously to the proof of Proposition 1.1 and 1.2 it can be shown that players have no
incentive to delay experimentation and that there is at most one time period in which they
use interior experimentation intensities. Let us start with the central player. Comparing
expected utility from experimenting with intensity φht to not experimenting (with no ex-
perimentation in t+1), the risky arm is optimal as long as (1−δ)Ept+δE1ptpi(1−φstpi)n−1 ≥
0. The cut-off belief above which an experimentation intensity of 1 is optimal for the hub
is given by ph = pc, and the lower cut-off by ph = pa. If (1−δ)Ept +δE1ptpi(1−φstpi)n−1 = 0,
then φst is given by (1.8). This means that the hub is indifferent between experiment-
ing and not experimenting on the interval [pa, pc] if the peripheral players choose φst =
φct . If φst > φct for a given belief then (1 − δ)Ept + δE1ptpi(1 − φstpi)n−1 < 0 and conse-
quently the hub stops experimenting immediately. On the other hand if φst < φct , then
(1− δ)Ept + δE1ptpi(1− φstpi)n−1 > 0 and the hub will exclusively use the risky option.
Peripheral players are symmetric and receive all their information from the hub. In
t = 1 (with no experimentation in t = 2) they are indifferent between the risky and the
safe arm as long as Is1 = 0, where
Is1 = (1− δ)Ep1 + δE1p1pi(1− φh1pi)(1− δ + δ(1− φs1pi)n−2).
From this we can derive φs1 and the corresponding cut-off beliefs ps1 = p
a, and
ps1 =
(1− δ)|E0|
(1− δ)[|E0|+ E1] + E1δpi(1− φh1pi)(1− δ + δ(1− pi)n−2)
.
Existence and uniqueness of φs1 can be easily verified by analyzing the expression Is1 . The
minimum of this function is at 1
pi
which implies that there is only one root on [0, 1] due
to the parabolic shape of the function. In t = 1 we have ph = pa =ps1 and p
s
1 < p
h = pc,
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where the last inequality holds for all φh1 ∈ [0, 1]. Consequently, in the interval [ps1, ph), the
peripheral players experiment with an effort level that violates the indifference condition
of the hub (φs1 > φc1) which implies that the central player will stop experimenting imme-
diately for any belief below ph = pc. For beliefs in (pa, ps1), if φh1 = 0, the experimentation
intensity of the peripheral players is higher than it would be in a symmetric equilibrium
in the complete network. Consequently, the hub does not experiment in this region either.
More precisely, comparing Is1 and Ic1 we see that φs1 > φc1 for all φh1 ∈ [0, φc1].
Let us turn to the problem in t ≥ 2. The posterior beliefs of the agents are pst+1 =
pt(1−pi)2
pt(1−pi)2+1−pt for the peripheral players and p
h
t+1 =
pst+1(1−pi)n−2
pst+1(1−pi)n−2+1−pst+1 for the hub. Not only
do agents now hold different beliefs, also the upper and lower cut-offs for the peripheral
players are different due to the first round information that will reach them. For t ≥ 2 we
have
Is2 = (1− δ)Epst + δE1pstpi(1− pi)n−2(1− φht pi)(1− δ + δ(1− φstpi)n−2)
where, by imposing Is2 = 0, we obtain
ps2 =
(1− δ)|E0|
(1− δ)[|E0|+ E1] + E1δpi(1− pi)n−2(1− φht pi)(1− δ + δ(1− pi)n−2))
and
ps
2
=
(1− δ)|E0|
(1− δ)[|E0|+ E1] + E1δpi(1− pi)n−2 .
We have pht = p
c > ps
2
> pa = ph and further ps2 > p
c for φht = 1 and t ≥ 2. Now we
want to show that it is still optimal that either all agents choose effort level 1 (for high
beliefs), effort level 0 (for pessimistic beliefs) or the peripheral players choose φst ∈ (0, 1)
while the hub does not experiment. If agents in the complete network and the peripheral
players have the same φt as optimal effort level, then their beliefs are less than n − 2
failed experiments apart from each other. This means that if the distance (measured in
experiments) is n − 2, the belief and effort level of the peripheral players is higher than
for the complete network in the interval where agents use both arms. Then it is optimal
for the hub to stop experimenting completely below pc. As before, an optimal strategy
requires either (φsi,t, 0) or (1, φsi,t+1), i.e., there is at most one time period in which agents
use both arms simultaneously. For any belief in (ps
2
, p¯s2], if all peripheral players choose
the equilibrium experimentation effort φst , the posterior belief in case all experiments fail
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is given by
(1− δ)|E0|(1− piφst)(1− pi)n−2
(1− δ)|E0|(1− piφst)(1− pi)n−2 + (1− δ)E1 + E1δpi(1− pi)n−2(1− δ + δ(1− piφst)n−2))
,
which is below ps
2
. Existence and uniqueness of φst for t ≥ 2 can be shown by analyzing
the expression Is2 based on the same arguments as for φs1. 
Proof of Proposition 1.5.
The proof consists of two parts. Part 1 is for beliefs such that in case all experiments
in t = 1 fail, there will be no experimentation in t = 2. Part 2 describes the proof for
beliefs where agents experiment in t ≥ 2. First, for prior beliefs in [0, pa] and [pc, 1] the
experimentation intensity in t = 1 is the same in both networks. Moreover, for beliefs pc−ε
the agents in the complete network experiment almost with full intensity while the agents
in the star network cannot increase their effort any more. Hence, for beliefs right below pc,
total experimentation effort is higher in the complete network. The interesting interval is
(pa, ps1) in which the hub does not experiment and in which agents both networks invest in
both arms simultaneously. Therefore, nφc1 has to be compared to (n−1)φs1. In this interval
along the equilibrium path
pc1 =
(1− δ)|E0|
(1− δ)[|E0|+ E1] + δE1pi(1− φc1pi)n−1
,
for the complete network and
ps1 =
(1− δ)|E0|
(1− δ)[|E0|+ E1] + δE1pi(1− δ + δ(1− φs1pi)n−2)
,
for the star. This implies that for a given fixed belief the relation between φc1 and φs1 can
be found through these expressions and is given by
φc1 =
1
pi
− 1
pi
(1− δ + δ(1− φs1pi)n−2)
1
n−1 .
Now the difference between n−1
n
φs1 − φc1 can be defined as
Γn(δ, pi, p1) := 1− δ −
(
1− n− 1
n
φs1pi
)n−1
+ δ(1− φs1pi)n−2.
Based on the expression for Γn(·) we can then define the region Sn(p1) ⊂ [0, 1]2 for p1 ∈
(pa, p¯c) as
Sn(p1) := {δ, pi ∈ [0, 1]2 : Γn(δ, pi, p1) > 0}.
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That is, Sn(p1) is the set of all combinations of δ and pi for which nφc1 < (n− 1)φs1. Clearly,
Γn(δ, pi, p1)→ 1− δ > 0 as n→∞ for all δ, pi ∈ [0, 1]2 and hence λ(Sn(p1))→ 1 as n→∞.
If agents experiment in t ≥ 2 a similar argument as above can be used with addition-
ally making use of the fact that pct =
pst (1−pi)n−2
pst (1−pi)n−2+1−pst . That is, setting
pct =
(1− δ)|E0|
(1− δ)[|E0|+ E1] + δE1pi(1− φctpi)n−1
,
it can be solved for pst , which has to be equal to
(1− δ)|E0|
(1− δ)[|E0|+ E1] + δE1pi(1− pi)n−2(1− δ + δ(1− φstpi)n−2)
.
Expressing φct in terms of φst , to find out whether φct ≤ n−1n φst we analyze
Γn(δ, pi, pt) := 1− δ −
(
1− n− 1
n
φstpi
)n−1
+ δ(1− φstpi)n−2 +
(1− δ)[1− (1− pi)n−2]
δpi(1− pi)n−2 ,
by the same arguments as for Γn(δ, pi, p1). Γn(δ, pi, pt) is equivalent to Γn(δ, pi, p1) up to
replacing φs1 by φst and adding a positive constant. Sn(pt) ⊂ [0, 1]2 can be defined in an
analogous way as
Sn(pt) = {δ, pi ∈ [0, 1]2 : Γn(δ, pi, pt) > 0}.

Proof of Proposition 1.6.
We start the proof by defining Fn,1(φ1), which is derived by considering the difference
between Is1 and Ir1 and imposing φr1 = φs1 = φ1, i.e.,
Fn,1(φ1) := {δ, pi ∈ [0, 1]2 : Ir1 − Is1 ≥ 0},
where Ir1 − Is1 for φr1 = φs1 = φ1 is given by
[1− δ(1−φ1pi)2][δ− 1− δ(1−φ1pi)n−2 + (1−φ1pi)2]− [1− (1−φ1pi)2]δ n−12 (1− (1−φ1pi)n−1)].
This means Fn,1(φ1) represents all combinations of δ and pi such that φs1 ≥ φr1. For proving
part (i) of the proposition it is easy to verify that for small n (e.g., n = 3) the inequality is
satisfied for all δ, pi ∈ [0, 1]. This suffices to conclude that there exists some finite n1 ∈ N
such that for all n < n1 we have Fn,1(φ1) = [0, 1]2. For the second part we explore the
behavior of Fn,1(φ1) in the limit as n→∞ and obtain
F1(φ1) := {δ, pi ∈ [0, 1]2 : [1− δ(1− φ1pi)2][δ − 1 + (1− φ1pi)2] ≥ 0},
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where it can be shown that the inequality fails to hold for some values of δ and pi implying
that F1(φ1) is a strict subset of [0, 1]2.
If agents experiment in t ≥ 2 as well, we proceed in an analogous way replacing Is1
and Ir1 with Irt and Is2 and additionally make use of the fact that
prt =
pst(1− pi)n−2−yt
pst(1− pi)n−2−yt + 1− pst
.

Proof of Proposition 1.7.
Part (i) is obvious as for p1 ∈ [0, pa] no one experiments in any network and hence ex-
pected payoffs are zero in all networks.
To show (ii) we compare W c(p1) with W s(p1) making use of the fact that in the relevant
interval Ic1 = 0 and Is1 = 0 and further
1− δ + δ(1− φs1pi)n−2 = (1− φc1pi)n−1.
The result then follows from the fact that φs1 > φc1 in equilibrium.
For (iii) we obtain the following. By comparing W c(p1) and W r(p1) for p1 ∈ [0, p¯r1] it is
straightforward to show that c ∼ r, as in this interval Ic1 = 0 and Ir1 = 0. That c  r for
p1 ∈ (p¯r1, 1] follows from discounting, i.e., the fact that δ < 1.
For (iv), the condition
(1−δ)(2p1−1)+δp1[(1−pi)n−1[1+δ(n−1)]+(1−δ)(n−1)(1−pi)−n(1−φc1pi)n] > 0. (A.9)
is derived from W c(p1) −W s(p1). That is, if (A.9) holds then W c(p1) > W s(p1) for p1 ∈
(p¯s1, p¯
c
1).
Finally, a comparison of W c(p1) and W s(p1) for the case when all agents in both networks
experiment with full intensity, shows that due to discounting, expected payoffs are higher
in the complete network, which proves part (v). 
Proof of Proposition 1.8.
Expected payoffs in the complete network with one agent who does not experiment and
no experimentation in t ≥ 2 are given by
U c
′
= (n− 1)δp1[1− (1− φcpi)n−2] + δp1[1− (1− φcpi)n−1],
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where we made us of the fact that for p1 ∈ [pa, pc′ ] we have Ic′1 = 0. For the star network
expected payoffs are
U s = δp1[1− (1− φspi)n−1] + δ2p1[1− (1− φspi)n−2](n− 1).
The difference U c′ − U s is given by
δp1{(1− φspi)n−1 − (1− φcpi)n−1 + (n− 1)[1− δ + δ(1− φspi)n−2 − (1− φcpi)n−2]}. (A.10)
Expression (A.10) is negative, as the term in square brackets equals zero and the difference
(1− φspi)n−1 − (1− φcpi)n−1 is negative for φs > φc.

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Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 2.1.
At time T firm 1 compares whether investing one more time yields a higher payoff than
stopping right now, i.e., when −(1 − δ)ck1,T + δp1,Tλ1k1,T ≥ 0. Linearity in k1,T implies
that k1,T = 1 for p1,T ≥ (1−δ)cδλ1 = pa1. It is straightforward to verify that ka1,T = 1 implies
ka1,T−1 = 1, as beliefs are decreasing and future payoffs discounted. More precisely, for
any two consecutive periods we obtain
−k1,t(1− δ)c+ δp1,tλ1k1,t + δ(1− p1,tλ1k1,t)[−k1,t+1(1− δ)c+ δp1,t+1λ1k1,t+1].
Now suppose k1,t+1 = 1 which implies that p1,t+1 ≥ pa1 and −(1 − δ)c + δp1,t+1λ1 ≥ 0.
Rearranging terms around k1,t to find ka1,t, we see that ka1,t = 1 if (1 − δ)c(δp1,tλ1 − 1) +
δp1,tλ1(1− δp1,t+1λ1) ≥ 0. This inequality is always satisfied since p1,t ≥ p1,t+1. 
Proof of Lemma 2.2.
The proof is the same as for Lemma 2.1 taking the dependency between sectors into ac-
count. At time T the firm decides whether it is better to experiment one more time com-
pared to stopping right now, i.e., −(1 − δ)ck2,T + δp2,Tλ2k2,T [x + p1,T qT x˜] ≥ 0. If the firm
in sector 1 stopped experimenting qT = 0 and we obtain the autarky cutoff pa2 =
(1−δ)c
δλ2x
for
sector 2. The other cutoffs can be found by distinguishing between the case when there
was no breakthrough in sector 1 but firm 1 still experiments and the case when there was
a breakthrough. As in Lemma 2.1, it is easy to verify that ka2,t+1 = 1 implies ka2,t = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2.1.
For simplicity of exposition we drop the subscript indicating the sector for this proof. At
time t firm i = 1, 2 solves the following problem:
ui(pt) = max
ki,t∈[0,1]
{−(1− δ)ki,tc+ δptλα[ki,t(1− k−i,tλ1(1 + γ)/2) + k−i,tγ] +
δ(1− pt + pt(1− λki,t)(1− λk−i,t))ui(pt+1)}.
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If we substitute pt+1, where
pt+1 =
pt(1− λki,t)(1− λk−i,t)
pt(1− λki,t)(1− λk−i,t) + 1− pt , (B.1)
we see that the term in brackets before ui(pt+1) cancels out with the denominator in (B.1)
and the maximization problem is linear in ki,t, ki,t+1 and pt. Similarly if we plug in for pt+2
we obtain linearity in ki,t+2 and so forth. After time T agents cannot experiment anymore
and ui(pT+1) = 0 if there was no success up to time T . Suppose T = t + 1 implying that
u(pt+2) = 0 and let us focus on finding the optimal values for ki,t and ki,t+1. Linearity in
the maximand implies that the solution to the maximization problem is on the boundaries
of [0, 1] × [0, 1]. Hence, denoting by U(ki,t, ki,t+1) the expected payoff of strategy profile
(ki,t, ki,t+1), we need to compare the values for U(0, 0), U(1, 0), U(0, 1), and U(1, 1). These
are given by
U(0, 0) = δptλk−i,tγα + δ2pt(1− k−i,tλ)k−i,t+1γλα,
U(1, 0) = −(1− δ)c+ δptλα[1− λk−i,t(1 + γ)/2 + k−i,tγ] + δ2pt(1− k−i,tλ)(1− λ)k−i,t+1γλα,
U(0, 1) = δptλk−i,tγα+ δ(1− ptk−i,tλ)[−(1− δ)c+ δpt+1λα[1− λk−i,t+1(1 + γ)/2 + k−i,t+1γ],
and
U(1, 1) = −(1 − δ)c + δptλα[1 − λk−i,t(1 + γ)/2 + k−i,tγ] − (1 − δ)δc(1 − p + p(1 − λ)(1 −
λki,t)) + δ
2p(1− λ)(1− λk−i,t)λα[1− λk−i,t+1(1 + γ)/2 + k−i,t+1γ].
Thus, U(1, 0) ≥ U(0, 0) if
pt ≥ (1− δ)c
δλα[1− λk−i,t(1 + γ)/2− δγ(1− k−i,tλ)λk−i,t+1] . (B.2)
As players are symmetric an equivalent expression holds for player −i. Hence, for sym-
metric actions where k−i,t+1 = 0, ki,t = 0 is a best response to k−i,t = 0 for pt < p, both
choose kt = 1 for pt ≥ p and in between they choose kt ∈ (0, 1) so that the other firm is
indifferent towards its level of R&D investment given by
k∗t =
−(1− δ)c+ δλαpt
δλ2ptα(1 + γ)/2
.
A similar comparison shows that for symmetric strategies U(0, 1) ≥ U(0, 0), at the same
threshold belief as in (B.2). Now let us compare U(1, 0) and U(0, 1). Both are linear and
increasing in pt and intersect with U(0, 0) at the same belief for symmetric actions. As
U(1, 0) is steeper than U(0, 1) we can conclude that U(1, 0) ≥ U(0, 1) for all beliefs above
the intersection with U(0, 0).
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Further, let us see for which beliefs the action profile (1, 1) is optimal. As we know
that (1, 0) dominates (0, 1) for all
pt ≥ (1− δ)c
δλα[1− k∗t λ1+γ2 ]
, (B.3)
we see that U(1, 1)− U(1, 0) is positive for
pt ≥ (1− δ)c
(1− δ)cλ(2− λ) + δλ(1− λ)2[1− kt+1λ1+γ2 ]
. (B.4)
If we update this to
pt+1 =
pt(1− λ)2
pt(1− λ)2 + 1− pt ,
we obtain
pt+1 ≥ (1− δ)c
δλα[1− kt+1λ1+γ2 ]
,
which is the same belief that determines when U(1, 0) ≥ U(0, 0) replacing kt by kt+1 and
pt by pt+1. Finally, we can show that U(1, 1) ≥ U(0, 0) for
pt ≥ (1− δ)c(1 + δ)/δλ[[1− λk−i,t(1 + γ)/2]α + (1− δ)c(1 + k−i,t(1− λ)) +
δα(1− k−i,tλ)[(1− λ)(1− λk−i,t+1(1 + γ)/2)− k−i,t+1γλ]].
This threshold belief is above (B.3) for all k−i,t, k−i,t+1 ∈ [0, 1] if and only if
c <
δλα(2− λ− (1 + γ)/2)
(1− δ)(2− λ) . (B.5)
Further, the same condition guarantees that two failed experiments from p take the pos-
terior belief below p and that if both firms choose k∗s,t ∈ (0, 1) for beliefs ps,t ∈ (ps, ps), the
posterior is below the lower cutoff in the absence of a success. Hence, if (B.5) is satisfied,
there is at most one time period in which players use an interior action.
Note that U(kt, kt+1, pt) is linearly increasing in the belief. The threshold belief at
which U(1, 1, pt) ≥ U(1, 0, pt) (given by (B.4)) is above (B.3) where U(1, 0, pt) intersects
with U(0, 0, pt). Additionally, it is easy to verify that U(1, 1) is steeper than U(1, 0) which
immediately implies that the intersection of U(1, 1) with U(0, 0) is above (B.3) as well.
This implies that (B.5) is always satisfied. Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium for opti-
mistic beliefs (1, k∗t+1) is optimal, for low beliefs (0, 0) and for intermediate beliefs (k∗t , 0)
with k∗t , k∗t+1 ∈ [0, 1]. These arguments are valid for any two consecutive periods. 
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Proof of Proposition 2.2.
A social planner maximizes aggregate expected payoffs given by
W (ki,t, k−i,t, pt) = max{ki,t,k−i,t}
{−c(1− δ)(ki,t + k−i,t) + δp1,tλ1(ki,t + k−i,t − ki,tk−i,tλ1)Ws +
δ(1− p1,t + p1,t(1− λ1ki,t)(1− λ1k−i,t))W (pt+1)}.
Setting W (pt+1) = 0 to compare when experimenting in t is better than stopping, we
obtain for symmetric actions
kw =
−(1− δ)c+ δp1,tλ1Ws
δλ21p1,tWs
,
which reaches its upper bound kw = 1 at pw1 and kw = 0 at pw1 . Similar arguments as in
the proof of Proposition 2.1 show that two failed experiments from pw yield a posterior
belief below pw. This implies that also for the social planner there is at most one period in
which kw ∈ (0, 1). The second part for sector 2 can be derived in the same way. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3.
Part (i): Firm 1 is in sector 1 while firm 2 decides whether to join or start research in
(dependent) sector 2. To compare the cutoff beliefs of the strategic agent to the social
planner, we separate the analysis into different intervals of p1.
• For p1 ∈ [p1, 1]: If p2 < pa2, sector 1 is preferred by both the social planner and the
strategic firm. If p2 ≥ pa2, we have
u1,1 = −(1− δ)c+ δp1λ1α(1 + γ1)(1− λ1/2) + δ(1− p1λ1(2− λ1))u′1,1, and
u2,1 = −(1− δ)c+ δp2λ2(x+ p1q1x˜) + δ(1− p2λ2)u′2,1,
where u′s,n denotes the payoff in period t+ 1. For the social planner we obtain
W1,1 = −2(1− δ)c+ δp1λ1(2− λ1)(1 + α) + δ(1− p1λ1(2− λ1))W ′1,1, and
W1,2 = −2(1− δ)c+ δp1λ1 + δp2λ2(x+ p1q1x˜) + δ(1− p2λ2)u′2,1 + δ(1− p1λ1)u′1,2.
From these expressions we can derive the cutoff beliefs for p2 such that for beliefs
above this threshold sector 2 is preferred to sector 1. The continuation payoff in sec-
tor 2 after observing a failure, δ(1− p2λ2)u′2,1, enters both decisions in the same way.
We are only interested in the difference between the socially optimal and strategic
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decision and the closed form solution of the cutoffs does not matter. Hence, we can
set u′2,1 = 0 as the expression is linearly increasing in p2. Then we have pw2 > p∗2 if
and only if
p1λ1[1−λ1 +α(1−γ1)(1−λ1/2)] + (1−p1λ1(2−λ1))(W ′1,1−u′1,1)− (1−p1λ1)u′1,2 > 0.
(B.6)
The first term is always positive, which means that it depends on the continuation
payoffs whether the inequality is satisfied. We know from Heidhues et al. (2015)
that, if the optimal number of experiments for a single firm is given by K, the total
number of experiments that are performed by two firms that can observe each other
and interact strategically is given byK−1, K orK+1 (see Proposition 3 in Heidhues
et al., 2015). If there are no further experiments in any sector, i.e., u′1,2 = u′1,1 = W ′1,1 =
0 (which implies K + 1 experiments for two firms), pw2 > p∗2. What we need to show
is that (B.6) is satisfied for any possible number of experiments in equilibrium. The
difference between W ′1,1 and u′1,1 is positive. Hence, it suffices verify that (B.6) holds
for W ′1,1 = u′1,1 = 0 while u′1,2 > 0. As there are at least K − 1 experiments if agents
experiment jointly we know that for W ′1,1 = u′1,1 = 0 in equilibrium u′1,2 is bounded
above by
−(1− δ)c+ δp1,t+1λ1 + δ(1− p1,t+1λ1)[−(1− δ)c+ δp1,t+2λ1]. (B.7)
Plugging (B.7) back in (B.6) we see that the inequality is satisfied if p1 is smaller or
equal to
(1− δ)c(1 + δ)
λ1[(1− δ)c[1 + δ(2− λ1)]− (1− λ1)[1− δ − δ2(1− λ1)]− α(1− γ1)(1− λ1/2)] := p
1.
Further we know that p1 is such that the posterior belief after two failed experiments
is below p
1
, because there are no more experiments if both firms experiment one
more time and fail. That is,
p1(1− λ1)2
p1(1− λ1)2 + 1− p1 < p
a
1,
which implies
p1 <
(1− δ)c
(1− δ)cλ1(2− λ1) + δλ1α(1− λ1)2 := p
2.
Now it suffices to show that p1 > p2.
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• For p1 ∈ [pa1, p1) the firm joins sector 1 if p2 < pa2 (the same is true for the social
planner). If p2 ≥ pa2 the social planner compares the expected utility from both firms
being in sector 1
W1,1 = −(1− δ)2k∗1c+ δp1k∗1λ1(2− λ1k∗1)(1 + α)
with expected payoffs if firms experiment in different sectors given by
W1,2 = −(1− δ)2c+ δp1λ1δp2λ2(x+ p1q1x˜) + δ(1− p2λ2)u′2,1 + δp1λ1.
The strategic firm compares expected payoffs from joining sector 1 to payoffs from
starting research in the dependent sector. Comparing the social planner to the strate-
gic firm we see that pw2 ≥ p∗2 if and only if
(1− δ)c(1− k∗1) + δp1λ1[k∗1(2− k∗1λ1)(1 + α)− 1− αk∗1(1 + γ)(1− k∗1λ1/2)] ≥ 0.
This inequality is always satisfied if k∗1 is sufficiently large, but fails to hold for small
k∗1 . Thus, for p1 close to p1 the social planner is less likely to let both firms experiment
in sector 1.
• For p1 < p1, firm 2 prefers sector 2 if p2 ≥ pa2, otherwise the firm is indifferent. The
social planner applies the same decision rule.
The proof for the case when one firm is located in sector 2 and the other decides whether
to join proceeds along the same lines. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4.
See proof of Proposition 2.3. 
Proof of Proposition 2.5.
We assume that the social planner ignores the impact of γs on experimentation and only
cares about selecting the socially optimal sector. Expected aggregate payoffs are given by
W1,1 = −2(1− δ)c+ δp1λ1(2− λ1)W1 + δ(1− p1λ1(2− λ1))W ′1,1,
W1,2 = −2(1− δ)c+ δp1λ1 + δ(1− p1λ1)u′1,2 + δp2λ2(x+ p1qx˜) + δ(1− p2λ2)u′2,1, and
W2,2 = −2(1− δ)c+ δp2λ2(2− λ2)W2 + δ(1− p2λ2(2− λ2))W ′2,2.
For strategic firms expected profits are given by,
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u1,1 = −(1− δ)c+ δp1λ1(1− λ1/2)(1 + γ1)α + δ(1− p1λ1(2− λ1))u′1,1,
u2,1 = −(1− δ)c+ δp2λ2(x+ p1qx˜) + δ(1− p2λ2)u′2,1,
u1,2 = −(1− δ)c+ δp1λ1 + δ(1− p1λ1)u′1,2, and
u2,2 = −(1− δ)c+ δp2λ2(1− λ2/2)(1 + γ2)xα + δ(1− p2λ2(2− λ2))u′2,2.
To find the value for γs at which the strategic and the socially optimal sector choice coin-
cide, we have to find γ1 such that W1,1 −W1,2 = u1,1 − u2,1 and γ2 such that W2,2 −W1,2 =
u2,2 − u1,2. By analyzing the expression for W1,1 −W1,2 = u1,1 − u2,1 it is easy to see from
the way x˜ enters the l.h.s. and the r.h.s. that the optimal γ∗1 does not depend on this term.
From W2,2 −W1,2 = u2,2 − u1,2 we obtain for ψ2 = (1− αγ2)x,
γ˜∗2 =
p2λ2[x(1 + α− λ2 − λ2α/2)− p1q1x˜]− (1− p2λ2(2− λ2))(u′2,2 −W ′2,2)− (1− p2λ2)u′2,1
p2λ2x(1− λ2/2)α .
In this case x˜ enters negatively (directly and indirectly through u′2,1) and thus we have
γ˜∗2 < γ
∗
2 . If ψ2 does not depend on γ2, the sign is reversed. That is, for ψ2 = 0 we have
γ˜∗2 =
p2λ2[x+ p1q1x˜] + (1− p2λ2(2− λ2))(u′2,2 −W ′2,2) + (1− p2λ2)u′2,1
p2λ2xα(1− λ2/2) − 1.
In this case x˜ enters positively (directly and indirectly through u′2,1) and thus we have
γ˜∗2 > γ
∗
2 . 
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Appendix C
Proof of Lemma 3.1.
The research alliance solves the following problem
max
{Ti,Tj}
Ui + Uj, s. t. Ti, Tj ≥ 0.
Using the Kuhn-Tucker approach to deal with the nonnegativity constraints, the neces-
sary conditions for an optimum are ∂L
∂Ti
Ti = 0, Ti ≥ 0 while ∂L∂Ti ≤ 0 and ∂L∂TjTj = 0, Tj ≥ 0
while ∂L
∂Tj
≤ 0. Suppose Ti ≥ Tj . The derivatives w.r.t. Ti and Tj are
∂L
∂Ti
= −(1− p)c+ pe−λiTi−λjTj(λipi − c), and
∂L
∂Tj
= −(1− p)c+ pe−λiTi−λjTj λi
λj
(λipi − c)− pce−ΛTj λi−λjλi .
Three possible cases have to be distinguished:
(i) Ti = Tj = 0: Then ∂L∂Ti ≤ 0 and ∂L∂Tj ≤ 0, which implies
−c+ λipip ≤ 0, and − c+ λjpip ≤ 0.
This violates Assumption 3.1.
(ii) Ti, Tj > 0 : Then ∂L∂Ti =
∂L
∂Tj
= 0. Both derivatives cannot be zero simultaneously. If
∂L
∂Ti
= 0, then ∂L
∂Tj
< 0 and if ∂L
∂Tj
= 0, then ∂L
∂Ti
> 0. Thus, Ti and Tj cannot both be
strictly positive.
(iii) Ti > 0, Tj = 0 : Then ∂L∂Ti = 0 and we obtain
Ti = − 1
λi
[
ln
(
1− p
p
)
+ ln
(
c
λiW a − c
)]
,
and
∂L
∂Tj
= −c(1− p) + pe−λiTi λj
λi
(λipi − c) < 0.
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It is easy to verify that for Ti < Tj there is no solution that satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions. 
Proof of Lemma 3.2.
(i) λi > λj =⇒ Ti > Tj :
Let Tmin = min{Ti, Tj}, then equations (3.9) and (3.10) imply that
e−λiTi−λjTmin(λipi − c) = e−λjTj−λiTmin(λjpi − c).
Dividing by λjpi − c and e−λiTi−λjTmin and taking the logarithm yields
λiTi − λjTj − (λi − λj)Tmin = ln
(
λipi − c
λjpi − c
)
.
As the r.h.s. of this equality is positive for λi > λj it follows that λiTi − λjTj − (λi −
λj)Tmin must be positive, which is only satisfied if Tmin = Tj.
(ii) λiTi + λjTj = λiT ai + λjT aj :
As T aj = 0, λiT ai + λjT aj equals
− ln
(
1− p
p
)
− ln
(
c
λipi − c
)
,
while λiTi + λjTj is equal to
− ln
(
1− p
p
)
− ln
(
c
λipi − c
)
− λjTj + λjTj.

Expected payoffs in a winner-takes-all competition with one patent for ε > 0:
The expected payoff of firm n consists of two parts: the benefit of R&D measured by the
value of the patent minus the costs of R&D. The expected benefit of firm n equals
ppiλn
(∫ Tmin
0
e−Λtdt+ e−λ−nTmin
∫ Tn
Tmin
e−λntdt
)
.
Firm n receives the profit pi with the probability that the state of the world is good and
she makes a discovery.Until Tmin this monopoly profit can only be obtained if none of the
two firms had a discovery before. Further, if Tn 6= Tmin, firm n can still make a discovery
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after firm −n stopped. If Tn = Tmin the second term in the brackets equals zero. The costs
of R&D are
c(1− p)Tn + pc
(∫ Tmin
0
e−λnt(ε+ (1− ε)e−λ−nt)dt+ (ε+ (1− ε)e−λ−nTmin)
∫ Tn
Tmin
e−λntdt
)
.
The first term, c(1− p)Tn, are the costs the firm pays in case the state of the world is bad.
As in this case there never will be a discovery, the firm pays until her stopping time Tn.
Further, the firm pays the costs cdt also in the good state of the world. The probability
that n does not observe a discovery in the interval [0, dt] (and hence pays the costs in
the subsequent time interval) equals e−λndt(e−λ−ndt + ελ−ndt), that is, the probability that
none of the two firms has a discovery e−Λdt or firm n did not have a discovery, while
firm −n had an unobserved discovery e−λndtελ−ndt. As firm −n stops to invest after a
discovery, the probability of not observing a discovery from firm −n in [0, t] is given by
e−λ−nt + ε(1− e−λ−nt).
Proof of Proposition 3.1.
In part 1 we show that the stronger firm invests more in R&D for all ε ∈ [0, 1]. In part 2
it is shown that for Ti, Tj ≥ 0 a solution to equations (F 1) and (F 2) exists and is unique.
Finally, in part 3 we apply the implicit function theorem to derive ∂Ti/∂ε and ∂Tj/∂ε.
Part 1: λi > λj implies Ti > Tj for all ε ∈ [0, 1] :
Equations (F 1) and (F 2) imply
cε(e−λjTj(1−e−λiTmin)−e−λiTi(1−e−λjTmin)) = e−λjTj−λiTmin(λjpi− c)−e−λiTi−λjTmin(λipi− c).
(C.1)
The l.h.s. of equation (C.1) is always non-negative: As λi > λj it follows that 1−e−λiTmin >
1− e−λjTmin . Further, rewriting (F 1) and (F 2), yields
c(1− p)
p
= e−λiTi(e−λjTmin(λipi − c(1− ε))− cε), (C.2)
and
c(1− p)
p
= e−λjTj(e−λiTmin(λjpi − c(1− ε))− cε). (C.3)
For λi > λj , e−λjTmin > e−λiTmin and consequently
e−λjTmin(λipi − c(1− ε)) > e−λiTmin(λjpi − c(1− ε)).
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For equations (C.2) and (C.3) to be satisfied we thus need e−λjTj > e−λiTi , which implies
λiTi > λjTj for all ε ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, the l.h.s. of equation (C.1) is always positive and zero
only if ε = 0. Thus, also the r.h.s. of (C.1) has to be positive, i.e.,
e−λjTj−λiTmin(λjpi − c)− e−λiTi−λjTmin(λipi − c) ≥ 0,
which can be rewritten as
e−λjTj−λiTmin+λiTi+λjTmin ≥ λipi − c
λjpi − c > 1.
Taking the logarithm yields λiTi + λjTmin − λjTj − λiTmin > 0, which implies Tmin = Tj.
Part 2: For Ti > Tj we want to show that a unique solution to the system of equations
−c(1− p+ pe−λiTi(ε+ (1− ε)e−λjTj)) + ppiλie−λiTi−λjTj = 0, (F1)
−c(1− p+ pe−λjTj(ε+ (1− ε)e−λiTj)) + ppiλje−ΛTj = 0, (F2)
exists. Equation (F1) can be solved for Ti uniquely, that is,
Ti = − 1
λi
[
ln
(
1− p
p
)
+ ln
(
c
λipie−λjTj − c (ε+ (1− ε)e−λjTj)
)]
,
where λipie−λjTj − c
(
ε+ (1− ε)e−λjTj) > 0 due to (F1). Hence it suffices to show that a
solution to equation (F2) w.r.t. Tj exists and is unique. Denoting y = e−ΛTj equation (F2)
can be rewritten as
εy
λj
Λ = −1− p
p
+ y
(
λjpi
c
− (1− ε)
)
. (C.4)
Note that 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, λj
Λ
∈ (0, 1) and we assume ε > 0. Thus, f(y) = y λjΛ is a monotonically
increasing concave function going through the points (0, 0) and (1, 1). The r.h.s. of (C.4) is
linear in y and has a unique intersection with y
λj
Λ on 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 if and only if
1 ≤ −1− p
εp
+
1
ε
(
λjpi
c
− (1− ε)
)
.
That is, at y = 1, the r.h.s. of (C.4) has to be greater than the l.h.s. of (C.4). This inequality
is satisfied for any belief p above c
λjpi
. Hence, a solution to the system of equations exists
and is unique if and only if p ≥ c
λjpi
, which is always satisfied by Assumption 3.1.
Part 3: As we do not have an explicit expression for the optimal stopping times we will
use the implicit function theorem (IFT) to analyze the impact of ε on the stopping times in
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equilibrium. In part 2 we showed that a unique solution to (F 1) and (F 2) exists. Further-
more, both implicit functions are continuously differentiable. Let F lx denote the derivative
of F l w.r.t. x for l = 1, 2. The IFT implies that ∂Ti/∂ε
∂Tj/∂ε
 = −
 F 1Ti F 1Tj
F 2Ti F
2
Tj
−1 F 1ε
F 2ε
 .
Taking the derivative of (F1) and (F2) w.r.t. Ti and Tj yields
F 1Ti = −λipe−λiTi(e−λjTj(λipi − c(1− ε))− εc) < 0,
F 1Tj = −λjpe−λiTi−λjTj(λipi − c(1− ε)) < 0,
F 2Ti = 0, and
F 2Tj = −pe−λjTj(e−λiTjΛ(λjpi − c(1− ε))− λjεc) < 0.
The sign of the derivatives can be obtained by analyzing expressions (F 1) and (F 2). From
(F1) we know that
pe−λiTi
(
e−λjTj(λipi − c(1− ε))− cε
)
= (1− p)c > 0.
Hence, e−λjTj(λipi−c(1−ε))−cε > 0, which implies that F 1Ti < 0.A similar analysis can be
used to verify the signs of the other derivatives. The determinant of the Jacobian is given
by F 1TiF
2
Tj
, which is positive. Taking the derivative of (F1) and (F2) w.r.t. ε yields
F 1ε = −cpe−λiTi(1− e−λjTj) < 0,
F 2ε = −cpe−λjTj(1− e−λiTj) < 0.
To obtain the effect of an increase in ε on equilibrium R&D investment we need to solve ∂Ti/∂ε
∂Tj/∂ε
 = −
 F 1Ti F 1Tj
F 2Ti F
2
Tj
−1 F 1ε
F 2ε
 = − 1
F 1TiF
2
Tj
 F 2Tj −F 1Tj
0 F 1Ti
F 1ε
F 2ε
 .
Thus, the derivatives can be calculated as
∂Tj
∂ε
= − F
1
Ti
F 2ε
F 1TiF
2
Tj
= − F
2
ε
F 2Tj
< 0,
and
∂Ti
∂ε
= − 1
F 1TiF
2
Tj
[F 2TjF
1
ε − F 1TjF 2ε ],
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where F 2TjF
1
ε − F 1TjF 2ε equals
cp2e−λiTi−λjTj
 (1− e−λjTj)(e−λiTjΛ(λjpi − c+ cε)− εcλj)
−λj(λipi − c+ cε)(1− e−λiTj)e−λjTj
 .
Thus, ∂Ti/∂ε < 0 if and only if
(1− e−λjTj)(e−λiTjΛ(λjpi − c+ cε)− εcλj) > λj(λipi − c+ cε)(1− e−λiTj)e−λjTj . (C.5)
Rewriting (C.5) by denoting λj by λ, λi by λx, where x ≥ 1 and Tj by T, we see that
∂Ti/∂ε < 0 if
(1− e−λT )(e−λxT (1 + x)(λpi − c+ εc)− cε)− (λxpi − c+ cε)(1− e−λxT )e−λT
is positive. It is positive for x = 1 (λi = λj) and negative as x goes to ∞. Moreover, by
taking the derivative w.r.t. x we can show that the expression is decreasing in x. Hence,
∂Ti/∂ε > 0 for x sufficiently large. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2.
As Uj does not depend on Ti, firm j has no incentive to change the level of transparency.
The payoff of firm i depends on the stopping time of firm j and the derivative of Ui
w.r.t. Tj is
∂Ui
∂Tj
=
pλje
−λjTj
λi
(e−λiTi − e−λiTj)[piλi − c(1− ε)] < 0.

Proof of Proposition 3.3.
The derivative of the welfare function Ω w.r.t. ε equals
∂Ti
∂ε
(
e−λiTi−λjTjpψλi − pc(ε+ (1− ε)e−λjTj
)
e−λiTi − (1− p)c)+
∂Tj
∂ε
(
e−λiTi−λjTjpψλj − pc
(
ε+ (1− ε)
(
e−λiTj + λj
λi
(e−λiTj − e−λiTi)
))
e−λjTj − (1− p)c
)
+pc
(
21−e
−ΛTj
Λ
− 1−e−λjTj
λj
− 1−e−ΛTj−e−λiTi+e−λjTj−λiTi
λi
)
.
Adding and subtracting e−λiTi−λjTjpip
(
∂Ti
∂ε
λi +
∂Tj
∂ε
λj
)
and using equations (F 1) and (F 2),
the derivative can be rewritten as
∂Ω
∂ε
= pe−λiTi−λjTj(ψ − pi)
(
∂Ti
∂ε
λi +
∂Tj
∂ε
λj
)
− ∂Tj
∂ε
c(1− ε)p(e−λiTj − e−λiTi)e−λjTj λj
λi
+
cp
(
2
1− e−ΛTj
Λ
− 1− e
−λjTj
λj
− 1− e
−ΛTj − e−λiTi + e−λjTj−λiTi
λi
)
.
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The last term represents the direct increase in costs associated with an increase in ε and
is negative. Further ∂Ω/∂Ti > 0, while ∂Ti/∂ε is negative for λi close to λj . Moreover,
∂Tj/∂ε < 0, while ∂Ω/∂Tj is positive if
λie
−λiTi(ψ − pi) > c(1− ε)(e−λiTj − e−λiTi).

Proof of Lemma 3.3.
(i) λi > λj =⇒ Tj > Ti :
Let Tmin = min{Ti, Tj}. Then equations (3.18) and (3.19) imply that
c(e−λiTi−λjTmin − e−λjTj−λiTmin) = pie−λiTi−λjTj(λi − λj).
As the r.h.s. is positive for λi > λj this implies that
−λiTi − λjTmin > −λjTj − λiTmin,
which is only satisfied for Tmin = Ti.
(ii) λjTj + λiT < λiT ai + λjT aj :
As T aj = 0, λiT ai + λjT aj equals
− ln
(
1− p
p
)
− ln
(
c
λipia − c
)
,
while λjTj + λiTi equals
λiTi − ln
(
1− p
p
)
− ln
(
c
λjpi − c
)
− λiTi,
which implies Tjλj + λiTi < λiT ai + λjT aj as
ln (λjpi − c) < ln (λipia − c) ,
where pia = pi1τ + ω1τ = 2pi > pi.

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Proof of Proposition 3.4.
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.1. In part 1 conditions for existence and
uniqueness are derived. In part 2 we analyze the impact of ε on the optimal stopping
times.
Part 1: Existence and uniqueness of a solution to the system of equations
−c(1− p+ pe−λiTi (ε+ (1− ε)e−λjTmin)) + ppiλie−λiTi (ε+ (1− ε)e−λjTj) = 0, (F3)
−c(1− p+ pe−λjTj (ε+ (1− ε)e−λiTmin)) + ppiλje−λjTj (ε+ (1− ε)e−λiTi) = 0. (F4)
First, note that e−λjTmin = max{e−λjTi , e−λjTj} and e−λiTmin = max{e−λiTi , e−λiTj}. Thus, we
can rewrite (F 3) and (F 4) as
−c(1− p) + εpx(λipi − c) + (1− ε)px(λipiy − cmax{y, xµi}) = 0,
−c(1− p) + εpy(λjpi − c) + (1− ε)py(λjpix− cmax{x, yµj}) = 0,
where x = e−λiTi , y = e−λjTj , µi =
λj
λi
, µj = λiλj and x, y ∈ [0, 1]. Now two possible cases
have to be distinguished:
(i) y > xµi which implies e−λjTj > e−λjTi and hence Ti > Tj : Then we can solve (F 3)
for x given by
x =
c(1− p)
p(λipi − c)
1
ε+ (1− ε)y , (C.6)
which is monotonically decreasing in y for y ∈ [0, 1]. Solving (F 4) for x yields
x =
c(1− p)
(1− ε)pλjpi
1
y
− ε(λjpi − c)
(1− ε)piλj +
c
piλj
yµj , (C.7)
which is convex and has one global minimum (possibly on [0, 1]) for y ∈ [0, 1]. The system
of equations (C.6) and (C.7) has at most two solutions. At y = 0, (C.6) is smaller than (C.7).
A necessary and sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness is that (C.6)>(C.7) at
y = 1, that is,
c(1− p)
p(λipi − c) >
c(1− p)
(1− ε)pλjpi −
ε(λjpi − c)
(1− ε)piλj +
c
piλj
.
This is equivalent to
ε >
c
λjpi
pi(λi − λj) + λjppi − c
λippi − c = ε.
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A necessary and sufficient condition for the system of equations (C.6) and (C.7) to have
two solutions is that there exists Ti such that
1− p
p
(
c
λjpi − c
1
ε+ (1− ε)e−λiTi −
c
λipi(1− ε)e−λiTi
)
+
ε
1− ε
(
1− c
λipi
)
− c
λipi
e−λjTi ≥ 0.
(ii) y < xµi , which implies Tj > Ti. By similar arguments as for (i) a necessary and
sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness is
ε <
c
λipi
λippi − c− pi(λi − λj)
λjppi − c = ε.
Similarly as for Ti > Tj a necessary and sufficient condition for the system of equations
(C.6) and (C.7) to have two solutions is that there exists Tj such that
1− p
p
(
c
λipi − c
1
ε+ (1− ε)e−λjTj −
c
λjpi(1− ε)e−λjTj
)
+
ε
1− ε
(
1− c
λjpi
)
− c
λjpi
e−λiTj ≥ 0.
Part 2: We again use the implicit function theorem to derive ∂Ti/∂ε and ∂Tj/∂ε. In part 1
we derived conditions for existence and uniqueness. Further, both equations are contin-
uously differentiable. The derivatives of (F3) and (F4) for Tj > Ti w.r.t. Ti and Tj are
∂F 3
∂Ti
= −λ2i ppie−λiTi
(
ε+ (1− ε)e−λjTj)+ cpe−λiTi(λiε+ (1− ε)Λe−λjTi),
∂F 3
∂Tj
= −pλjλi(1− ε)pie−λiTi−λjTj < 0,
∂F 4
∂Ti
= −pλi(1− ε)e−λiTi−λjTj (λjpi − c) < 0, and
∂F 4
∂Tj
= −pλje−λjTj (λjpi − c)
(
ε+ (1− ε)e−λiTi) < 0.
The determinant of the Jacobian |J | is given by F 3TiF 4Tj − F 3TjF 4Ti , and equals
p2λj(λjpi− c)e−λiTi−λjTj
 ε2((λ2ipi − λic+ Λce−λjTi)(1− e−λiTi)− λ2ipie−λjTj)− Λce−ΛTi
+ε(e−λiTiλi(λipi − c) + λ2ipie−λjTj − (1− e−λiTi)Λce−λjTi)
 .
Further, the derivatives w.r.t. ε are
F 3ε = pe
−λiTi (λipi(1− e−λjTj)− c(1− e−λjTi)) > 0, and
F 4ε = pe
−λjTj(piλj − c)(1− e−λiTi) > 0.
Consequently,
∂Tj
∂ε
= − 1
F 3TiF
4
Tj
− F 3TjF 4Ti
(−F 4TiF 3ε + F 3TiF 4ε ) ,
and
∂Ti
∂ε
= − 1
F 3TiF
4
Tj
− F 3TjF 4Ti
(
F 4TjF
3
ε − F 3TjF 4ε
)
,
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where −F 4TiF 3ε + F 3TiF 4ε equals
p2e−λjTj−λiTi(λjpi − c)
 c(λiε− λie−λiTi + (1− ε)e−λjTi(Λ− λje−λiTi))+
λ2ipi((1− ε)(e−λiTi − e−λjTj)− ε(1− e−λiTi))

and F 4TjF
3
ε − F 3TjF 4ε is given by
p2e−λjTj−λiTiλj(λjpi − c)
 c(1− e−λjTi)(ε+ (1− ε)e−λiTi)+
λipi
(
e−λjTj − ε− e−λiTi(1− ε))
 .
Thus,
∂Ti
∂ε
= − c(1− e
−λjTi)(ε+ (1− ε)e−λiTi) + λipi
(
e−λjTj − ε− e−λiTi(1− ε))
λ2ipiε(1− ε)e−λjTj + (ε+ (1− ε)e−λiTi)(λiε(λipi − c)− Λc(1− ε)e−λjTi)
,
∂Tj
∂ε
= − 1
λj
λi(ε− e−λiTi)(c− λipi) + (1− ε)(e−λjTiΛc− λ2ipie−λjTj − cλje−ΛTi)
λ2ipiε(1− ε)e−λjTj + (ε+ (1− ε)e−λiTi)(λiε(λipi − c)− Λc(1− ε)e−λjTi)
.
To analyze these expressions we start by considering the denominator, a quadratic func-
tion in ε of the shape b0 + b1ε+ b2ε2, where b0 = −ce−ΛTiΛ < 0, b1 = λ2ipi(e−λiTi + e−λjTj)−
c(Λe−λjTi(1 − 2e−λiTi) + e−λiTiλi) and b2 = λ2ipi(1 − e−λiTi − e−λjTj) − c((1 − e−λiTi)λi −
Λe−λjTi(1− e−λiTi)). At ε = 1, b0 + b1 + b2 = λi(λipi − c) > 0. This implies that on ε ∈ [0, 1]
there is exactly one root. Let ε˜ denote this root. The function 1/(b0 + b1ε+ b2ε2) is negative
for ε < ε˜ and goes to −∞ as ε→ ε˜−, it is positive for ε > ε˜ and goes to∞ as ε→ ε˜+. Now
consider the nominator of ∂Ti/∂ε, which is linear in ε and of the shape a0 + a1ε, where
a0 = λipi(e
−λjTj − e−λiTi) + ce−λiTi(1− e−λjTi) and a1 = (1− e−λiTi)(c(1− e−λjTi)− λipi) < 0.
∂Ti/∂ε = 0 at ε = ε̂i = −a0/a1 < 1. Multiplying (a0 + a1ε) by 1/(b0 + b1ε + b2ε2) gives
us the sign of the derivative. A similar analysis can be used to the determine the sign of
∂Tj/∂ε, as well as the signs of the derivatives for Tj < Ti. 
Proof of Proposition 3.5.
For Tj > Ti, the expected payoffs are given by
Uj = −(1− p)cTj + p(λjpi − c)
(
εi
1− e−λjTi
λj
+ (1− εi)1− e
−ΛTi
Λ
)
+p(λjpi − c)(εi + (1− εi)e−λiTi)e
−λjTi − e−λjTj
λj
and
Ui = −(1−p)cTi+p(λipi−c)
(
εj
1− e−λiTi
λi
+ (1− εj)1− e
−ΛTi
Λ
)
+ppie−λiTi(e−λjTi−e−λjTj).
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Hence,
∂Ui
∂Tj
= ppiλj(1− εj)e−λiTi−λjTj > 0,
and
∂Uj
∂Ti
= p(1− εi)λi
λj
e−λiTi
(
(λjpi − c)e−λjTj + ce−λjTi
)
> 0.
Similarly, ∂Ui/∂Tj > 0 and ∂Uj/∂Ti > 0 for Ti > Tj. 
Proof of Proposition 3.6.
Taking the derivative of Ω in (3.22) w.r.t. ε yields (for Ti < Tj)
∂Tj
∂ε
(
e−λiTi−λjTjpψλj − pc(ε+ (1− ε)e−λiTi
)
e−λjTj − (1− p)c)+
∂Ti
∂ε
(
e−λiTi−λjTjpψλj − pc
(
ε+ (1− ε)(e−λjTi − λi
λj
(e−λjTi − e−λjTj)
)
e−λiTi − (1− p)c
)
+pc
(
21−e
−ΛTi
Λ
− 1−e−λiTi
λi
− 1−e−ΛTi−e−λjTj+e−λjTj−λiTi
λj
)
.
Adding and subtracting ppiλie−λiTi(ε+(1−ε)e−λjTj)∂Ti∂ε and ppiλje−λjTj(ε+(1−ε)e−λiTi)∂Tj∂ε ,
the derivative can be rewritten as
∂Ω
∂ε
=
∂Tj
∂ε
λje
−λjTj(ψe−λiTi − piε+ (1− ε)e−λiTi) +
∂Ti
∂ε
λie
−λiTi
(
ψe−λjTj − pi(ε+ (1− ε)e−λjTj) + c(1− ε)(e
−λjTi − e−λjTj)
λj
)
+
c
(
2
1− e−ΛTi
Λ
− 1− e
−λiTi
λi
− 1− e
−ΛTi − e−λjTj + e−λjTj−λiTi
λj
)
.
The last term is negative and represents the increase in costs associated with an increase
in ε. Now ∂Ω/∂Tj > 0 if
ψe−λiTi > pi(ε+ (1− ε)e−λiTi).
Furthermore, welfare is increasing in Ti, if
ψe−λjTj − pi(ε+ (1− ε)e−λjTj) + c(1− ε)(e
−λjTi − e−λjTj)
λj
> 0.
For Ti > Tj , the derivative changes to
∂Ω
∂ε
=
∂Tj
∂ε
λje
−λjTj
(
ψe−λiTi − pi (ε+ (1− ε)e−λiTi)− c(1− ε)(e−λiTj − e−λiTi)
λi
)
+
∂Ti
∂ε
λie
−λiTi (ψe−λjTj − pi(ε+ (1− ε)e−λjTj))+
c
(
2
1− e−ΛTi
Λ
− 1− e
−λiTi
λi
− 1− e
−ΛTi − e−λjTj + e−λjTj−λiTi
λj
)
.
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Proof of Lemma 3.4.
The expected costs of R&D do not change compared to the previous sections, while the
expected benefit for firm n is given by
(pinλn + ωnλ−n)
(
1−e−ΛTmin
Λ
)
+ e−λ−nT−n e
−λnTmin−e−λnTn
λn
pinλn
+ωne
−λnTmin(e−λ−nTmin − e−λ−nT−n),
where pin = pi1τ + v1n and ωn = ω1τ + v2n. Hence the first order conditions are given by
−(1− p)c+ pωiλie−λjTj−λiTi + p(λi(pii − ωi)− c)e−λiTi−λjTmin = 0, (C.8)
and
−(1− p)c+ pωjλje−λiTi−λjTj + p(λj(pij − ωj)− c)e−λjTj−λiTmin = 0. (C.9)
This implies
e−λiTi−λjTj
(
λiω1 + λiv
2
i − λjω1 − λjv2j
)
= e−λjTj−λiTmin(λj(pij − ωj)− c)−
e−λiTi−λjTmin(λi(pii − ωi)− c).
For λi > λj the l.h.s. is always positive no matter whether both firms invest, only the
inventor invests, only the imitator invests or none of the firm invests. Thus,
e−λjTj−λiTmin(λj(pij − ωj)− c) > e−λiTi−λjTmin(λi(pii − ωi)− c),
which implies that
−λjTj − λiTmin + λiTi + λjTmin > ln
(
λi(pii − ωi)− c
λj(pij − ωj)− c
)
(C.10)
The r.h.s. of (C.10) is always greater or equal to 1, which implies Tmin = Tj. 
Proof of Corollary 3.1.
From Lemma 3.2 and 3.4 we know that in a winner-takes-all competition λiTi+λjTj equals
− ln
(
1− p
p
)
− ln
(
c
λipii − c
)
,
which is increasing in pii. For perfect positive spillovers λiTi + λjTj equals
− ln
(
1− p
p
)
− ln
(
c
λjpij − c
)
,
which is as well increasing in pij.  ——————————
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